NYU

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL INQUIRY

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

Spring 2017

Journal of Political Inquiry
Spring 2017
New York University
19 University Pl. New York, NY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EDITORIAL BOARD

The Water Crisis in Syria and Iraq

A Tool for Terror

Leonardo Dinic

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

As water resources become more limited, drought prone societies will experience considerable resource stress and increased violence; a trend which is increasingly being seen in the Middle East. The outcomes of the ongoing conflicts in Syria and Iraq will depend partly on the role of regional state actors to regain complete control of water sources and infrastructure from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The severe drought, which destabilized the region in 2006, is a central topic of conversation for resource conflict experts, who label water scarcity a leading factor in socio-economic strain, state failure, and the rise and growth of violent extremism.[1] The populations of both states respond to the lack of adequate water with tension, societal conflict, and continuous migration from rural areas to urban centers. As a result of distributional pressures, individuals look to sub-state actors to provide water resources in place of the failed state. Extremist non-state actors continue to target water sources to seize power and control local populations. Furthermore, terrorist groups seek to secure waterways to inherit public responsibilities, create societal dependency, and employ water as a weapon of war.

In its 2012 *Global Water Security: Intelligence Community Assessment,* the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) states that terrorist and extremist groups often target water infrastructure to further objectives and establish influence over local populations.[2] The report also establishes a correlation between groundwater depletion and risks to national and global food markets. In sum, the degradation of terrorist capabilities in Syria and Iraq requires the full liberation of water sources and infrastructure. Drought is a primary variable when analyzing poverty, social tensions, environmental degradation, ineffective leadership, and fragile political institutions.[3] The prospect for a stable Middle East requires the elimination of terror groups, which often identify the water crisis as an opportunity to inherit state responsibility, manufacture societal dependence, and utilize water installation sites as strategic weapons of war.

Factors Contributing to the Water Crisis

Due to the natural scarcity of groundwater and lack of precipitation in the basin, Syria and Iraq rely on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers for drinking water, electricity, and irrigation via installations.[4] The rivers originate in Turkey and flow southward into Syria and Iraq, giving Turkey an upstream strategic advantage. Syria and Iraq rely on external sources for 60% and 75% of their water, respectively, and 78% of Syrian extractable groundwater is considered unsustainable.[5] Geographical placement demands that Iraq and Syria cooperate with Turkey on transnational waterway issues, or resort to water manipulation, territorial claims, and/or military conflict to secure national interests.[6] After ongoing conflict, which nearly escalated into full-

---

[1] United States. Intelligence Community Assessment. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. *Global Water Security*. ICA 2012 - 08. 2012. Accessed April 26, 2017. https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/ICA_Global%20Water%20Security.pdf.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Gleick, Peter H. "Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria." *Weather, Climate & Society* 6, no. 3 (July 2014): 332. *Environment Complete*, EBSCO*host* (accessed April 26, 2017).
[5] Damluji, Nadim. "Legal Analysis: Daesh control of watercourses in Syria and Iraq." *Washington International Law Journal* 25, no. 2 (April 2016): 331-363. *Legal Source*, EBSCO*host* (accessed April 26, 2017).
"Iraq Country Water Resource Assistance Strategy: Addressing Major Threats to People's Livelihoods." (2006): *AGRIS*, EBSCO*host* (accessed April 26, 2017).
[6] "Iraq." AQUASTAT - FAO's Information System on Water and Agriculture. 2016. Accessed April 26, 2017. http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries_regions/irq/index.stm.

fledged military conflict in 1974, Syria and Iraq were able to coalesce against dominant Turkish water interest. [7]

Since 1990, the complexities of transnational water issues have led to attempted solutions with the construction of the Turkish Ataturk Dam in 1992 and the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP), an ongoing development initiated in the 1970s.[8] However, the GAP, upon completion and combined with low precipitation levels, will actually decrease the average annual flow of the Euphrates through the Syrian-Turkish border.[9] Adding further resource stress, Syria's population has grown from 3 million in 1950 to 22 million in 2012. The Arab region experienced a 43 percent population increase over the past two decades, which has produced alarming consequences.[10] Drought sparked the migration of millions of farmers from the countryside to urban centers.[11] More specifically, this relocation occurred as a result of reduced incomes, a lack of employment opportunities, and a burgeoning youth demographic, which all exacerbated resource strains.[12] Over the past four decades the per capita share of renewable water resources in the region halved.[13] According to some academics, the drought is implicated in the current Syrian conflict and terrorist groups, specifically, ISIL often seek to exploit water scarcity to spread extremism.[14]

ANALYSIS OF KEY VARIABLES

The acknowledgement of conflict-prone trends is vital for understanding the regional instability and violence in Syria and Iraq. Three variables increase the likelihood of water manipulation by terrorist groups: water crisis-induced decreases in food production, a decline in quality of life, and, state, institutional, and sectarian distributional tension concerning water resources. To unpack the rise and progression of ISIL in the context of water scarcity, each variable will be explained below.

Water Crisis-Induced Decreases in Food Production

Many experts attribute the Arab Spring uprisings to decreases in food production and spikes in grain prices.[15] Dr. Peter H. Gleick, a specialist on water issues, notes that while the origins of war in Syria are multilayered and dependent upon many political, economic, and social variables, water shortages, "contributed to the displacement of large populations from rural to urban centers, food insecurity for more than a million people, and increased unemployment—with subsequent effects on political stability."[16] Experts describe the drought that struck the region in 2006, and lasted until 2011, as "[the] most severe set of crop failures since agricultural

---

[7] Hipel, K, DM Kilgour, and RA Kinsara. "Strategic Investigations of Water Conflicts in the Middle East." *Group Decision And Negotiation* 23, no. 3 (n.d.): 358-359. *Social Sciences Citation Index*,
EBSCO*host* (accessed April 26, 2017).
"Iraq." AQUASTAT - FAO's Information System on Water and Agriculture. 2016. Accessed April 26, 2017. http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries_regions/irq/index.stm.

[8] Haftendorn, Helga. "Water and International Conflict." *Third World Quarterly*, (2000): 51-68. *JSTOR Journals*, EBSCO*host* (accessed April 26, 2017).

[9] Ibid.

[10] *Managing Water under Uncertainty and Risk*. Paris: UNESCO, 2012. Accessed April 26, 2017.
http://www.unesco.org/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/SC/pdf/WWDR4%20Volume%201-Managing%20Water%20under%20Uncertainty%20and%20Risk.pdf.

[11] Gleick, Peter H. "Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria." *Weather, Climate & Society* 6, no. 3 (July 2014): 332. *Environment Complete*, EBSCO*host* (accessed April 26, 2017).

[12] *Managing Water under Uncertainty and Risk*. Paris: UNESCO, 2012. Accessed April 26, 2017.
http://www.unesco.org/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/SC/pdf/WWDR4%20Volume%201-Managing%20Water%20under%20Uncertainty%20and%20Risk.pdf.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Kelley, C.P. et al. "Climate change in the Fertile Crescent and implications of the recent Syrian drought." *Proceedings Of The National Academy Of Sciences Of The United States Of America* 112, no. 11 (March 17, 2015): 3241-3246. *Scopus®*, EBSCO*host* (accessed April 26, 2017).
According to Colin P. Kelley, Sahrzad Mohtadi, Mark A. Cane, Richard Seager and Yochanan Kushnir.

[15] Rami Zurayk, "Use Your Loaf: Why Food Prices Were Crucial in the Arab Spring," *The Guardian*, July 16, 2011, accessed September 23, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2011/jul/17/bread-food-arab-spring.

[16] Gleick, Peter H. "Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria." *Weather, Climate & Society* 6, no. 3 (July 2014): 338. *Environment Complete*, EBSCO*host* (accessed April 26, 2017).

civilizations began in the Fertile Crescent many millennia ago."[17] During the shortage, water intensive crops declined, specifically "yields of wheat and barley dropped 47 percent and 67 percent respectively."[18] Livestock populations also suffered and 1.5 million Syrians were labeled as food insecure.[19] Cotton and grain production also plummeted.[20] While the Assad regime made efforts to subsidize water intensive crops, a lack of improvement resulted in a decayed quality of life within the state. [21]

Food and Water Insecurity and Quality of Life

Regional decreases in food production catalyzed socio-economic pressures, which sparked fluctuating food prices, unemployment, and the mass migration of millions of people to urban centers. The drought also led to inefficiencies in hydroelectric power, on which most major cities in the region rely. In 2006, the World Bank reported that poor infrastructure and the water crisis left 70% of Iraqi sewage untreated, 20% of households without drinking water and 30% of farmers without enough water to perform daily tasks.[22] High levels of salinity and pollution, resulting from poor management, rendered the Iraqi freshwater supply undrinkable. [23] Ineffectiveness in management highlights the difficulties of distribution during times of crisis. Furthermore, ISIL and other sub-state actors continue to engage in conflict to secure water sources during shortages.

