

POWER SHIFTS IN THE CITY OF MILAN:

An Analysis Using Selectorate Theory

Elia Francesco Nigris

Introduction

In this paper, I will be using Selectorate Theory to carry out a comparative analysis of the 1990, 1993, 2006, 2011 municipal elections in the city of Milan.¹ I have selected these four electoral cycles for specific reasons. In 1990, local elections in Italy were held with a purely proportional system, in which the mayor was not directly elected by the population; the 1993 municipal elections were the first ones in which Italians voted with a new electoral law (Legge n. 81, 1993), allowing them to directly elect a person to the office of mayor (specifics of the electoral mechanisms will be described later) and the first one in which a right wing candidate became mayor of Milan since Italy became a Republic in 1946. I also deem interesting to compare results from the 2006 and 2011 elections, the two most recent elections, in which Ms. Moratti, Milan's mayor from 2006 to 2011, was able to win a first term in 2006, but could not win re-election in 2011, with the ones that took place in 1990 and 1993. The scope of this analysis will be to

try to understand, within the settings of the Selectorate Theory model, how a change in the electoral law in 1993 might have contributed to a lasting shift in political power in the city of Milan, through the use of official electoral data, while the political shift of 2011 was simply caused by Ms. Moratti's inability to keep her Winning Coalition intact. I also intend to show that a change in the mechanisms that determine how leaders are elected in democratic settings may have an effect on important parameters within Selectorate Theory, such as the Loyalty Norm (more on what it is and this means will be detailed later in this paper) and voters' turnout, which in turn may impact electoral results.

The City of Milan

On May 29th 2011, Giuliano Pisapia, an independent supported by a center-left coalition was elected mayor of the city of Milan, the business capital of Italy and the capital of the Region of Lombardy. Milan is also the capital city of the Province of Milan and the second largest city in Italy, with a population of 1,366,409 (Comune di Milano, 2012). Its metropolitan region is the largest in the nation and the seventh largest in the

¹ Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow, *The Logic of Political Survival*, Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 2003

European Union, with a total population of 4,275,216, as of 2012 (Eurostat, 2012).

Giuliano Pisapia is a former lawyer, who had served in the Italian Chamber of Deputies for ten years, from 1996 to 2006, as an independent with the party *Communist Refoundation* (CR); the Italian Communist Party (PCI), the strongest communist party in any NATO country during the Cold War, traditionally elected some non-politicians from the “civic world” to public office, allowing them to vote independently (Valluari, 2013); CR, born from the ashes of the PCI, continued this tradition.

When Mr. Pisapia won the elections in 2011, his main opponent was Ms. Letizia Moratti, an incumbent one-term mayor, supported by a center-right coalition. She had been Minister of Education, Universities and Research in President Berlusconi’s governments from 2001 to 2006 and was formerly a businesswoman. Mr. Pisapia’s victory was somewhat unexpected and had major consequences on Italy’s national stage. Silvio Berlusconi, then President of the Italian Council, had lost the city of Milan for the first time since he decided to run for public office, in 1994: the city of Milan had always been the symbol of his political power until then. Mr. Pisapia’s victory marked the beginning of Berlusconi’s political decline: later that year, he was forced to resign from the premiership and he has just recently been voted out of the Senate and probably from Italian politics, after being convicted for tax fraud.

A Brief Contextualization

The Republic of Italy is a unitary parliamentary republic. However, the central government is not the only source of power: as defined by the Italian Constitution, Italy has different forms of local government, who have specific authority in their confines (L.cost. 18 ottobre 2001, n. 3). These autonomous entities are Municipalities, Provinces, Metropolitan Cities and Regions.

Regions are the biggest and the most powerful forms of local government. They have total authority to produce legislation in certain constitutionally defined areas, on which the central government cannot legislate. Although they have yet to become “operative”, Metropolitan Cities have been mentioned in the Constitution, since it came into effect in 1948, and their authority was later clarified by ordinary law. They are supposed to be entities with great authority on big metropolitan areas, whose power and autonomy would be greater than the ones Provinces have. However, no official Metropolitan Cities exist today and, at the moment, Regions are divided into Provinces and Provinces into Municipalities, the lowest form of local government. The city of Milan is therefore a form of local government itself and it will be the focus of this paper. From now on, I will refer to the city or municipality of Milan, simply as Milan.

