

“ASISOZE SIVUME” (We Will Not Yield):

An Analysis of the Political Selection Institutions in Zimbabwe

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I. Introduction

Robert Mugabe has been in power since Zimbabwe achieved independence in 1980. His 33-year reign is set to continue for at least another five years, after he ‘won’ the 2013 elections by a landslide. Under the current constitution, he can stay in power for another ten years, at which point he will be 99 years old. The only serious threat to his leadership over the past three decades occurred in 2008, when he lost the presidential election. Despite the 2008 defeat, Mugabe remained in power, which proved that the electoral process does not affect the selection of the leader in Zimbabwe. In reality, Mugabe consolidated his power through the use of oppression, unchecked executive authority and control of the public purse. In this paper, I will use selectorate theory, developed by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al¹ to examine the political selection institutions in Zimbabwe and explain the survival of the Mugabe regime. After briefly summarizing selectorate theory, I will set out an historical context of how Mugabe rose to power, before outlining the current political system in Zimbabwe and identifying those who compose the selectorate and

the winning coalition. With this information, I will use selectorate theory to analyze Zimbabwe’s international relationships, the policy of land reform and economic growth in the country. Selectorate theory and its predictions for small winning coalition systems neatly explain electoral and policy outcomes observed in Zimbabwe.

Brief Summary of Selectorate Theory

Selectorate theory seeks to describe the factors that explain the selection and retention of political leaders. Two key political institutions that affect this; the selectorate (S) and the winning coalition (W). The selectorate is the body of people within a state, who have a political voice and can participate in selecting a leader. The winning coalition is a subset of the selectorate, whose support is vital for a leader to gain power and retain it. In democracies, both the selectorate and the winning coalitions are generally large (in comparison to population size and demographic). Comparatively, autocracies will have smaller winning coalitions, but the size of the selectorate can be small or large. The size of these institutions will affect the distribution of resources. The basic model of the theory assumes that leaders have sole control over distribution of resources. These can become either private goods

¹ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., *The Logic of Political Survival* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2003).

or public goods. In states with a large winning coalition (democracies), the distribution favors public goods, whereas in small W states (autocracies) the leader will focus on private goods. This is because a large W leader will need to keep more people happy in order to retain power and will favour public goods as an efficient mechanism to retain support. Conversely, an autocrat uses private goods to buy support from key personnel. Furthermore, when little is spent on public goods, the prospect of being removed from the winning coalition becomes more costly. The leader is therefore able to buy and retain loyalty, by directing resources into private goods, rather than public goods. The selectorate theory is more complex than the rudimentary version set out here, but with these building blocks, it is possible to investigate the political selection institutions in Zimbabwe.

Historical Context

Zimbabwe gained independence from colonial rule on December 21, 1979, with the signing of the Lancaster House Agreement. This followed more than ten years of significant civil war led by two militant political parties; Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) headed by Joshua Nkomo, and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) commanded by Robert Mugabe. Mugabe's ZANU party represented the Shona people, who made up over 80% of the population, whereas Nkomo's ZAPU represented the Ndebele people, who accounted for less than 15% of the country.

Subsequent to independence, elections took place in early 1980, which saw Mugabe elected as Prime Minister with a landslide vote. However, in Matabeleland there was an uprising by the Ndebele people, as they considered themselves to have received unfair representation in the political process. Mugabe responded with systematic and brutal repression in the region, over a number of years and more than 20,000 civilians are estimated to have been killed. The conflict ended in 1987 when Mugabe and Nkomo signed a peace accord, which merged the two parties to create what is now the current ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). Despite this appearing as a move towards a more politically representative system, Mugabe used it as an opportunity to create the new position of President for himself, allowing him to circumvent checks of power in the Lancaster House constitution. While he had risen to power on the back of popular support from the Shona people, he quickly entrenched this power and reduced his need for popular support. As head of the army, and with control over the distribution of public finances, he ensured that no political opposition could arise in Zimbabwe. Bueno de Mesquita et al describe this as the 'incumbency advantage'.² Over time, a leader is able to determine affinities, and the longer they stay in power, the more efficient they can be with resources. This effectively increases

² Bueno de Mesquita et al., *Logic of Political Survival*, 63.

their resource pool with which to maintain power. By heavily oppressing any opposition during the initial few years of his regime, Mugabe was able to limit any challenge to his power.