Distributional Tensions

Distributional water tensions between the countries of the Tigris-Euphrates river basin are not uncommon. As mentioned earlier, Turkey, Syria and Iraq often fight over their transnational waterway rights and recorded hydro-political tensions go back centuries. Regional actors have long utilized water installations to assert dominance over waterways and deprive neighbors through aggressive diplomatic behavior. The rise of sub-state terrorist groups has further complicated environmental water tensions. Research by Marc Levy of Columbia University's Center for International Earth Science Information Network, Charles Vorosmarty of the University of New Hampshire's Water Systems Analysis Group, and Nils Petter Gleditsch of the Center for the Study of Civil War at the International Peace Research Institute (PRIO) stated in 2005 that, "at the global scale there is a highly significant relationship between rainfall deviations and the likelihood of outbreak of a high-intensity internal war. When rainfall is significantly below normal, the likelihood of conflict outbreak is significantly elevated in the subsequent year." [24] In Syria and Iraq, ISIL undermines the two failing states by exacerbating the abovementioned conflict-prone trends and manufacturing an artificial societal dependency through the seizure of water sources and facilities.[25] In battle, the caliphate's forces recognize the strategic value of such installations and employ them as weapons. [26]

---

[17] Femia, Francesco, and Caitlin Werrell. "Syria: Climate Change, Drought and Social Unrest." The Center for Climate & Security. December 07, 2015. Accessed April 26, 2017. https://climateandsecurity.org/2012/02/29/syria-climate-change-drought-and-social-unrest/.

[18] Gleick, Peter H. "Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria." *Weather, Climate & Society* 6, no. 3 (July 2014): 334. *Environment Complete*, EBSCO*host* (accessed April 26, 2017).

[19] Ibid, 338.

[20] United States. USAID knowledge services center. USAID. *Syrian Agriculture Historical and Environmental Context.* By Christopher Chapman. June 18, 2014. Accessed April 26, 2017. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PBAAC901.pdf.
United States. USDA Foreign Agricultural Service. Global Agricultural Information Network. *Syria: Cotton and Products Annual.* By Julio Maldonad. March 30, 2010. Accessed April 26, 2017.
https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Cotton%20and%20Products%20Annual_Damascus_Syria_3-30-2010.pdf.
United States. USDA Foreign Agricultural Service. Global Agricultural Information Network. *Syria: Grain and Feed Annual.* By Julio Maldonad. Accessed April 26, 2017.
https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Grain%20and%20Feed%20Annual_Damascus_Syria_2-17-2011.pdf.

[21] Ibid, 334.

[22] "Iraq Country Water Resource Assistance Strategy: Addressing Major Threats to People's Livelihoods." (2006): *AGRIS*, EBSCO*host* (accessed April 26, 2017).

[23] Müşerref Yetim, *Negotiating International Water Rights: Resource Conflict in Turkey, Syria and Iraq (*London: I.B.Tauris, 2016), 12-13.

[24] Bencala, Karin R., and Geoffrey D. Dabelko. "WATER WARS: OBSCURING OPPORTUNITIES." *Journal Of International Affairs* 61, no. 2 (Spring/Summer2008 2008): 21-33. *Business Source Complete*, EBSCO*host* (accessed April 26, 2017)

[25] King, M.D. "The weaponization of water in Syria and Iraq." *Washington Quarterly* 38, no. 4 (October 2, 2015): 153-169. *Scopus*®, EBSCO*host* (accessed April 26, 2017).

[26] Ibid.

ANALYSIS OF TRENDS IN THE ISIL CASE

The abovementioned conflict-prone trends provide a framework for understanding the regional instability and violence in Syria and Iraq. Groups, like ISIL, exploit the trends to further their objectives and utilize the water crisis and its corresponding developments in three ways: by replacing the failed state, manufacturing societal dependence, and utilizing water sources and installations as weapons of war.

Replacing the Failed State

First, by seizing and controlling water installations, ISIL replaces the role of the failed Syrian state as the producer, provider, and distributor of food and water during times of need. Throughout the occupation of Syria and Iraq, ISIL secured agricultural sources of wheat, barley, and cotton, all of which are water intensive crops, to improve public opinion and maintain economic stability.[27] As previously mentioned, the Assad regime had also attempted this by subsidizing agriculture. After the government failed, ISIL began to control imports and exports of grain, regulate food prices, and dictate agricultural practices to farmers in spite of inefficiencies and disincentives.[28] Mass migration into urban areas produced a disaffected, angry, and desperate potential workforce for ISIL to exploit. Lastly, given the region's history of water conflict, ISIL seized installations through conquest and in doing so, refused to comply with standard regional transnational norms of negotiation and diplomacy.[29] ISIL boasts of its accomplishments of providing "food, healthcare and power generation"[30] to its subjects. The caliphate projects its legitimacy through local service organizations like the Islamic Network for Public Services, which provided electricity and transportation within Aleppo city limits.[31] ISIL recognizes and maintains the population's dependence, and is confident that its subjects will not retaliate against a group that controls its primary resources and services. Gaining legitimacy via controlling water sources is a common method employed by groups in other conflicts, specifically the Sudanese Civil War.

Manufacturing Dependency

Second, if ISIL feeds the community and employs men within its ranks, in the eyes of the alienated, it is functioning properly in comparison to the previous dysfunctional regime. ISIL uses dependence to justify the taxation of its citizenry and to prop up its unsustainable economy. In some estimates, taxation has accounted for 40% of the group's income, 10% of which derives from the taxation of agriculture.[32] However, ISIL funds social services through its taxation. The group's food allocation system provides for vulnerable segments of the population, an otherwise neglected portion of society. The food ISIL allocates fulfills the role of the government by reaching 99 percent of people within its borders and comprises 85 percent of calories required for all people.[33] The group's legitimacy and economic resilience depend on the control of water and the production of food. In 2014, ISIL raised $200 million in barley and rye sales alone. Societal dependence on ISIL for key resources influences the process of grooming the local

[27]Jaafar, Hadi H., and Eckart Woertz. "Agriculture as a funding source of ISIS: A GIS and remote sensing analysis." *Food Policy* 64, (October 1, 2016): 14-25. *ScienceDirect*, EBSCO*host* (accessed April 26, 2017).
[28] Ibid.
[29] King, M.D. "The weaponization of water in Syria and Iraq." *Washington Quarterly* 38, no. 4 (October 2, 2015): 153-169. *Scopus*®, EBSCO*host* (accessed April 26, 2017).
[30] Jaafar, Hadi H., and Eckart Woertz. "Agriculture as a funding source of ISIS: A GIS and remote sensing analysis." *Food Policy* 64, (October 1, 2016): 14-25. *ScienceDirect*, EBSCO*host* (accessed April 26, 2017).
[31] King, M.D. "The weaponization of water in Syria and Iraq." *Washington Quarterly* 38, no. 4 (October 2, 2015): 153-169. *Scopus*®, EBSCO*host* (accessed April 26, 2017).
[32] Jaafar, Hadi H., and Eckart Woertz. "Agriculture as a funding source of ISIS: A GIS and remote sensing analysis." *Food Policy* 64, (October 1, 2016): 14-25. *ScienceDirect*, EBSCO*host* (accessed April 26, 2017).
[33] Jaafar, Hadi H., and Eckart Woertz. "Agriculture as a funding source of ISIS: A GIS and remote sensing analysis." *Food Policy* 64, (October 1, 2016): 14-25. *ScienceDirect*, EBSCO*host* (accessed April 26, 2017).

population into ideological commitment. This is evident in the fact that local enlistment accounts for 60-70 percent of total fighters.[34]

Water as a Weapon of War

Third, just as Saddam Hussein flooded and dried up the southern marshes of Iraq to punish Shia enemies and political opponents, ISIL has also utilized water as a weapon.[35] During varying points in time, ISIL seized key installations on both the Tigris and the Euphrates, notably the Tabqa Dam in 2013. With the dam, ISIL controlled Syria's largest city, Aleppo, and dictated the water and electricity supply to five million people.[36] The structure also irrigates one thousand square miles of farmland.[37] In 2014, ISIL captured the Fallujah Dam in Iraq, and first intentionally deprived downstream Shiite communities of water and then emptied the dam to destroy their crops and infrastructure. [38,] As ISIL seizes water installations, it imposes political coercion and military might. ISIL celebrated tactical victories in both Fallujah and Mosul by reducing and increasing water flow toward its enemies. The intentional polluting of water is also a common ISIL strategy.[39] In 2014, ISIL poisoned water sources south of Tikrit, Iraq through the dumping of crude oil.[40] In December 2016, in the midst of the battle for Mosul, fighting between Iraqi coalition forces and ISIL destroyed a pipeline that provided approximately 650,000 people in the city with water.[41] Islamic State forces utilized water and food shortages, as well as threats of execution, to draw civilians toward the city center to form a civilian human shield. [42] ISIL exploited the 2011 Syrian conflict and utilized transnational waterways and installations to develop a concept of sovereignty that spilled over into Iraq. Through waterway manipulation, ISIL can harm its armed opponents and civilian populations through strategies of total war and resource deprivation

CONCLUSION

Recent developments do not indicate a near end to the Syrian civil war. The result of the water crisis in the Middle East is contingent on the outcome of the Syrian conflict and the foreign policy decisions of great and regional powers, specifically the United States, Russia, Iran, and Turkey.[43] While the analysis presented here is forward-looking in nature, it is difficult to project how the Syrian conflict will end. Additionally, there is a lack of objective primary source testimony available from the populations subject to ISIL control. Reports from individuals who understand the inner workings of ISIL would strengthen the judgments made concerning the efficacy of

---

[34] King, M.D. "The weaponization of water in Syria and Iraq." *Washington Quarterly* 38, no. 4 (October 2, 2015): 153-169. *Scopus*®, EBSCO*host* (accessed April 26, 2017).