Political History

As I hinted earlier, it is possible to divide Milan’s, as well as Italy’s, political history after the end of World War II, into three blocks. The first one, known as the “First Republic”, went from 1946 to 1993;

during the “First Republic” only members of the Italian Socialist Party or of the Italian Social-Democratic Party have been elected Mayor of Milan. The second one, fittingly known as the “Second Republic”, went from 1993 to 2011: in every local election that took place in the 18 years of “Second Republic” the people of Milan consistently elected conservatives as their “*sindaco*”. The third “era”, the current one, started in 2011.

As previously pointed out, since the end of the fascist dictatorship in 1945, up until 1993, the people did not directly elect Mayors in Italian cities. The resident population only voted for their representatives in the City Council with a proportional system (Legge n. 84, 1951 et Decreto del Presidente della Repubblica n. 570, 1960) and then it was up to the members of the assembly to elect the new mayor. Moreover, since Italy has historically operated a multiparty system, in which no political force was usually able to win more than 50% of the votes, the creation of a post-election coalition was often required to form majorities at any level. Hence, during the “First Republic”, the Socialist Party and the Social-democratic Party, who were strong political allies (at least locally), consistently required other allies in order to have a majority. Therefore, for the larger part of the second half of the 20th century, they had to choose to form an alliance with either the Christian Democracy, the party that had led the Italian government, almost without interruption from 1945 to 1992 or with the Italian Communist Party, which hovered consistently around 20% in Milan and was

the biggest opposition party in the rest of the country.

After 1992, however, Italy’s political scenario radically changed. With the arrest of Mario Chiesa, a member of the Italian Socialist Party and a leader of the party in Milan, on February 17, 1992, “Tangentopoli” (translatable in English as “Bribesville”) officially began.² “Tangentopoli” is the name journalists gave to the biggest corruption scandal in the history of the country. It led to a high number of arrests of elected and past public officials all over the country and the scandal literally dissolved some of the biggest parties in the country: namely the Italian Socialist Party and the Christian Democracy. Italians stopped trusting politicians and political power shifted from the old parties to newly born political formations. In Milan, for example, it went from the hands of the Socialist Party to more conservative parties. This is why, in the 1993 elections, the first ones in which Italians directly elected their mayors, Marco Formentini, a member of a new born far right, populist, anti-system and secessionist political movement, the “Northern League”, defeated his center-left opponent, Nando Dalla Chiesa; Mr. Formentini hence served a four year term as the first non-socialist mayor of Milan, since 1945, and although he had had previous ties with the Italian Socialist Party and the Christian Democracy in the 1970s (Gaspari et al., 2009), he claimed that he “ran away [from politics] because things smelled fishy.

² Biagi, Enzo. *Era Ieri*. Milan, IT: Rizzoli Editore, 2005.

There was a dust cloud set to destroy our corrupt political establishment that was about to hit us”³. In 1997, after four years as mayor, Mr. Formentini ran again, but lost badly to Gabriele Albertini, a more moderate conservative backed by Silvio Berlusconi; Mr. Albertini was able to win in a runoff against Aldo Fumagalli, who was supported by a progressive coalition. Then, before the 2001 elections, some minor changes were made to the laws that regulated the length of mayoral terms, extending a single one from four to five years (D. Lgs. n. 267; art. 51, 2000). Mr. Albertini won again in 2001, becoming the only mayor of Milan so far re-elected for a second term under the new electoral law. After his second term, he did not pursue a third term and in 2006 Ms. Letizia Moratti announced her intention to run as Mayor. She was also backed by Silvio Berlusconi and more or less by the same political coalition that had supported Mr. Albertini during his 9 years as mayor. In 2006, Ms. Moratti won against the center-left candidate Bruno Ferrante, further consolidating the power of the conservatives’ coalition in the city. Then, at the end of 2010, Giuliano Pisapia won the center-left primaries and was nominated by his coalition to be an official candidate for the 2011 mayoral elections. At the same time, Ms. Moratti announced her intention to run for a second term. Ms. Moratti was considered the frontrunner in the race and was expected to extend her party’s dominance in Milan. For

different reasons, that will be analyzed later on, Ms. Moratti lost the race, in a runoff against Mr. Pisapia, currently the Mayor of Milan and the first non-conservative Mayor of the city since 1993.