By the late 1990's there was significant internal and external pressure on Mugabe to allow funding for opposition parties.³ In 1997, he made amendments to the law to allow this, which resulted in the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) with Morgan Tsvangirai as its leader. This action seemingly went against Mugabe's mandate to maintain power, but selectorate theory again provides reasoning. Bueno de Mesquita et al state, "the ability of small-coalition leaders to survive in office is further enhanced by a large selectorate".⁴ With no opposition parties, the influence of the selectorate was clearly marginal, and




Fig. 1: The Zimbabwe Polity IV score for the period 1970 – 2012. The two lines represent independence (1980) and the power sharing agreement (2009)

(source: Polity IV Annual Time-Series

³ Monty Marshall and Ted Gurr. *Polity IV Country Report 2010: Zimbabwe* (Vienna, VA: Center for Systemic Peace, 2010), 2.

⁴ Bueno de Mesquita et al., *Logic of Political Survival*, 292.

1800-2012)

as such, the public did not consider themselves to have a political voice. With the addition of opposition parties, not only did Mugabe effectively increase the size of the selectorate, but he also made a symbolic move towards democracy (as can be seen in Fig. 1), which opened up opportunity for international cooperation. The MDC performed well during the elections in 2000, winning 57 out of 120 seats in the parliament, despite an intense intimidation campaign.⁵ This seemed to take Mugabe by surprise, and each subsequent election has appeared to be tightly controlled. International observers have found elections in Zimbabwe to be neither free nor fair, and accusations of vote rigging and violence have been widespread following elections.

As stated above, the only real threat to Mugabe's power came in the 2008 elections. Two weeks after the election took place, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) released figures showing that Morgan Tsvangirai had won over 49% of the votes, while Mugabe had only won 43%.⁶ However, as no candidate had won the necessary majority of 50% or more, a run-off election was called. In the run up to these elections, Mugabe stated that a vote for the MDC would be "a wasted vote" as "there is no way we can allow them to rule this country... It will never, ever happen.

⁵ Marshall and Gurr. *Polity*, 3.

⁶ It is likely that Tsvangirai had won a majority, but this is impossible to prove.

Asisoze sivume [we will not yield].”^{7, 8} A campaign of extreme violence and intimidation from ZANU-PF followed the results of the first round, “in which thousands of people lost property, were beaten, or were displaced, and in which more than 300 people died.”⁹ Due to this, Tsvangirai withdrew from the elections, declaring them illegitimate. Consequently, Mugabe won with a vote of 85%.¹⁰ However, due to international pressure Mugabe conceded to a power sharing agreement. Unfortunately, it appears that whilst the MDC gained some semblance of power in 2008, they were never actually part of the winning coalition. This became evident by Mugabe’s ability to block any real change during the power-sharing government and the ease with which he was able to ‘win’ the 2013 election. The 2008 elections proved that winning an election is not a sufficient condition to gain power in Zimbabwe.

II. Political Selection Institutions Zimbabwe Political System and the Selectorate

Since 1987 Zimbabwe has been a presidential republic. Under the amended Lancaster house constitution, all executive and legislative power

effectively resides in the office of the president.¹¹ Despite the concentration of power under the presidency, there is a bicameral legislature, composed of a Parliament (National Assembly) and a Senate. The National Assembly has 210 directly elected seats, whereas the Senate has 93 seats; 60 of which are directly elected, the remaining 33 being presidential appointments. Elections for the presidency, the legislature and local government were harmonized in 2008, and are supposed to take place every five years.

Interestingly, a new constitution was signed into law in May 2013. The constitution served as the culmination of the power-sharing government, which temporarily placed checks on the previously unrestricted power of the president and gave all opposition parties access rights to state media.¹² This constitution signaled a move towards a more democratic electoral process in Zimbabwe. However, the elections of 2013 were fraught with violations of the newly approved constitution. From the announcement and date of the elections, to the Zimbabwean High court ruling that ZEC “were not obligated to provide the MDC-T with the final voting patterns,”¹³ the whole election process showed a completed disregard for the laws of the new constitution. Moreover, since Mugabe currently possesses sole power as president and holds a majority

⁷ Translation from Shona.