[35] Ibid, 5.

[36] Damluji, Nadim. "LEGAL ANALYSIS: DAESH CONTROL OF WATERCOURSES IN SYRIA AND IRAQ." *Washington International Law Journal* 25, no. 2 (April 2016): 331-363. *Legal Source*, EBSCO*host* (accessed April 26, 2017).

[37] Fred Pearce, "Mideast Water Wars: In Iraq, A Battle for Control of Water," *Yale Environment 360*, August 25, 2014, accessed December 08, 2016, http://e360.yale.edu/features/mideast_water_wars_in_iraq_a_battle_for_control_of_water.

[38] Damluji, Nadim. "LEGAL ANALYSIS: DAESH CONTROL OF WATERCOURSES IN SYRIA AND IRAQ." *Washington International Law Journal* 25, no. 2 (April 2016): 331-363. *Legal Source*, EBSCO*host* (accessed April 26, 2017).
Fred Pearce, "Mideast Water Wars: In Iraq, A Battle for Control of Water," *Yale Environment 360*, August 25, 2014, accessed December 08, 2016, http://e360.yale.edu/features/mideast_water_wars_in_iraq_a_battle_for_control_of_water.

[39] von Lossow, Tobias. "The Rebirth of Water as a Weapon: IS in Syria and Iraq." *International Spectator* 51, no. 3 (September 2016): 82-99. *Publisher Provided Full Text Searching File*, EBSCO*host* (accessed April 26, 2017).

[40] Ibid.

[41] "Almost Half of Mosul's Children Cut Off from Clean Water as Fighting Intensifies - UNICEF." *Targeted News Service (USA)*, November 30, 2016. *NewsBank*, EBSCO*host* (accessed April 26, 2017).
Isabel Coles and Saif Hameed, "Mosul food, water reserves dwindle as fighting cuts off supplies," *Reuters*, November 30, 2016, accessed April 10, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-idUSKBN13P1G8.

[42] Emma Graham-Harrison, "Fighting around Mosul Leaves Majority in Isis-held City without Water," *The Guardian*, November 29, 2016, accessed December 08, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/29/fighting-around-mosul-isis-city-without-water-pipe-line-hit-siege-iraq.
"Almost Half of Mosul's Children Cut Off from Clean Water as Fighting Intensifies - UNICEF." *Targeted News Service (USA)*, November 30, 2016. *NewsBank*, EBSCO*host* (accessed April 26, 2017).

[43] Michael B. Kelley, "The Madness of the Syria Proxy War in One Chart," *Business Insider*, October 16, 2013, accessed April 10, 2017, http://www.businessinsider.com/who-is-involved-in-the-war-in-syria-2013-10.

ISIL' seizure and management of water and food sources. The evidentiary proof of consistent primary sources would further bolster the abovementioned arguments should they become available.

In an assessment released in 2012 the ODNI stated that, "during the next 10 years, many countries…will experience water problems…that will risk instability and state failure [and] increase regional tensions."[44] In addition to recognizing the potential risk factors, the ODNI assessment asserts, with moderate confidence that states like Syria and Iraq will continue to suffer economic difficulties, and will therefore be unable to develop the technological methods necessary to mitigate water crises.[45] The ODNI predicts that the ten years following 2012 will present few water-related conflicts overall, but that over time water will "increasingly be used as leverage [and that] the use of water as a weapon or to further terrorist objectives" will increase.[46] ODNI, in consensus with prominent scholars, also declares with high confidence that patterns indicate water problems induce regional tension, conflict, and war. The report concurs with the arguments described above: water will increase as a bargaining tool and a weapon for terror over the next ten years.[47] These conflicts will arise out of food and water insecurity, but will also stem from energy issues.[48] If historic droughts continue to occur, economic output in states like Syria and Iraq will decrease substantially, further exacerbating the abovementioned risk factors. It is clear that water scarcity creates an environment fertile for internal strife and extremism. Such tension and conflict will prevent stability and allow groups like ISIL to continue to exploit water shortages to impose control in both Syria and Iraq.

[44] United States. Intelligence Community Assessment. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. *Global Water Security*. ICA 2012 - 08. 2012. Accessed April 26, 2017. https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/ICA_Global%20Water%20Security.pdf.
[45] Ibid.
[46] United States. Intelligence Community Assessment. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. *Global Water Security*. ICA 2012 - 08. 2012. Accessed April 26, 2017. https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/ICA_Global%20Water%20Security.pdf.
[47] Ibid
[48] Ibid.

US-Mexico Border Policy in the Age of Terrorism

2001-2016

Ionut Gitan

US-Mexico border policy shifted from an issue of economic policy to an issue of homeland security after the September 11 terrorist attacks. Immigration policy adopted a mission of border enforcement with increased security through the reorganization of federal agencies and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. The US-Mexico border became militarized through increased patrols, including coordinated military troops, and a physical border wall. The US government adopted border enforcement as immigration policy at the cost of human lives on the US-Mexico border.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: FROM PEARL HARBOR TO THE BRACERO PROGRAM

In the winter of 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt called a joint session of Congress. Radio transmitted his address across the nation. President Roosevelt said, "Yesterday, December 7, 1941—a day which we will live in infamy—the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan."[49] The attack on Pearl Harbor killed 2,403 people.[50] They compelled President Roosevelt and Congress to enter World War II, which impacted the United States economy and US-Mexico border policy.

In response to the war abroad, Congress passed the Selective Service Act of 1940, well before Pearl Harbor. The military drafted nearly 10 million men,[51] leaving a labor gap in the workforce. Others left farms to enter the defense industries. But the demand for human capital on farms persisted. In 1941, Southwestern farmers lobbied Congress to import workers from Mexico. They asked the United States Immigration Service to forgo the literacy test, head tax, and contract labor provisions that limited Mexican immigration.[52] As men continued to leave the fields for war after Pearl Harbor, farm labor shortages entered into the federal government's concerns. Congress moved its pen on immigration policy.

The governments of the United States and Mexico signed the Mexican Farm Labor Agreement on August 4, 1942. The agreement codified immigration policy with Mexico as a predominantly economic policy in the United States, open to the forces of supply and demand from this period.[53] It brought the Spanish word bracero, meaning arm, into the American English lexicon as Mexican laborer. For more than two decades, braceros migrated to the country as temporary farm laborers. Between the agreement's beginning in 1942 and end in 1964, the bracero program brought 4.6 million documented migrants into the United States to work.[54]

As labor shortages ceased after World War II and into the 1950s, Mexican laborers in the United States received a new name, wetbacks, a descriptive of Mexicans crossing into the country in

[49] "Educator Resources – A Day Which Will Live in Infamy - The First Typed Draft of Franklin D. Roosevelt's War Address," *National Archives*, accessed March 17, 2017, https://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/day-of-infamy.
[50] "Remember Pearl Harbor – A Pearl Harbor Fact Sheet," *The National WWII Museum New Orleans*, accessed March 17, 2017, http://www.nationalww2museum.org/assets/pdfs/pearl-harbor-fact-sheet-1.pdf.
[51] Christina D. Romer, "The Hope that Flows from History," *New York Times*, August 13, 2011, accessed March 17, 2017. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/14/business/economy/from-world-war-ii-economic-lessons-for-today.html.
[52] Otey M. Scruggs, "Evolution of the Mexican Farm Labor Agreement of 1942," *Agricultural History, 34* (1960): 141, accessed December 2, 2016, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3740146.
[53] Jorge I. Dominguez and Rafael Fernandez de Castro, *The United States and Mexico: Between Partnership and Conflict*, (New York: Routledge, 2009), 153.
[54] Philip L. Martin, *Promise Unfulfilled: Unions, Immigration and the Farm Workers* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).

the waters of the Rio Grande. The ethnic slur first appeared in The New York Times in 1920.[55] The article storied an 'invasion' of more than 500,000 Mexicans into Southwestern states to farm. The slur highlighted protectionist and prejudicial elements embedded in United States immigration policy more broadly. While US-Mexico immigration policy adopted the language of economics during World War II, prejudice based on national origin, race, and ethnicity has underlined immigration policy since the nation's founding.[56]

United States immigration policy towards Mexico maneuvered to serve new economic interests from WWII. The program ended as "wetback" replaced "bracero." Unauthorized crossings into the United States during the 1950s also contributed to the end of the program with mass deportations of undocumented Mexicans.[57] After the program ended in 1964, economic interests continued to dominate US-Mexico immigration policy in the 1980s, during the Reagan administration.[58] In the 1990s, during the Clinton administration, interests began to shift towards enforcement.[59] But a security crisis in 2001 changed US immigration policy. Like Pearl Harbor, the crisis introduced new ideas about the border between the United States and Mexico.