The Electoral System

I will now explain, in detail, how Mayors of Italian cities with a population larger than 15,000, such as Milan, are elected under the “Unified Text on Local Administration”, approved as law in 2000 (D. Lgs. n. 267, 2000). Before I move any further, it is worth reminding the reader that only since 1993, Italians have directly elected their mayors (Legge n. 81, 1993); in 2000, the electoral law and the regulations regarding municipalities have then been revised, although not substantially (D. Lgs. n. 267, 2000) and they have stayed the same until now.

Under current laws and regulations, any citizen of the age of 18 or older, can vote in mayoral elections in the city where he or she officially resides. The mayor is directly elected by voters and needs to be officially supported by one or more parties competing for seats in the local City Council. Voters simultaneously cast their ballot for their favorite mayoral candidate and for their City Council representatives, in the first round. If no mayoral candidate wins more than 50% of the votes in the first round, the two most voted mayoral candidates meet in a runoff, to be held exactly two weeks after the previous election. The candidate that wins the runoff is elected mayor and the party or parties that officially supported him in the first round

³ Elio Girompini, “Il cuore socialista di Marco Formentini” *Corriere della Sera*, November 29, 1993

automatically win 60% of the seats in City Council, thanks to a majority bonus that serves the purpose of giving the elected mayor a strong majority and political stability. The remaining seats are proportionally assigned to any party or coalition who is able to win at least 3% of the votes.

It is worth pointing out that under the new system, the one implemented since 1993, the elected assembly lost a lot of its power and authority. The Mayor and his administration have the authority to run the city and possess strong public legitimation to do so. Hence today, the City Council essentially acts as a controlling body and a ratifier of regulations put forward by the Mayor and his administration. Under the pre-1993 electoral law, however, the City Council was much more powerful, since it actually elected the mayor.

Furthermore, since in the previous legislation there was no majority bonus for the parties elected in City Council, whose seats were appointed under a purely proportional system, the election of any mayor was really the outcome of a closed-door, post-electoral negotiation between the major parties.

Selectorate Theory

According to Selectorate Theory, the best for way a leader to govern is to do whatever “is necessary first to come to power, then to stay in power, and to control as much national (or corporate) revenue as possible all along the way”⁴. To do so the leader

⁴ Bruce Bueno De Mesquita, and Alastair Smith.

cannot do it alone, he or she needs to count on a winning coalition (W), defined as the “the quantity of selectors whose support the leader must retain to remain in office”⁵. According to the theory, “coalition members are drawn from a broader group: the *selectorate*”⁶. Therefore, the selectorate (S) is essentially the group of people that may be part of a winning coalition and may have a say in the selection of the leader (Morrow et al, 2008). Furthermore, Selectorate Theory draws some interesting conclusions from the relationship between the size of the winning coalition and the size of the selectorate. That link (W/S) is defined as the Loyalty Norm: “the probability that a selector is included in future coalitions.”⁷

The most common situation in democratic polities, such as Milan, is that both the selectorate and the winning coalition are large. This fact, which I will show later in this paper, has interesting implications for the purpose of this research. For example, since leaders need to decide how to allocate resources and since they need to decide if they want to spend money

The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior Is Almost Always Good Politics. New York: PublicAffairs, 2011.

⁵ James D. Morrow, Bruce Bueno De Mesquita, Randolph M. Siverson And Alastair Smith (2008). *Retesting Selectorate Theory: Separating the Effects of W from Other Elements of Democracy*. *American Political Science Review*, 102, pp 393-400. doi:10.1017/S0003055408080295.

⁶ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow, *The Logic of Political Survival* Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003, 8.