⁸ Lebo Nkatanzo, “Mugabe will not concede defeat,” *New Zimbabwe*, published Dec 11, 2009, accessed Dec 5, 2013, <http://www.newzimbabwe.com/pages/electoral179.17935.html>.

⁹ Solidarity Peace Trust. *The End of the Road* (Johannesburg, SA: Solidarity Peace Trust, 2013), 29.

¹⁰ Marshall and Gurr, *Polity*, 2.

¹¹ Justice Mavedzenge. *Thematic Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Proposed Draft Constitution* (FreedomHouse, 2013), 3.

¹² *Ibid*, 4.

¹³ Solidarity Peace Trust, *End of the Road*, 55.

of the parliament (from the 2013 elections), it is unlikely that the new constitution will provide any real checks on his power. I therefore will not treat this development as meaningful.

There is universal suffrage in Zimbabwe; all resident citizens over the age of 18 are allowed to vote in elections. Based on the 2012 census, Zimbabwe has a population of 12.9 million,¹⁴ with 6.6 million (51%) of voting age,¹⁵ A sizeable group that is disqualified from voting is the diaspora, which constitutes between two and four million people,¹⁶ Additionally, registration on a voter roll is necessary to participate in elections. The voter roll for the 2013 election remains unavailable (a further breach of the 2013 constitution), however the number of voters in the 2013 election was reported to be 3.5 million.¹⁷

The Winning Coalition

The winning coalition is the group of people, from within the selectorate, whose support the leader

must maintain to stay in power. Zimbabwe represents a rigged electoral system and, as such, Mugabe needs to maintain the support of a very small section of the selectorate to stay in power. This winning coalition is composed of two key groups, the ZEC and Supreme Court, and the defense forces.

The ZEC has sole responsibility for the management of elections. It is composed of 8 commissioners who are appointed by the president. The current chair is Rita Makarau, who previously served as an MP for ZANU-PF¹⁸ and was a professor in the Faculty of Law of the University of Zimbabwe¹⁹ whose chancellor is Mugabe. It is the ZEC's responsibility to declare the winner of an election. Therefore, by controlling the ZEC, Mugabe effectively controls the final election results. ZEC rulings can only be queried through the High Court. The Supreme Court can overturn any High Court ruling and Mugabe appoints positions in both the High Court and the Supreme Court.²⁰ The most senior

¹⁴ ZimSTAT. Census 2012: Preliminary Report (Harare, Zimbabwe: ZimStat, 2012).

¹⁵ CIA. *The World Factbook* (Washington: CIA, 2013) accessed on Dec 15, 2013 [/library/publications/the-world-factbook](http://library/publications/the-world-factbook) .

¹⁶ IRIN, "Diaspora can also discuss new constitution," *IRIN News*, Aug 17, 2010, accessed on Dec 15, 2013, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/90198/zimbabwe-diaspora-can-also-discuss-new-constitution>

¹⁷ Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa, "Zimbabwe 2013: Presidential Election Results," *EISA*, published Aug 2013, accessed Dec 14, 2013, <http://eisa.org.za/WEP/zim2013results.htm>.

¹⁸ Frank Chikowore, "Tough road ahead for Zimbabwe Electoral Commission's new head," *The African Report*, published Apr 23, 2013, accessed Dec 15, 2013, <http://www.theafricareport.com/Politicians/tough-road-ahead-for-zimbabwe-electoral-commissions-new-head.html>.

¹⁹ Alex Magaisa. "My teacher, the judge president," *New Zimbabwe*, published on Dec 11, 2009, accessed on Dec 14, 2013 <http://www.newzimbabwe.com/pages/judges12.15832.html>.

²⁰ Bart Simbisai, "Mugabe judges appointments stink," *The Independent*, published on Jul 19, 2013, accessed on Dec 15, 2013,

judge in Zimbabwe, Godfrey Chidyausiku, was an MP for ZANU-PF from independence until 2001, when he received the appointment of Chief Justice.²¹ By controlling all legal channels within the country Mugabe can ensure the ‘legality’ of his rule remains intact.