HOMELAND SECURITY ACT 2002

The terrorist attacks on the morning of Tuesday, September 11, 2001 by the Islamic terrorist group al-Qaeda killed 2,996 people[60] and transformed immigration policy from largely an issue of economic policy to an issue of "homeland security."[61] The Homeland Security Act marked this shift in policy. Congress enacted the bill[62] with unprecedented bipartisan support.[63] In his 2002 State of the Union address, President George W. Bush lauded congressional unity in the fight against terrorism. He said, "September 11 brought out the best in America, and the best in this Congress, and I join the American people in applauding your unity and resolve."[64] President Bush signed the bill into law on November 25, 2002. The bill's passage caused the biggest federal government transformation since World War II[65] with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security.[66]

---

[55] Gerald B. Breitigam, "Welcomed Mexican Invasion – Thousands of Families Crossing the Border to Till the Soil and Otherwise Build Up the Southwest," *New York Times*, June 20, 1920, accessed March 17, 2017, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1920/06/20/118331082.html?pageNumber=109.

[56] There is a pattern of prejudice rooted in nativism in US immigration policy from the hallmark 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act to the Immigration Act of 1924 that established a quota system. For more information, see Michael C. LeMay's *From Open Door to Dutch Door: An Analysis of U.S. Immigration Policy Since 1820*, (New York: Praeger, 1987), 29-30, 82.

[57] Juan Ramon Garcia , *Operation Wetback: The Mass Deportation of Mexican Undocumented Workers in 1954* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1980).

[58] Robert Pear, "President Signs Landmark Bill on Immigration," *New York Times*, November 7, 1986, accessed March 17, 2017, http://www.nytimes.com/1986/11/07/us/president-signs-landmark-bill-on-immigration.html.

[59]Eric Schmitt. "Milestones and Missteps on Immigration," *New York Times*, October 26, 1996, accessed March 17, 2017, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/10/26/us/milestones-and-missteps-on-immigration.html.

[60] Brad Plumer, "Nine Facts About Terrorism in the United States since 9/11," *Washington Post*, September 11, 2013, accessed December 2, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/09/11/nine-facts-about-terrorism-in-the-united-states-since-911/?utm_term=.641643c9ce1f.

[61] The US government does not have a single definition of homeland security. It is a broad term that encompasses law enforcement, disaster, immigration, and terrorism issues. Homeland security is a combination of law enforcement, disaster, immigration, and terrorism issues. For a discussion of the term, see Shawn Reese, "Defining Homeland Security: Analysis and Congressional Considerations," *Congressional Research Service*, January 8, 2013, accessed March 17, 2017, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=728387.

[62] During the 107th United States Congress, the Homeland Security Act (H.R. 5005) passed in the House of Representatives with a vote of 295-132, with 6 not voting. In the Senate, the bill gathered more support and passed with a vote of 90-9, with 1 not voting.

[63] For historical comparison, the 107th United States Congress enacted the No Child Left Behind Act in 2001 with passage in the House of Representatives 384-45, with 1 not voting, and in the Senate 91-8, with 1 not voting. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 passed by the same 107th United States Congress with 240-189, with 6 not voting, and in the Senate 60-40.

[64] George W. Bush, "The State of the Union; President Bush's State of the Union Address to Congress and the Nation," *New York Times,* January 30, 2002, accessed December 2, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/30/us/state-union-president-bush-s-state-union-address-congress-nation.html.

[65] David Firestone, "Threats and Responses: Legislation; Senate Votes, 90-9. To Set Up a Homeland Security Dept. Geared to Fight Terrorism," *New York Times*, November 20, 2002, accessed December 2, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/20/us/threats-responses-legislation-senate-votes-90-9-set-up-homeland-security-dept.html.

[66] The Truman administration transformed the military apparatus in 1947 with the purpose to fight the cold war. The National Security Act of 1947 restructured the military and intelligence agencies by creating the United States National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense.

GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION

The new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) absorbed key functions of the federal government, including immigration and border protection. In order to make room for the new department, Congress dissolved the United States Customs Service, one of the country's oldest agencies,[67] and created DHS in its place to assume the agency's duties. The Customs Service collected revenue[68] and combated the smuggling of illegal goods at the border, like unreported money, narcotics, and weapons. This remained a primary activity until the September 11 attacks. With roughly 1.3 million people and 350,000 cars, buses, and trucks traveling each day, the 2,000-mile border with Mexico became a front line of the United States' defense against terrorism.

The new US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agency formed under DHS. It became one of the largest federal law enforcement agencies by merging the US Customs Service, US Immigration and Naturalization Service, and US Border Patrol. Through increased security at airports and expanded border patrol, CBP adopted antiterrorism as its first immigration policy objective. In less than ten years, the size of the border patrol doubled from 10,717 agents in 2003 to 21,394 agents in 2012 with a budget increase of $1.4 billion to $3.5 billion.[69]

US-MEXICO BORDER MILITARIZATION

The United States and Mexican governments coordinated military efforts to patrol the border in early 2003. In an unprecedented order by the Mexican government to defend the US border, Mexico sent 18,000 soldiers to secure airports, seaports, bridges, and border posts- with half of sentries serving in the desert within miles of the border. In 2003, Mexican Interior Minister Santiago Creel said, "Mexico is not going to be used as a transit point for any terrorist or anyone who wishes to harm the United States."[70] The United States deployed Special Forces, Army Rangers and Marines to monitor the border using night patrols, electronic sensors, and drone aircraft- first used in the US war in Afghanistan. During the border patrol agent recruitment and training process in 2006, President Bush deployed around 6,000 National Guard troops to the US-Mexico border. The troops monitored surveillance cameras, built roads, and erected fencing along the border to support border patrol agents in executing the CBP's law enforcement mission.[71] The coordinated efforts on both sides resulted in a militarization of the US-Mexico border.

President Bush further increased border militarization with the creation of a physical border-wall through the Secure Fence Act of 2006. In support of the measure, he said, "[t]his bill will help protect the American people. This bill will make our borders more secure. It is an important step toward immigration reform."[72] Through border enforcement, President Bush framed the Secure

---

[67] Established by the First Congress and President George Washington on July 31, 1789, the agency provided the primary funding for the federal government for its first 100 years through the Tariff Act of 1789. "Celebrating 227 Years of the US Customs Service," *Department of Homeland Security*, August 1, 2016. accessed December 2, 2016, https://www.dhs.gov/blog/2016/08/01/celebrating-227-years-us-customs-service.

[68] Tim Weiner, "Trace of Terror: Immigration Security; Border Customs Agents Are Pushed to the Limit," *New York Times*, July 25, 2002, accessed December 4, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/25/us/traces-terror-immigration-security-border-customs-agents-are-pushed-limit.html?rref=collection/byline/tim-weiner&action=click&contentCollection=undefined®ion=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=312&pgtype=collection.

[69] Lourdes Medrano, "Is US-Mexico Border Secure Enough? Immigration Reform Could Hinge on Answer," *Christian Science Monitor*, March 6, 2013, accessed December 2, 2016, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2013/0306/Is-US-Mexico-border-secure-enough-Immigration-reform-could-hinge-on-answer.

[70] Tim Weiner, "A Nation at War: The Mexican Border; U.S. and Mexico Coordinate Military Efforts for Mutual Protection Against Terror," *New York Times*, March 23, 2003, accessed December 2, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/23/world/nation-war-mexican-border-us-mexico-coordinate-military-efforts-for-mutual.html.

[71] Randal C. Archibold, "Guard Troops Set to Begin Mission on Mexican Border," *New York Times*, June 18, 2006, accessed December 2, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/18/us/18guard.html.

[72] "Fact Sheet: The Secure Fence Act of 2006," *White House Office of the Press Secretary*, October 26, 2006, accessed December 2, 2016. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061026-1.html.

Fence Act as part of his administration's four-point plan for immigration reform.[73] Congress passed the bill with bipartisan support.[74] President Bush signed the bill into law on October 26, 2006.