⁷Ibid, 67

on public or private goods,⁸ it becomes clear that the leaders of large winning coalition polities will have a stronger incentive to spend money on public goods, rather than on private goods. For instance, in big cities in advanced industrialized and democratic countries, all citizens over 18 are usually members of the selectorate (except for minor exceptions, such as convicted felons); the selectorate is therefore fairly large, as well as the winning coalition. Hence, in democratic systems and in large winning coalition polities in general, leaders (mayors in this case) cannot really afford to pay off members of the winning coalition with private goods: it would prove too costly.⁹ The only way they can avoid the risk of defection from members of their W is by paying them off with public goods such as, an efficient public transportation network, cycling lanes, public nurseries and so on- and good policy, of course.

Worthy of consideration is also the fact that democracies tend to have a higher W/S than autocracies. A small loyalty norm is ideal for a leader, because it makes it unlikely for a member of his winning coalition to be part of another winning coalition in the future, making it more difficult for a member of W to defect. This is why it is much harder for leaders in large winning coalition polities to stay in power for a long period of time.¹⁰ On this subject, I

deem relevant to note that William H. Riker theorized that agents that are interested in winning elections should have no rational incentive to form larger than minimal winning coalitions (Riker, 1962).

A Qualitative analysis of the Selectorate and Winning Coalition in Milan

After a more general approach, I now want to illustrate specifically what is the selectorate and what is the winning coalition in Milan. The Selectorate (S) simply consists of every citizen who resides in Milan and is over 18 years old. It is worth pointing out, that immigrants who live in Milan and do not have European citizenship are not part of the selectorate. On the other hand, European citizens, who live in Milan and officially move their residence there, may vote in local elections and are therefore part of the Selectorate.

The reason why this is relevant is that the city of Milan is home to 261,412 foreigners- 19.13% of the entire local population (Comune di Milano, 2012). Of the total resident foreigners only 32,239 come from EU countries, which amounts to only 12,33%. Hence, 87,66% of Milan's immigrant population is not part of the selectorate and is completely left out of the "selectoral" process that elects the Mayor and the City Council (Comune di Milano, 2012).

The winning coalition (W), simply amounts to 50%+1 of the total voters in the elections. The parties that supported the elected mayors are obviously part of W, however there are some groups and lobbies that have consistently been part of winning

⁸ Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce and Alastair Smith. Introduction. *The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior Is Almost Always Good Politics*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2011. N. pag. Print.

⁹ Ibid

¹⁰ Ibid.

coalitions in Milan: some Catholic organizations and the wealthier parts of the middle class, known as “*borghesia milanese*”, are just some examples.

The elections

Note: All data was retrieved from the City of Milan’s official statistical agency.

-1990: elections held on May 6th, 1990
 NUMBER OF PEOPLE ENTITLED TO VOTE: 1,229,279
 NUMBER OF EFFECTIVE VOTERS (NOEV): 1,041,970
 VOTER TURNOUT: 84.8%

VOID BALLOTS: 50.973

PERCENTAGE OF VOID BALLOTS ON TOTAL VOTES: 4.9%

As previously stated, the Selectorate (S) is basically the number of people entitled to vote: in the 1990 elections it amounted to 1,229,279. The Winning coalition (W) amounts to:

$$(NOEV/2)+1=(1,041,970/2)+1=520,986.$$

The Loyalty Norm for the 1990 elections was $W/S=0.42$. As this was the last election in which there was no direct vote for a mayoral candidate, I will also list the party results below:

Party	Total Votes	Vote Percentage
Christian Democracy (DC)	204,954	20.7%
Italian Communist Party (PCI)	194,261	19.6%
Italian Socialist Party (PSI)	192,145	19.4%
Northern League-Lombardy League (LN)	128,312	12.9%
Italian Republican Party (PRI)	58,377	5.9%
Green Party- The Sun Smiles (Verdi)	41,986	4.2%
Italian Social Movement - Nationalist Right (MSI)	36,610	3.7%
Retired People’s Party (PP)	34,963	3.5%
Others (Sum of 6 parties)	99,389	10.1%
TOTAL	990,997	100%