In addition to these institutions, Mugabe needs to maintain support from those who, as Weber²² would say, are in charge of carrying out the legitimate use of force in the state. These groups are the Zimbabwean Defense Forces, the Zimbabwe Republic Police and the War Veterans. Mugabe’s official title, which must always be used when referring to him in state media, is ‘Head of State and Government and Commander in Chief of the Zimbabwean Defense Forces’. Mugabe came to power at the head of a revolutionary army and remains its leader. He grants many privileges to the defense forces and maintains the support of the key leaders through strategic appointments and private goods provisions. These groups are estimated to have around 50 thousand members²³, but informal members supplement this. Of these, only the “senior members... are well looked

<http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2013/07/19/mugabe-judges-appointments-stink>.

²¹ BBC, “New Top Judge in Zimbabwe,” *BBC*, published on Mar 13, 2001, accessed on Dec 15, 2013, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1218621.stm>.

²² Max Weber. *Politics as a Vocation* (Fortress Press, 1919).

²³ International Institute for Strategic Studies. *The Military Balance 2013* (Abingdon: Routledge Journals, 2013).

after and regularly [divert] scare army resources for private use.”²⁴ There have been reports of mass desertion in the military and new recruits are subjected to extreme brutality.”²⁵ This would suggest only a very small proportion of the defense forces are part of the winning coalition.

The War Veterans organization, supposedly composed of those who fought in the 1970 civil war against the colonial government, allegedly contains 30 to 50 thousand members,²⁶ who are complimented by ZANU-PF youth brigades. The organization is mobilized to undertake campaigns of threats and violence before elections to ensure that people are ‘persuaded’ to vote for ZANU-PF. This group is a crucial part of Mugabe’s winning coalition. They represent the group that fought for Mugabe in the wars to gain independence and as such, they retain a strong ideological connection and an extremely strong affinity for Mugabe.

²⁴ ZimDiaspora, “Zimbabwe National Army recruitment drive of rural teenagers is of great concern,” *ZimDiaspora*, published on Feb 25, 2009, accessed on Dec 15, 2013, http://www.zimdiaspora.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=756:zimbabwe-national-army-recruitment-drive-of-rural-teenagersis-of-great-concerns&catid=38:travel-tips&Itemid=274.

²⁵ France24, “Raw video of brutal Harare police training,” *France24*, published Jun 6, 2009, accessed Dec 14, 2013, <http://observers.france24.com/content/20090608-raw-video-brutal-harare-police-training-initiation-pay-day-mugabe>.

²⁶ Reuters, “Zimbabwe's war veterans, Mugabe's shock troops,” *Reuters*, published Apr 4, 2008, accessed Dec 13, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/04/04/id_USL04186450.

Whilst not all of the members are necessarily part of the winning coalition (some, especially the youth, are ‘muscle for hire’ during election campaigns and do not receive continual benefits), this group represents a significant part of the coalition.

In addition to these two vital groups, Mugabe also holds a tight grip on nearly all government institutions, state media, and mining groups. Taking these into consideration, I would propose that the winning coalition is made up of around 25-50 thousand members (perhaps a generous estimation). This would mean that the winning coalition represents 0.38-0.75% of the selectorate and 0.2-0.4% of the population, making Zimbabwe a small winning coalition, large selectorate system.

States where rigged elections occur typically have a small winning coalition, a large selectorate and thus, an autocratic leader. Zimbabwe is an exemplary case of this. Small coalition systems will focus resources on private goods, rather than public goods, as these are used to ‘buy’ support from the leaders winning coalition. By maintaining a large selectorate and using rigged elections to ensure only a small coalition is necessary, Mugabe has ensured there is a strong loyalty norm (W/S). Since the rewards of being in the winning coalition are great and the potential for replacement is high, it is tremendously difficult to convince members of the winning coalition to defect. This is very advantageous for a leader, as it ensures the cost of maintaining his winning coalition

remains low, allowing him to keep more for resources for himself.

III. Implications

Land Reform

The implementation of land reform is one of the key issues in Zimbabwean politics and has been one of the most divisive policies of Mugabe’s regime. It began at independence, with the adoption of the ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ policy. From 1980-2000 redistribution occurred but was limited. The Zimbabwe government struggled to obtain funds to purchase land and white farmers were reluctant to sell. In 2000 the government ‘fast tracked’ the process, when they “revised the constitution and amended legislation in order to allow it to acquire commercial farms without offering compensation.”²⁷ Many claiming to be war veterans or ZANU-PF militia mobilized, and numerous land invasions occurred. Through violence and intimidation, many farms were taken from white owners without compensation. Scoones et al estimate that in 1980 there were roughly 6,000 farmers “nearly all of them white,”²⁸ but that by 2010, only 200 – 300 white owned farms remained. The process of redistribution, managed by the police and the army, awarded the ‘reclaimed’

²⁷ BBC, “I have a right,” *BBC*, 2002, accessed on Dec 13, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/people/features/ihavearightto/four_b/casestudy_art17.shtm.