The Secure Fence Act of 2006 aimed to secure the border by building 700 miles of physical barriers. By 2008, the Department of Homeland Security erected 309 miles of fencing and pushed to complete 670 miles total by the end of the year. However, opponents of the wall questioned the construction cost and the wall's efficacy in deterring immigration along the border. According to the Government Accountability Office, the average cost per mile varied from $1 million to $3.9 million.[75] The Secretary of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff, acknowledged the concerns. He said, "I don't believe the fence is a cure-all. Nor do I believe it is a waste. Yes, you can get over it; yes, you can get under it. But it is a useful tool that makes it more difficult for people to cross."[76] In 2006, the Congressional Research Service reported a strong indication that crossers found new routes.[77] By 2009, 613 miles of physical barriers were built as a result of the Secure Fence Act of 2006. However, the wall was met with further opposition from President Barack Obama's administration and Congress.[78] Between 2008 and 2010, members of Congress introduced bills to extend the fence, but the bills died before a vote.[79] In 2015, the Republican presidential candidate, Donald J. Trump, renewed the call for a US-Mexico border-wall, bringing border enforcement as immigration policy into the center of domestic politics.[80]

HUMAN COST

The US government adopted border enforcement as immigration policy to combat terrorism at the cost of human lives. The human toll at the US-Mexico border has been well documented.[81] Some have gone as far to call the US-Mexico border a "war zone"[82] because of the policies enacted in the name of antiterrorism. According to a 2016 US Border Patrol report, the death toll along the US Southwest border totaled 6,571 lives between 1998 and 2015. Figure 01 below charts the death toll with a valley of 249 deaths in 1999 and a peak of 492 deaths in 2005. Since the September 11 attacks, the least deadly year on record is 2015 with 240 deaths on the US-Mexico border. Deaths increased again in 2016 to 322. The data shows an overall increase of reported deaths since the September 11 attacks and the US government's adoption of border enforcement as immigration policy.

The Department of Homeland Security refuted claims that Islamic terrorists in Mexico were currently poised to enter along the US-Mexico border. A DHS spokesperson said, "There is no

---

[73] President Bush's four-point plan for immigration reform included: 1) enforcing immigration laws inside the United States 2) reducing pressure on the border by creating a lawful path for temporary workers to enter the country 3) finding a middle-ground between amnesty and deportation for undocumented immigrants 4) acknowledging the tradition of the American melting pot.

[74] During the 109th United States Congress, the Secure Fence Act of 2006 (H.R. 6061) passed in the House of Representatives with a vote of 283-137, 10 not voting and 1 present. In the Senate, the bill gathered more support and passed with a vote of 80-19, with 1 not voting.

[75] Stephanie Simon, "Border-Fence Project Hits a Snag," *Wall Street Journal*, February 5, 2009, accessed December 2, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123370523066745559.

[76] Randal C. Archibold and Julia Preston, "Homeland Security Stands by Its Fence," *New York Times*, May 21, 2008, accessed December 2, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/21/washington/21fence.html.

[77] Chad C. Haddal, Yule Kim, and Michael John Garcia, "Border Security: Barriers Along the U.S. International Border" *Congressional Research Service*, March 16, 2009, accessed December 2, 2016, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33659.pdf.

[78] April Reese, "U.S.-Mexico Fence Building Continues Despite Obama's Promise to Review Effects," *New York Times*, April 16, 2009, accessed December 2, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/04/16/16greenwire-usmexico-fence-building-continues-despite-obam-10570.html.

[79]In 2008 during the 110th Congress, Representative for California's 52nd congressional district
Republican, Duncan Hunter, introduced Reinstatement of the Secure Fence Act (H.R. 5124) to construct at least 700 miles of fencing along the US-Mexico border. In 2009 and 2010, Senator Jim DeMitt, Republican of South Carolina, unsuccessfully introduced provisions to a DHS appropriation bill to extend the wall.

[80] Alexander Burns, "Donald Trump, Pushing Someone Rich, Offers Himself," *New York Times*, June 16, 2015. accessed December 2, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/17/us/politics/donald-trump-runs-for-president-this-time-for-real-he-says.html.

[81] Luis Alberto Urrea, *The Devil's Highway: A True Story* (New York: Black Bay, 2004).

[82] Todd Miller, *Border Patrol Nation: Dispatches from the Front Lines of Homeland Security* (San Francisco: City of Lights Media 2014).

credible intelligence to suggest that there is an active plot by ISIS to attempt to cross the southern border."[83] There have been no reported captures or arrests of international terrorists at the border to date.

CONCLUSION

The September 11 terror attacks changed US immigration policy. It is difficult to divorce US-Mexico border policy from homeland security after September 11 in the age of terrorism. Therefore, analyzing post-September 11 immigration policy as a reaction to terrorism is important. US-Mexico border policy shifted from largely an issue of economics to one of homeland security. Law enforcement, through border patrol and border militarization, characterized US-Mexico border policy. The Executive branch shifted policy in coordination with bipartisan Congressional support. The hallmark of their cooperation was the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2002, the biggest federal government reorganization since World War II. The human cost of enforcement has been well-documented with 5,661 recorded deaths between 2002 and 2016 on the US-Mexico border. However, the efficacy of the trade-off between human lives and border enforcement to ensure homeland security remains undetermined.

US Southwest Border Deaths, 1998-2016[84]



[83] Michael S. Schmidt, "U.S. Pushes Back Against Warnings that ISIS Plans to Enter from Mexico," *New York Times,* September 15, 2014, accessed December 2, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/16/us/us-pushes-back-against-warnings-that-isis-plans-to-enter-from-mexico.html.
[84] "U.S. Border Patrol Fiscal Year Southwest Border Sector Deaths (FY 1998 – FY 2016)," *U.S. Customs and Border Protection*, accessed April 10, 2017, https://www.cbp.gov/document/stats/us-border-patrol-fiscal-year-southwest-border-sector-deaths-fy-1998-fy-2016.

The Re-Commodification of US Higher Education

Alexander Montero

INTRODUCTION

Educating an estimated 68 percent of total college students,[85] public higher education institutions in the United States provide an increasingly important service to a growing student body. The inimical surge of public college prices in the US has spurred much debate over where to place blame. While some *prima facie* arguments decry decreased state funding, others accuse recalcitrant public colleges of putting accrued state subsidies toward non-academic pursuits. Yet it could be simply an economic question of supply and demand with institutions raising prices in response to the increased labor-market viability of their product.

Rising tuition prices are best described as a symptom of the increased cost of education—i.e., how much institutions must spend on educating students. Continued dependence on updated technology, coupled with a concordant surge in enrollments, expanded the output necessary for both public four-year and public two-year colleges in the US.

Public policy and low state-level tax revenues left public colleges financially unable to cover the rising cost of education, forcing institutions to convert from a system predominantly funded by state and federal appropriations to a commodified, predominantly tuition-based funding model, in which federal aid subsidizes individuals' tuition. Increased institutional costs, susceptibility to austerity and low-tax revenues have acted as the predominant variables affecting this process of conversion (i.e., price increases) in public higher education.

THE RISING PRICE AND COST OF COLLEGE

Along with increases in average published tuition, public colleges have faced several changes over the last few decades. From 1970 to 2014, enrollments[86] at public institutions rose by roughly 128 percent—from 6.4 million to 14.7 million students. The 1970s saw one of the largest enrollment surges in the post-war period, with the 2000s coming in second. For this reason, the 1970s can be viewed as a prudent starting point for viewing enrollment expansion. Some arguments view deindustrialization, the comparative increase of white-collar wages, and the later rise in the highly educated, information and communications technology (ICT)-based service sector as the main catalyst for such expansions.[87] Additionally, Archibald and Feldman draw upon "skill-biased technological change,"[88] wherein the use of new technology drives up skill and educational requirements, increasing both the demand and return of a college degree.

Concurrent with enrollments, tuition rates at public colleges began surging in the early 1980s. From 1983 (first year with available data in dataset) to 2015, tuition at public four-year institutions increased by approximately 130 percent in inflation adjusted dollars, while prices rose by roughly 60 percent at public two-year institutions (see Fig. 1).[89] Thus, following the marked

[85] Pew Charitable Trusts. *Federal and State Funding of Higher Education.* 2015, http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2015/06/federal-and-state-funding-of-higher-education
[86] Quantified by the National Center for Education Statistics as total fall enrollment for all public degree-granting institutions for a given year.
[87] Lawrence Katz and Robert A. Margo. "Technical Change and the Relative Demand for Skilled Labor: The United States in Historical Perspective." in *Human Capital in History: The American Record.* (University of Chicago Press, 2014.
[88] Robert Archibald and David Feldman, *Why Does College Cost So Much?* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 56.
[89] U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics. Digest of Education Statistics, (2015), https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d16/tables/dt16_330.10.asp?current=yes

enrollment surge of the 1970s, a subsequent tuition spike occurred beginning in the early 1980s.