No party was able to win enough votes to elect a mayor without forming a coalition. The incumbent mayor, Paolo Pillitteri, a

socialist, elected for the first time in 1986, was determined to stay in power and negotiated a deal with the Italian Communist

Party choosing it as his main political ally (Passalacqua, 1990). Together, the two leftist parties had 39% of the votes, still short of the 50%+1 needed to elect him. Mr. Pillitteri then decided to ask the Italian Republican Party, the Green Party-The Sun Smiles and the Retired People’s Party to join his coalition, giving him just enough votes in City Council to elect him for a second term (PSI+PCI+PRI+Verdi+PP=52.6%).

-1993: runoff held on June 6th, 1993

Since the 1993 elections Italians directly elected their Mayors. If a runoff was needed to elect a mayor, I will report only the data VOID BALLOTS: 34.514

PERCENTAGE OF VOID BALLOTS ON TOTAL VOTES: 4.2%

Candidate Mayor	Total Votes	Vote %
Formentini Marco (Northern League)	452,732	57.1%
Dalla Chiesa Fernando Romeo (Center-Left Coalition)	340,708	42.9%
TOTAL	793,440	100%

The Selectorate in 1993 was 1,195,257. The Winning coalition amounted to $(NOEV/2)+1=(827,953/2)+1=413,977$. The Loyalty Norm was $W/S=0.35$.

I deem interesting to point out, that the direct election of the mayor seems to have contributed significantly to the end of the era of a “leftist” control over Milan and to the beginning of a long conservative dominance over the city.

-2006: elections held on May 28th, 2006

As previously stated, after Formentini’s win in 1993, the center-right was able to win the mayoral elections the next three times: in

from the runoff and not from the first round. This is because, in the first leg, there were usually a lot of “dummy” candidates, with no real chance to win. As stated earlier all data was retrieved from Comune di Milano-Settore Statistica; “*Banca Dati Elettorale - Dati Ufficiali*”, the official statistical agency of the City of Milan.

NUMBER OF PEOPLE ENTITLED TO VOTE: 1,195,257

NUMBER OF EFFECTIVE VOTERS (NOEV): 827,953

VOTER TURNOUT: 69.3%

1997 and 2001 with Gabriele Albertini and in 2006 with Letizia Moratti. In 2006, Letizia Moratti did not need a runoff to win the elections, as she secured more than 50% support in the first round.

NUMBER OF PEOPLE ENTITLED TO VOTE: 1,030,616

NUMBER OF EFFECTIVE VOTERS (NOEV): 696,171

VOTER TURNOUT: 67.5%

VOID BALLOTS: 15.879

PERCENTAGE OF VOID BALLOTS ON TOTAL VOTES: 2.3%

Candidate Mayor	Total Votes	Vote %
Moratti Letizia (Center-Right Coalition)	353,298	51.9%
Ferrante Bruno (Center-Left Coalition)	319,823	47%
Other Candidates (8 candidates)	7,701	1.1%
TOTAL	680,292	100%

In 2006, the Selectorate was 1,030,616. The Winning Coalition amounted to $(NOEV/2)+1=348,086$ and the Loyalty Norm was $W/S=0.34$.

Letizia Moratti won in the first round; at the time, the majority of voters were split between the center-right candidate, Ms. Moratti, and the center-left candidate, Mr. Ferrante, with eight more candidates were able to collectively gather only 1.1% of support.

NUMBER OF EFFECTIVE VOTERS (NOEV): 671,420

VOTER TURNOUT: 67.4%

VOID BALLOTS: 7,889

PERCENTAGE OF VOID BALLOTS ON TOTAL VOTES: 1.2%

Candidate Mayor	Total Votes	Vote %
Pisapia Giuliano	365,717	55.1%
Moratti Letizia	297,814	44.9%
TOTAL	663,531	100%

In 2011, the Selectorate was 996,400 voters. The Winning Coalition was $(NOEV/2)+1=(671,420/2)+1=335,711$. The Loyalty Norm was $W/S=0.34$.