²⁸ Scoones et al., *Zimbabwe's land reform: myths & realities* (Oxford: James Currey, 2010), 3.

farmland to key leaders and supporters of ZANU-PF.²⁹

Selectorate theory would suggest that Mugabe adopted the ‘fast track’ policy of land reform to increase the pool of resources available to distribute to his winning coalition. As the actual invasion and ‘retaking’ of the land was not a process expressly run by the government, the cost of carrying it out was low to Mugabe. This land represents a useful resource for the Zimbabwean leader, as the people who received it “have little security of tenure on the land.”³⁰ The possibility of it having the land repossessed ensures that those who received it continue to remain loyal to Mugabe. Further, land reform removed a powerful and wealthy opposition group, the white farmers, from Zimbabwe. This group represented, perhaps, the greatest challenge to Mugabe’s regime and had important international ties. By removing them, Mugabe was able to reduce international influence in Zimbabwe and threats to his power.

Economic Growth

²⁹ Human Rights Watch. *Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2002), 2.

³⁰ *Ibid*, 2.




Fig. 2: Zimbabwe GDP from 1990-2012. (source: World Bank)

Whilst the ‘fast track’ land reform strengthened Mugabe’s regime, it also catalyzed an economic crisis in Zimbabwe. The elimination of many large farms led to the collapse of agricultural production, and agricultural output capacity fell by 45%. This caused unemployment to rise sharply, reaching 80% by 2005³¹ and led to a significant reduction in GDP (as can be seen in Fig. 2). The ‘fast track’ land reform broke Article 17 of the UN universal declaration of human rights; added to the violence committed during the land invasions, this reform caused significant international backlash. Zimbabwe was cut off from all loan programs, and the UK and US imposed targeted sanctions against key individuals. The crisis continued to worsen and the Zimbabwean central bank excessively printed money in an attempt to pay its liabilities. This led to hyperinflation of the Zimbabwean currency, culminating in late 2008 with

³¹ CIA, *World Fact Book*, 2013.

rates rising to 90 sextillion percent (90e+21 %).

The basic model of selectorate theory would suggest that such an economic crisis would impede Mugabe’s ability to provide sufficient private goods, as it would reduce the overall pool of resources. This should therefore create an opportunity for a challenger to arise, as the leader may be unable to maintain the support of his winning coalition. However, since the reduction in agricultural production, Zimbabwe has become increasingly dependent on natural resources and mining now accounts for a third of the country’s export earnings.³² Natural resources are ‘labor free’ resources. As such, Mugabe is not dependant on economic growth and tax revenues. The rents from natural resources have allowed him to retain the support of his

³² Janet Shoko, “Zimbabwe mineral exports hit \$1.86bn,” *The African Report*, published Jan 24, 2013, accessed on Dec 13, 2013, <http://www.theafricareport.com/Southern-Africa/zimbabwe-mineral-exports-hit-186bn.html>.

winning coalition without having to pursue any vaguely sensible economic policies. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, in an expansion of their model, showed that leaders with access to these 'labor free' natural resources are well equipped to stay in power, despite economic crisis.³³

International foreign policy towards Zimbabwe

In addition to natural resources rents, China has given Mugabe access to a large pool of resources, such as loans and foreign aid. Selectorate theory suggests that small coalition leaders do not rely on public support to remain in power. Thus, they are able to provide unpopular policy concessions in return for aid since they are not concerned about public backlash. Mugabe has made numerous deals with China, allowing them access to significant amounts of the country's natural resources³⁴ and has received vast amounts of financial resources with which to maintain the support of his 'cronies'. Research by Alesina and Dollar suggests that foreign aid flows are "dictated by political and strategic

considerations."³⁵ In the case of Zimbabwe and China, there is a strong political connection between the two countries, which stand in opposition to western democracies. As Hitchin's notes, Mugabe's initial rise to power was not only reflective of the tribal divisions in Zimbabwe; it represented a "Russo-Chinese" split in regards to communism.³⁶ Nkomo received support from Russia, whereas Mugabe "was backed by Beijing."³⁷ Thus, Mugabe and China often share policy aims, so the continuation of his regime is useful for the Chinese. China's affinity for Mugabe and the resources they have given him access to have certainly been an influential factor in the survival of his regime.