Following consistent annual tuition hikes, public colleges came to rely more on tuition as a revenue source. In 1990 (the first year with given data), tuition, on average, made up roughly 25 percent of institutional revenue at public colleges, while in 2015 tuition accounted for 46.5 percent of total institutional revenue.[90] Why the increased budgetary reliance on tuition? According to a recent State Higher Education Executive Officers Association report, "Since 1990, student FTE (full time equivalent) enrollment has increased 43 percent, while (state and local) educational appropriations per FTE have declined 20 percent, meaning state and local funding has not kept up with either inflation or enrollment growth over time."[91] Another way to gauge total state funding of higher education is via funding per $1,000 in student personal income—a figure that has dropped from 6.73 to 5.28 since 1984.[92]

Prior to 2013, state and local appropriations consistently made up the majority of institutional revenues. By 2013-'14, however, tuition became, for the first time, the highest percentage average revenue source, while state and local appropriations decreased, both making up around 30 percent of revenue, respectively.[93] At public two-year colleges, a similar pattern emerged; however, state and local appropriations still make up the vast majority of revenues, while federal dollars make up a small fraction.

[90] State Higher Education Executive Officers Association (SHEEO). *State Higher Education Finance: FY 2015.* 2015., http://sheeo.org/sites/default/files/project-files/SHEEO_FY15_Report_051816.pdf

[91] Ibid., 19.

[92] Grapevine. *Historical Data.* (University of Illinois. 2008, 2016), https://education.illinoisstate.edu/grapevine/historical.

[93] SHEEO, *State Higher Education Finance*



In concordance with tuition and public revenue, we also must draw our attention to the increased cost of education—i.e., the institutional price of educating students. In the decade preceding 2013-'14, educational expenditures per full-time-equivalent student rose by 16 percent at public four-year colleges (the SHEEO report does not provide data before this period). Concurrently, public two-year institutions saw a four percent rise.[94] Thus, heightened enrollment has not simply increased expenditures, as the cost of education *per individual student* exhibits a marked increase over time as well. Placing the blame of heightened prices on consistently declining state funding belies the importance that such cost plays in college tuition increases. For instance, while state and local appropriations declined in certain periods (particularly during and following recessions), such funding has increased by roughly 40 percent since the mid-1980s. Leading up to the most recent recession, appropriations peaked in 2007, indicating a 55 percent increase from the mid-1980s (appropriations declined dramatically following the recession and recently began to climb: see Fig. 2).[95] Tuition consistently rose even during periods wherein state appropriations increased. To best explain this paradox, we must analyze how the institutional cost of providing education has changed over time.

COST DISEASE: THE ISSUE OF PRODUCTIVITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION

Before approaching government and institutional cost shifts, a focus must be placed on the variables that incentivize and drive conversion. Conversion is best understood as a direct response to the rising cost of education. Beyond the costs needed to cover output in the face of heightened enrollments, higher education's status as a technology-reliant service dependent on highly educated workers and, in most cases, face to face interaction has impaired many public institutions' ability to increase productivity. Not only has demand increased, but the price of education per student has risen.

[94] SHEEO, *State Higher Education Finance*, 27.
[95] College Board. *Trends in College Pricing.* (Washington D.C., 2016) https://trends.collegeboard.org/college-pricing

The changes in post-secondary education most closely resemble shifts in the cost of legal services and health care. Archibald and Feldman argue that such productivity issues have plagued higher education since the 1980s: "The actual measures of productivity change are *negative* for healthcare and educational services since the 1980s, which means we currently use more input than in the past to achieve the same level of output … Costs must go up as a consequence."[96] Public colleges attempted to attenuate these rising costs through the use of online courses, part-time adjunct and graduate student faculty, and increasing class sizes, which have had little effect on productivity and cost: "Productivity measured as students taught per labor hour is the type of productivity that has failed to rise in higher education in any sustained fashion over the last century."[97]

Total expenditures, adjusted for inflation, at public institutions constantly rose by roughly $204 million, or 170 percent, between 1980 and 2013-'14 (data not available after 2014). More recently, instructional expenditures at public four-year colleges increased by 12.4 million, or 23 percent, between 2007-'08 and 2013-'14. Nearly all institutional expenditures from student services to operation and maintenance costs have increased substantially over the years.[98]

COST CONTAINMENT: HIGHER EDUCATION AND AUSTERITY

As costs have risen, budgetary issues and austerity have impacted public colleges, directly affecting available general funds. These monetary issues specifically affect higher education for a number of reasons: (1) since about the mid-1970s state tax-derived budgets have failed to provide adequate funding; (2) higher education is uniquely pliant in that it can balance its budget in the face of cutbacks by shifting costs to students in ways that public services, such as K-12 education, cannot; (3) for this reason spending cutbacks hit public higher education first, especially during and following recessions.

Currently, the aggregate amount of state tax revenue available to public higher education institutions has dropped to its lowest point.[99] Archibald and Feldman attribute the decline in available public revenue to the so-called tax revolt of the 1970s. Beginning in 1976, 23 states enacted tax limitations, directly affecting higher education. Archibald and Feldman's analysis shows that "a state's effort in support of its colleges and universities declined much more precipitously in the presence of tax-revolt provisions."[100] Borrowing Paul Pierson's terminology, higher education is coping with a form of "permanent austerity."[101]

On average, higher education spending as a percentage of total general fund spending is declining. In 1987 (the first year with recorded data), higher education made up 15.5 percent of general funding. By 2015, that number dropped 10 percent, while Medicaid spending more than doubled, rising from eight to 19 percent.[102] Much like higher education, Medicaid faced cost increases due to heightened costs of providing care (partially due to rising prescription drug prices) and a surge in recipients. As a codified public service, however, Medicaid is unable to push costs onto recipients in the same way public colleges can with heightened tuition prices. The most recent

---

[96] Archibald and Feldman, *Why Does College Cost So Much?*, 69.
[97] Ibid., 71.
[98] U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics. Digest of Education Statistics, (2015), https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d15/tables/dt15_334.10.asp; (1995) https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d95/dtab330.asp
[99] SHEEO, *State Higher Education Finance*.
[100] Archibald and Feldman, *Why Does College Cost So Much?*, 146.
[101] Paul Pierson. "Coping With Permanent Austerity: Welfare State Restructuring in Affluent Democracies," in *The New Politics of the Welfare State*, ed. Paul Pierson (Oxford University Press, 2001).
[102] National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO). *A Guidebook on State Budgeting for Higher Education.* (Washington, D.C., 2015), https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/NASBO/9d2d2db1-c943-4f1b-b750-0fca152d64c2/UploadedImages/Reports/Higher%20Education%20State%20Budgeting%20Guidebook.pdf

National Association for State Budget Officers report denotes this as a problem occurring in nearly every state: "costs are indeed rising over time … specific cost drivers are increasing the need for additional revenues far beyond what states can reasonably afford, especially given spending pressures in areas such as Medicaid and K-12 education."[103]

Due to their ability to offset cuts via tuition hikes, public colleges are often the first victims of state budget cuts during recessions. Higher education's ability to retain a balanced budget in the face of austerity is a prime example of what Pierson calls rationalization, or "modification of programmes in line with new ideas about how to achieve established goals."[104] Conversion policies are rationalized in the face of higher education's unique ability to re-commodify in ways that other public services cannot. As a member of the Ohio House of Representatives stated, "It was easier to cut something that could be replaced. When we made the budget cuts, we really felt that we were not hurting higher education."[105] Thus, following recessions, states are prone to defund higher education more than other public services.

On the state level, then, inevitable cost increases in public tertiary education have compounded with low tax revenues, spending pressures in other public services and austerity measures during recessions. Not only have budgets, on average, not kept pace with heightened costs, higher education's ability to offset costs in the face of these three variables has provided fecund ground for conversion to occur.

CONVERSION

Given that state appropriations have steadily risen since the 1980s with intermittent declines during recessions, state-led political institutions have not defunded higher education; rather, they have conferred new costs onto students. Since 1964, the passing of the Higher Education Act codified federal need-based support for students. As tuition continued to rise and state funding per $1,000 of student income decreased, students increasingly depended on federal aid. Such need-based aid indirectly attempts to attenuate rising student costs via individual federal grants that discount the amount paid by recipient students without decreasing tuition for students *en masse*. In more recent years, federal aid underwent another form of conversion, in which an emphasis on loans and student borrowing outpaced need-based aid.

From its inception, higher education mostly relied on the trinity of federal, state and tuition-based funding. Over time, none of these revenue sources disappeared, nor remained stagnant. As educational costs rose, state appropriations increased at times, but, as we have seen, at a markedly lower pace. Thus, within the triad of revenue sources, tuition and fees expanded more rapidly than both state and federal aid.

The historical move from a public policy of ubiquitous low-tuition directly funded via federal and state level institutional grants toward a system of need-based aid and higher tuition illustrates the process of re-commodification in public higher education—a trajectory that occurred hand-in-hand with a process of conversion. Hacker, Pierson and Thelen denote conversion as a process whereby existing policies are redirected, rather than ignored, to adapt to changes:

> *By conversion we mean the transformation of an already-existing institution or policy through its authoritative redirection, reinterpretation, or reappropriation … Conversion occurs when (1) institutions or rules are sufficiently*

---

103 National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO). *A Guidebook on State Budgeting for Higher Education.* (Washington, D.C., 2015), https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/NASBO/9d2d2db1-c943-4f1b-b750-0fca152d64c2/UploadedImages/Reports/Higher%20Education%20State%20Budgeting%20Guidebook.pdf

104 Pierson, "Coping With Permanent Austerity*",* 425.

105 Donald E. Heller. *The States and Public Higher Education Policy.* (Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 2001), 49.

malleable that they can serve multiple ends; (2) those ends are politically contested; and (3) political actors are able to redirect an institution or policy to serve new functions while (4) leaving its formal rules in place.[106]

Regarding shifts in higher education, the conversion model applies equally, but in different respects to federal and state funding, which exhibit interlocking but differentiated processes of conversion.