2011: runoff held May 29th, 2011

After a full first term, Letizia Moratti faced Giuliano Pisapia in a runoff, because no candidate was able to win at least $50\%+1$ (Pisapia had 48% and Moratti 41.6% in the first round). Below I report the data from the runoff.

NUMBER OF PEOPLE ENTITLED TO VOTE: 996,400

Mr. Pisapia won against Ms. Moratti by a wide margin and for the first time in 18 years the center-left coalition was able to win the mayoral elections in Milan.

Some important considerations can be drawn from the following table.

Final Analysis and Conclusions

Year	Selectorate	Winning Coalition	Loyalty Norm	Voter Turnout	NOEV
1990	1,229,279	520,986	0.42	84.8%	1,041,970
1993	1,195,257	413,977	0.35	69.3%	827,953
2006	1,030,616	348,086	0.34	67.5%	696,171
2011	996,400	335,711	0.34	67.4%	671,420
Averages 1993-2011	1,074,091	365,925	0.3433	68.1%	731,848

First of all, since 1990 the size of the Selectorate decreased in each election. The reason is simple: in the last two decades there was a drastic drop in the amount of the Italian population in Milan. This fact cannot be immediately grasped by simply looking at total resident population data: in 1991, Milan had a total population of 1,369,295 people (ISTAT, 1991) while at the end of 2012 the population was 1,366,409 (Comune di Milano, 2012), a difference of merely 2,886 people. The reason why the total population has remained stable can be explained by the extraordinary increase in the number of immigrants, particularly non-EU immigrants, who came to live in Milan. Since 1991 the number of such immigrants in Milan has increased by a staggering 6 times (Comune di Milano, 2012). On the contrary, the number of Italians who live in Milan decreased by 8.8% only from 2001 to 2011 (ISTAT, 2011). As I have pointed out

earlier, however, non-EU immigrants are not part of the Selectorate, therefore this explains the overall decrease of S, albeit a stable figure in the total city population. Winning coalitions also got smaller going from a W of 520,986 in 1990 to 365,925 in 2011, a 29.7% reduction.

The Loyalty Norm (W/S) also decreased significantly: since the introduction of the new elections to mayor it dropped from 0.42 in 1990 to 0.34 in 2011, a 19% decrease. Furthermore, we notice that in the three elections held under the new system, the loyalty norm has been stable throughout (0.35 in 1993, 0.34 in 2006 and 0.34 in 2011). A similar phenomenon happened to the voter turnout, which went from 84.8% in 1990 to an average of 68.1% in the 1993, 2006 and 2011 elections: a 19.69% decrease. The number of void ballots also steadily dropped over time, going from a 4.9% high in 1990, to a 1.2%

low in 2011, an astonishing 75.51% decrease.

The reasons why the phenomena just described happened and their link to the political outcomes can be consistent with Selectorate Theory. The introduction of the new electoral law, which allows citizens to directly elect their Mayor, induced a decrease in the loyalty norm. The reason is simple: in a proportional system more parties were usually represented in the City Council. It was therefore more likely for a small party to become a member of the winning coalition (therefore for its voters to also be part of W), even more so because, before 1993, parties negotiated whom to form an alliance with only after the elections. This is why a small party like the Retired People's Party, who won 3.5% of the votes in 1990, was unexpectedly able to become part of Mayor Pilitteri's winning coalition (and an important member, indeed: its defection from the winning coalition would have caused Pilitteri's administration to lose a majority in City Council). The new electoral system, on the other hand, gave the people the power to elect a new Mayor. Furthermore, the fact that a runoff is now required every time a candidate does not reach a majority 50%+1 of the votes, jointly with the 60% majority bonus assigned to the parties that support the winning Mayors (parties that have to declare their support to a candidate before the elections now) gives small parties a much smaller chance to become part of the winning coalition. Therefore, it is no surprise that under the

new system W/S decreased and then stabilized.