Conversely, a number of western countries have imposed sanctions against the Mugabe regime and have reduced the loans and aid available to him. Again, selectorate theory provides an insight into this western policy. Large coalition systems, such as the US and UK, should only incur the cost of sanctions in order to achieve policy concessions in the target state that benefit them. McGillivray and Smith argue that in certain contexts, such as US sanctions of Saddam

³³ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, "A Political Economy of Aid," *International Organization* 63-2 (2009): 309-340.

³⁴ Nelson, F. "Zimbabwe is booming – but its future lies in Chinese hands," *The Telegraph*, published Aug 1, 2013, accessed Dec 13, 2013, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zimbabwe/10216403/Zimbabwe-is-booming-but-its-future-lies-in-Chinese-hands.html>.

³⁵ Alesina, A & Dollar, D. "Who gives foreign aid to whom and why?" *Journal of Economic Growth*, 5-1 (2000): 33-63, 33.

³⁶ Chris Hitchins, "Why has South Africa tolerated Robert Mugabe's years of lawless misrule?" *Slate*, published Apr 21, 2008, accessed on Dec 14, 2013, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/fighting_words/2008/04/mandela_envy.html

³⁷ Ibid.

Hussein, “the concession sought can be thought of as regime change.”³⁸ These sanctions are supposed to reduce a leaders’ ability to access resources with which to maintain the support of their coalition. However, the effectiveness of these sanctions has been reduced by Mugabe’s access to rents from natural resources and Chinese finance, but this does not mean they are not useful. In a meeting with US and European ambassadors, Tsvangirai praised the sanctions, suggesting that they were influential in bringing around the power sharing agreement of 2008. McGillivray and Smith posit, “leader turnover in small coalition targets often results in the end of sanctions.”³⁹ Thus, selectorate theory predicts that these sanctions will end with Mugabe’s regime, which is an extremely likely situation.

IV. Conclusion

In conclusion, selectorate theory can provide an explanation for numerous policy decisions that have been observed in Zimbabwe, both domestic and international. Due to the country having a small winning coalition and large selectorate, there is a strong loyalty norm, allowing Mugabe to maintain easily the support necessary to stay in power. Selectorate theory suggests that Mugabe is incentivized to

pursue bad policy,⁴⁰ as evidenced by the disastrous effects on the economy wrought by his land reform and money printing policies. Furthermore, through the use of natural resource rents and readily available finance from China, Mugabe has been able to overcome western sanctions and keep himself and his winning coalition ‘well off’. He was even able to turn the sanctions to his advantage, using Tsvangirai’s support for them as propaganda to attack the MDC in his most recent election campaign.

The longevity of Mugabe’s regime is explained by selectorate theory’s analysis of small winning coalition systems. Until the power of the president is checked, there is nothing to stop a leader maintaining a strong autocratic position in Zimbabwe. The succession of party leadership, when Mugabe departs, represents a crucial juncture for Zimbabwean politics, as it will create an opportunity for opposition to reduce ZANU-PF’s grip on power. Claims exist that in 1934, religious leader Shonhiwa Masedza prophesied that Mugabe would rule Zimbabwe until his death.⁴¹ Based on the analysis of this paper, there is nothing to suggest that this will not become a reality.

³⁸ McGillivray, F. and Smith, A. *Punishing the prince: a theory of interstate relations, political institutions, and leader change* (Princeton: University Press, 2008), 184.

³⁹ *Ibid*, 187.

⁴⁰ Bueno de Mesquita et al., *Logic of Political Survival*, 19.

⁴¹ Kushure, W. “Mugabe win ‘prophecy’ not prophetic,” *Nehanda Radio*, published May 1, 2013, accessed Dec 13, 2013, <http://nehandaradio.com/2013/05/01/mugabe-win-prophecy-not-prophetic/>.

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