CONVERSION IN STATE FUNDING

On a state level, conversion has predominantly occurred via a shift toward student-derived appropriations in the form of tuition and fees. With regard to Hacker, Pierson and Thelen's model, the state level conversion of public higher education occurs when funding sources are redirected and re-appropriated as a direct response to increased costs and institutions' unique pliancy. The most recent NASBO report backs this model in the context of recent post-recession declines in state appropriations: "As a general pattern, institutions have reacted to declining state appropriations by shifting more of the cost burden onto students, rather than finding ways to significantly reduce overall costs."[107] As we have seen, conversion continues to occur even when appropriations are not declining, as illustrated by the fact that tuition rates consistently climbed even during periods of rising or stagnant appropriations.

Prior to 2013, state general funds made up the majority of operating revenues at public institutions. Now, tuition has a newfound stance as the largest proportion of institutional revenue, representing a "dramatic swing in the way that states are funding higher education … (reflecting) a willingness to have students share a greater portion of the costs."[108] Unlike a process of drift, wherein government actors turn their backs on certain services, conversion denotes the process whereby fungible state funding sources actively shifted toward students and away from general funds and tax revenues. As Archibald and Feldman argue, "By many measures, state governments have retreated substantially from their earlier commitment to low-priced public university education."[109]

Of course, cross-state differences exist throughout the US regarding tuition-setting policy and the price of education. Policy makers attempt to retain control of the triad of price, quality and subsidy costs; however, only two of these areas can be controlled, while the other will decline: "If you force universities to hold the line on price (while underlying costs are rising), then you cannot maintain quality unless the subsidy rises. If you cut the subsidy, you cannot hold the line on price unless you are willing to see quality fall."[110] While aggregate data doesn't account for substantial state differentials in tuition prices, the relative weights institutions place on the triad of cost, quality and subsidy can account for the variations in tuition. In other words, the extent to which conversion is used on a state-by-state basis will affect at least one portion of this triad. For example, Florida shifted from having the lowest tuition in the US to adopting rapid tuition hikes as the state's high-subsidy, low tuition policy resulted in "less than sufficient funds to help meet enrollment demands, attract top faculty talent and provide adequate student services."[111] In response, Florida's legislature pushed a deregulated tuition-setting model, wherein the state provided colleges with more tuition setting authority, which resulted in rising prices to cover institutional costs. Again, we see costs affecting the ability of states to keep tuition prices down. In the Florida example, the issue is not appropriation cuts, but the lack of necessary appropriation *increases* that enable heightened tuition.

---

[106] Jacob S. Hacker, Kathleen Thelen and Paul Pierson, "Drift and Conversion: Hidden Faces of Institutional Change." in *Advances in Comparative Historical Analysis,* ed. James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen. (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 185.
[107]NASBO. *A Guidebook on State Budgeting for Higher Education,* 14.
[108] Ibid., 11.
[109] Archibald and Feldman, *Why Does College Cost So Much?*, 143.
[110] Ibid., 93.
[111] Lesley McBain. "Tuition-Setting Authority and Deregulation at State Colleges and Universities. Policy Matters: A Higher Education Policy Brief." American Association of State Colleges and Universities (2010), 3.

Some states, such as Texas, recently enacted so-called tuition setting deregulation (providing institutions with more tuition setting authority) and exhibited a marked, comparative increase in tuition levels, as tuition deregulation increases the force of state-level conversion.[112] While California's public four-year institutions witnessed some of the highest price increases in the past few years, the state flaunts one of the most inexpensive public two-year systems in the nation. Low cost of city colleges in California is attributed to generous state and local appropriations, which make up the majority of institutions' operating revenue. Not only has the state-level conversion variable not occurred markedly in California,[113] public two-year institutions flaunt lower institutional cost.

While tuition-setting authority varies between states, more states have provided colleges with increased tuition setting autonomy in the past few years, which has resulted in further increases and deregulation. Aggregate data provides an adequate measure of overall trends in the US, but tuition, costs, funding and policies vary widely between states. State-level case studies, however, simply exhibit institutions approaching the aforesaid issues in variant ways with markedly different results. Additionally, cross-state comparisons demonstrate that republican-led state governments correlate with higher tuition rates.[114]

CONVERSION IN FEDERAL FUNDING

As states, on average, pushed costs onto students via the failure to keep pace with funding requirements, federal aid also shifted through a process of conversion. Over the years, updates to the 1964 Higher Education Act redirected the emphasis from direct institutional federal funding toward a system of need-based aid. Pell Grants, a prevalent form of federal aid, attempted to keep pace with rising prices and enrollments, but, much like state funding, lagged and depreciated in value. Along with the federal conversion toward expanded need-based aid, government loans have come to constitute the largest portion of federal aid, outpacing grants in recent years.

The reauthorization of the Higher Education Act in 1972 first introduced federally funded low-income grants—i.e., Pell Grants. The number of Pell Grant recipients has skyrocketed since the 1980s, rising from 2.7 billion to 7.6 billion in 2016. Pell Grant expenditures have naturally followed the rise in recipients, increasing from $6.9 billion to $28.2 billion over the same time. These increases in recipients and spending, however, do not necessarily mean that federal aid is keeping pace with tuition, but, rather, more postsecondary students are taking advantage of such grants. In fact, the maximum Pell Grant awarded as a percentage of published tuition at public four-year universities declined substantially in the last decade from 83 percent to 60 percent.[115]

In recent years, the quantity of federal aid has continued to surge. From 2005-'06 to 2015-'16, the amount of total federal grants increased by 106 percent, while loans, overall, increased by 36 percent even after steadily declining from a 2010-'11 peak. Conversely, aggregate state grants rose by just 22 percent.[116] Federal grant aid as a percentage of students' funding sources is currently the highest it has been in the last 20 years. Currently, at 34 percent, student loans constitute the largest funding source for postsecondary students, with federal grants following behind at 26 percent and state grants at 5 percent.[117] Overall, via Pell Grants, the federal government clearly provides the largest form of direct student funding—excluding lending—in comparison to the states.

---

112 Stella Flores, "Pricing out the Disadvantaged? The Effect of Tuition Deregulation in Texas Public Four-year Institutions," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* 655, no.1 (2014): 99-122.
113 Donald Heller, "Public Subsidies for Higher Education in California: An Exploratory Analysis of Who Pays and Who Benefits. *Educational Policy,* 19, no. 2 (2005): 349-370.
114 Michael McLendron, James Hearn and Christine Mokher, "Partisans, Professionals, and Power: The Role of Political Factors in Higher Education Funding," *The Journal of Higher Education*, 80, no. 6 (2009), 686-713.
115 Ibid.
116 College Board. *Trends in Student Aid.* (Washington D.C, 2016), https://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/2016-trends-student-aid.pdf
117 College Board. *Trends in Student Aid.* (Washington D.C, 2016), https://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/2016-trends-student-aid.pdf

The use of loans over time mimes state-level cost shifting, wherein loans—as a form of aid—are seen as an effective way to provide access, but by placing the burden of costs onto students. Again, federal loans are a way to shift costs while leaving formal rules in place. Loans exist as a way for policymakers to enact cost shifting by simply changing the funding source behind the tuition that state-run colleges receive. This has no attenuating effects on either the rising price or cost of education. In fact, as Heller points out, loans often increase the price of college via the addition of origination fees and interest.[118] While federal grants affect the net price paid by students, they have no effect on the cost of providing postsecondary education on the state level. Returning to the original question of rising costs and prices, conversion on the state level occurs as a response to the increased *cost* of education, while federal conversion occurs as a response to consequent *price* increase faced by students. As state aid exhibited conversion via a process of cost-shifting (from general fund appropriations to tuition), federal funding in the form of grants has indeed increased with loans now making up the largest percentage of aid.

These forms of conversion signify a move away from the low-tuition policies of the early to mid-twentieth century toward a system of heightened tuition in response to state-level cost increases. Consequently, the federal government has responded to state-level price increases by expanding grants and loans as a form of individual need-based aid, rather than providing appropriations directly to institutions to drive down tuition in general. Given this tradeoff, federal revenue toward higher education has surpassed state revenue regarding funding per student.

CONCLUSION

While some have postulated that public colleges are becoming increasingly privatized, a marked dichotomy still exists between public and private institutions. Moreover, Hacker, Pierson and Thelen's conversion model allows for more specificity by differentiating between form and impact. As we've seen, state support, though recently outpaced by tuition revenue, still makes up a large amount of public institutions' operating revenue.