I have already mentioned the reasons behind the reduction of the size of the selectorate, however an explanation for the drop in the size of W is definitely necessary. The size of Winning Coalitions decreased contextually with the decrease in voter's turnout, albeit more significantly. W decreased by about 30%, while turnout experienced a drop of about 20%: less people voted so W became smaller; another factor of smaller impact that led to a reduction of W is the 12.62% decrease in the size of the S. As mentioned, the turnout dropped by around 20%; this has happened for many reasons, some of them technical, other political. For example, "Tangentopoli" might have had something to do with a growing dissatisfaction towards the entire political establishment, expressed by Italians especially in local election; however, the fact that the abolition of the purely proportional system drastically reduced the number of viable choices Italians had and were used to, might also concur to explaining the drop in election turnout: in 2006, two candidates to the office of mayor won 98.9% of total votes in the first round, which is rather unusual for Italian politics. At last, the reason why the number of voided votes also decreased is pretty simple and may also be linked to the drop in turnout: with the direct election of Mayor, many of the people who had previously consciously voided their vote making the political choice of not choosing anyone, decided to just stay home because they felt

even less represented by the fewer parties on the ballot or because after “Tangentopoli” the fell even more discontent with politics in general.

As to what determined the shifts in political power of 1993 and 2011, Selectorate Theory may give us an indication if we think in terms of the allocation of public and private goods. The “Tangentopoli” scandal triggered a political scenario that eventually forced politicians to change a very unpopular electoral law. Mayors would now be more accountable for the way they allocated both private and public goods. So even though the loyalty norm shrunk and the size of the winning coalition decreased, theoretically making it riskier for the members of the winning coalition to defect,¹¹ the fact that the new electoral system would completely change the way a mayor and his administration would be able to allocate the available resources, induced members of the W in 1990 to recede from the previous W and join the challenger in 1993.

In 2011, the shift in political power from the center-right to the center-left is even more interesting. There was no change in the electoral law and no significant change in the loyalty norm. The reason why Ms. Moratti lost to Mr. Pisapia simply lies on the fact that parts of her coalition did not feel adequately rewarded from the way she

allocated the available resources. Therefore, Ms. Moratti was not able to hold on to parts of the Catholic vote that had backed her in 2006 (SKY TG 24, 2011). The Catholic voters did not necessarily vote for Mr. Pisapia, most of them simply chose not to vote (Istituto Cattaneo, 2011). Since the turnout remained about the same, this tells us that Mr. Pisapia was able to attract voters who had not voted in 2006, probably union workers and young people (Corriere della Sera, 2011). Mr. Pisapia was also able to convince parts of the *Borghesia* who had previously supported Ms. Moratti, that he was a viable candidate and that he would not be hostile to it as Mayor.

In their book, *The Dictator's Handbook*, Bueno de Mesquita et. al say that “Challengers succeed when they offer better rewards than the government”¹². This may very well be what happened in Milan in 2011. Mayor Pisapia should thus take note of what is reported on this paper if he wishes to keep his coalition intact for the next elections, in 2016. As a matter of fact, no radical changes in the laws that regulate the elections of mayors are currently discussed in Italy, hence it should be easier for Mr. Pisapia to win re-election, as all he needs to do is to make sure that the winning coalition that had backed him in 2011 stays intact, which seems fairly obvious. Furthermore, it seems safe to assume that the Loyalty Norm (W/S) for the 2016 elections will remain

¹¹ Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow, *The Logic of Political Survival*, Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 2003

¹² Bruce Bueno De Mesquita, and Alastair Smith. *The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior Is Almost Always Good Politics*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2011.

stable, continuing with the trend previously shown, which means that Mr. Pisapia will not be required to spend more government's revenue to keep his coalition intact (De Mesquita et al, 2003): he just needs to allocate resources efficiently. This may be easy to say, however it might not be as easy to do. Mr. Pisapia's administration has been facing growing criticism for its policies and Mr. Pisapia's own favorability, although still slightly above 50% has decreased significantly in the last year, from a 60% mark in 2012, to a 51% mark in 2013, which is also 4 points lower than his favorability when he took office in 2011, which stood

55% (Il Sole 24 Ore, 2014). This means that some of the members of the Winning Coalition that elected Mayor Pisapia in 2011 do not believe they have been adequately rewarded through the public good provision allocated by their Mayor during the first half of his tenure in office. This trend needs to stop if Mr. Pisapia wants to hold his position in *Palazzo Marino*, Milan's City Council building. The good news for Milan and its citizens is that to do so he will simply need to implement good policy, which sounds like a win-win solution for both them and their Mayor.

Bibliography

Biagi, Enzo. *Era Ieri*. Milan, IT: Rizzoli Editore, 2005.

Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce and Alastair Smith. Introduction. *The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior Is Almost Always Good Politics*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2011. N. pag. Print.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow, *The Logic of Political Survival*, Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 2003

Cattaneo Institute- Fondazione di ricerca Carlo Cattaneo, *Elezioni amministrative - 2011: I flussi elettorali a Milano fra I e II turno delle elezioni comunali del 2011*. Bologna, Italy.

<http://www.cattaneo.org/pubblicazioni/analisi/pdf/Analisi%20Istituto%20Cattaneo%20-%20Voto%20comunale%202011%20-%20Analisi%20flussi%20Milano.pdf>

Comune di Milano-Settore Statistica, "Banca Dati Elettorale-Dati Ufficiali", Retrieved 2013-12-1

Comune di Milano-Settore Statistica, "Popolazione Residente anno 2012". Retrieved 2012-31-12. http://allegati.comune.milano.it/Statistiche/Popolazione/Popolazione%202012/cleta_zone_eta_2012.pdf

Comune di Milano-Settore Statistica, "Stranieri: dati statistici". Retrieved 2011-04-11. www.comune.milano.it

- Eurostat, *Population by sex and age groups on 1 January 2013*. Retrieved 2013-12-11. www.Appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu
- Gaspari, Oscar; Rosario Forlenza, Sante Cruciani, *Storie di sindaci per la storia d'Italia*. Milan, IT.: Collana: *Autonomie e Quaderni Sspal*, 2009
- Girompini, Elio. 1993. "Il cuore socialista di Marco Formentini". *Corriere della Sera*.
- Il Sole 24 Ore, *Governance Poll 2013*, Retrieved 2014-01-13.
- Istituto Nazionale di Statistica, *Official Monthly Demographic Balance*. Retrieved 2013-11-26.
- Morrow, James D., Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith. 2008. "Retesting Selectorate Theory: Separating the Effects of W from Other Elements of Democracy." *American Political Science Review* 102(3): 393-400.
- Passalacqua, Guido. 1990, "Milano, Nasce nella tensione la nuova giunta Pillitteri". *La Repubblica*, <http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1990/08/03/milano-nasce-nella-tensione-la-nuova-giunta.html>
- Redazione. 2011. "Milano, Pisapia celebra il sorpasso sulla Moratti". *SKY TG24*, http://tg24.sky.it/tg24/politica/2011/05/16/dati_elezioni_comunali_milano_mor
- Istituto Nazionale di Statistica, *Non-Italian Resident Population by age and sex on January 1st, 2013*. Retrieved 2013-12-06.
- Ministry of Interior of Italy, "Ministero Dell'Interno – Elezioni." Retrieved 2011-06-08, <http://elezioni.interno.it/>
- Ministry of Interior of Italy, "Local self-government authority system under the Italian legislation". Retrieved 2013-12-02. http://www1.interno.gov.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/en/themes/state-local_authority_relations/Local_self-government_authority_system.html
- [atti_pisapia_risultati_proiezioni_scrutinio.html](http://www1.interno.gov.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/en/themes/state-local_authority_relations/Local_self-government_authority_system.html)
- William H. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press, 1962, p. 22
- Valluari, Carlo. 2013. "Gli indipendenti di sinistra e le riforme nella prima repubblica". *MicroMega*. <http://temi.repubblica.it/micromega-online/gli-indipendenti-di-sinistra-e-le-riforme-nella-prima-repubblica/>

LEGAL REFERENCES

- Decreto del Presidente della Repubblica n. 570, 16 maggio 1960
- Decreto Legislativo n. 267, 18 agosto 2000
- Legge n. 84, 24 febbraio 1951
- Legge n. 81, 25 marzo 1993

Legge costituzionale n. 3, 18 ottobre 2001