The state-level dilemma of declining tax revenues, coupled with the spending pressures of other publicly funded services, has provided a conduit for conversion to occur in higher education funding. Some states kept college prices down, while others, like California, witnessed dramatic percentage increases in the past few years for their public four-year institutions.[119] Cost increases force states to act, and, on average, states have responded with conversion rather than increased appropriations.

With the expansion of technology during the latter part of the twentieth century, higher education witnessed the cost of providing its service increase along with heightened demand. Faced with increased enrollments and costs, states must provide either equivalent subsidies or increased prices. Given declining tax revenues and recent recessions, budgetary issues hit higher education hardest due to their ability to shift rising costs from public appropriations to students. As students have faced higher sticker prices over the years, the federal government has increased its role in providing need-based redistributive aid to attenuate student-incurred price increases.

Conversion occurs as a response to a chain of causality. Rising educational costs and deficient tax revenues have pushed states to raise prices. Federal aid, rather than responding with investment policies that would drive down tuition prices for students, *en masse*, has responded with redistributive aid and lending, which seeks to decreases recipient students' net tuition prices or offset their costs. In this sense, federal aid in the form of grants is indirectly providing state institutions

[118] Heller, "State Support of Higher Education."
[119] College Board. *Trends in Student Aid.*

with operating revenues by funding student appropriations. Thus, state level conversion has not only shifted costs onto students, but also onto the federal government, which has now surpassed state funding as a revenue source.

If policy makers intend to drive tuition prices down, public appropriations (either federal or state) must, therefore, match the cost and output of public higher education institutions or else conversion will continue to occur. Furthermore, as federal aid (both lending and student grants) simply subsidizes individual student cost, any federal policy aimed at lowering institutions' tuition levels directly would require a return to providing direct institutional appropriations.

Oil Revenues and Rentier States

How did Economic Sanctions and Subsidy Reforms Affect Iranian Lower-Middle Class During the Presidency of Ahmadinejad in Iran?

Dena Motevalian

INTRODUCTION

This study focuses on the "rentier" character of a state[120], and the effect of economic sanctions on the state's foreign policy and its economic infrastructures. The resource-dependent economic foundation of rentier states allows the allocation of welfare benefits to society in boom periods. However, a rentier state's high dependency on resource export revenues creates a risky economy that can collapse by international oil price fluctuations or oil sanctions. Thus, I argue that oil sanctions can cause economic deprivation and resource revenue cuts, which leads to a shift in a rentier state's policies in favor of the sender state. I also argue that resource sanctions can lead to democratic shifts in economic administrations within the rentier state.

To investigate this, first I review literature on the resource curse hypothesis, the rentier state's economy and its power structures, and on successful sanctions among adversaries. Secondly, I present Iran as a case study and its rentier economic character. I summarize the process of global sanctions on Iran and their effects on tax reforms and government expenditures. More specifically, I look into the effects of intensified international economic sanctions during the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, which led to a tax and subsidy reform for the first time in Iran's history. Lastly, I explore how subsidy reforms affected the Iranian lower-middle class and the inequality ratio.

This paper aims to show that resource coercions on the Iranian case study with a rentier character were successful in shifting Iran's policy to comply with the senders' policies. Furthermore, I argue that resource revenue cuts on Iran led to rebuilding a more transparent tax administration, which is unorthodox for rentier states.

OIL RENTIER STATE ECONOMY

Countries with wealth derived from oil or other natural resources often fail to grow at the same pace as countries which lack natural resources. This phenomenon is known as the Natural Resource Curse.[121] Since oil rentier states are blessed with substantial oil revenues, they do not need to tax their population as much as other states. Consequently, they are less accountable to their populations than states without rent revenues.[122] The constant flow of resource rents allows the rentier state to enjoy substantial autonomy from its citizens, and to insulate itself against social and

---

[120] The rentier state is a term used for a state that derives all or a substantial portion of its national revenues from the rent of its indigenous resources from the outside world on a regular basis. The common characteristics of rentier states are their independency from their society, unaccountability to their citizens, and autocratic nature. For example, countries such as Iran, the Gulf States, many African states like Nigeria or Gabon, with abundant resource wealth are classified as rentier. A rentier state and rentier economy contributes to a rentier mentality, which negatively affects a country's economy and infrastructures. For more information, see Michael Cook and Hussein Mahdavy, "The Pattern and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran," *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East: From the Rise of Islam to the Present Day* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 428-467.

[121] Jeffrey Frankel, "The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey," *National Bureau of Economic Research*, March 2010, accessed on April 13, 2017, http://www.nber.org/papers/w15836.

[122] Michael L. Ross, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" *World Politics* 53, no. 3 (2001): 332, accessed April 13, 2017, doi:10.1353/wp.2001.0011.

political pressures. Oil rentier states are based on a capital-intensive economy[123] and the petroleum industry, which largely disassociates the state from the larger economic spectrum.[124] With income flowing into the state and less economic vulnerabilities, rentier states are more likely to act unilaterally and develop authoritarianism. During economic shocks, the oil-rich states, already isolated from social forces, have few credible institutions for peaceful conflict resolution. As a result, oil-rich states are more prone to encourage military rule and implement authoritarian solutions to conflicts.[125]

Since oil rentier states are largely dependent on oil revenues, oil price fluctuations and Dutch disease distorts their economies. Overspending, debt, and fiscal crises are the central challenges for rentier states due to the volatility of international petroleum markets. Their resource-dependent economies dwindle domestic manufacturing and service exports, diminishing values of other tradable goods, real estate, and services. Since tumbling oil prices constantly threaten the political and economic stability of rentier states, their domestic economic atmospheres remain high-risk for investors.[126]

The resource curse literature focuses on how rentier states receive a capricious flow of revenue from an economic reserve that is highly dependent on international market prices, and lacks substantial linkages with the rest of the economy. As a result of this resource income flow, rentier states can subsidize education, health care, and other social services without developing their tax administration or taxing their citizens. But this results in an inability to provide accurate information about enterprises and households, and since occupational specialization is discouraged, their educational system and labor economy remain largely disjointed.[127] This amounts to a typical case of Dutch disease, in which the resource dependency of oil rentier states not only distorts their economic infrastructures, but also creates a base to grow authoritarianism.

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND RENTIER STATES

The existing literature defines sanctions as foreign policy levers taken by *sender* countries to change the behavior of *target* states, either unilaterally or multilaterally.[128] Sanctions are assumed to inflict economic cost on their targets, with the intent to alter that state's behavior. The economic effectiveness of the sender government determines the pressure it places on the target state. Thus, the target's crippled domestic economy will create a new interest group that prefers complying with the sender state. Consequently, the sender state can expect that the economic deprivation it causes with sanctions will create modifications in power within the target state.[129]

States as rational unitary actors are constantly concerned about how their actions will affect their bargaining position during future interactions in material or reputation. Thus, decision makers, given a set of preferences, will make choices to obtain their most preferred outcome and to further their income and wealth.[130] Therefore in international political conflicts, decision makers care more

---

[123] The oil industry is considered capital intensive because it employs few workers and its inter-industry demand is underdeveloped. Therefore, it lacks linkages to the broader economy. For more information, see Michael Cook and Hussein Mahdavy, "The Pattern and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran," in *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East: From the Rise of Islam to the Present Day* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 435-436.
[124] *Ibid*., 435.
[125] Clement M. Henry, "Algeria's Agonies: Oil Rent Effects in a Bunker State," *Journal of North African Studies* 9, no. 2 (2004), 68-72, accessed April 13, 2017, doi:10.1080/1362938042000323347.
[126] Ibid., 70.
[127] Ross, Does Oil Hinder Democracy, 325-361.
[128] Daniel W. Drezner, *The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 2.
[129] Susan Hannah Allen, "The Domestic Political Costs of Economic Sanctions," *Journal of Conflict Resolution 52, no. 6 (2008): 916, accessed April 13, 2017, doi:*10.1177/0022002708325044.
[130] Daniel W. Drezner, "The Sanctions Paradox," *The Journal of Politics* 63, no. 2 (2001): 27-29, accessed April 13, 2017, doi:10.1017/CBO9780511549366.

about the distribution of gains and payoffs, as well as maintaining a reputation for tough bargaining.[131]

When sanctions are imposed, economic interactions and increased trade escalate the target's cost of any coercion attempt. Therefore, when conflict expectations are the greatest among adversary states, threats to impose damaging sanctions will prevent the target state from financing long-run opportunity costs. For this reason, adversaries who anticipate more future conflicts will act to minimize their trade vulnerabilities.[132]

The sanction's outcome is primarily dependent on the economic and political atmosphere of the target country. Since the target's political and economic stability may fluctuate during sanction episodes, it is crucial for the sender state to update its sanction's effectiveness in pursuing foreign policy goals. In order to obtain the desired results, the sender state must assess the stability of the target properly and replenish its sanction measures.[133]

Studies show that sanctions have an average effect of a 2.4 percent decrease in GDP of the target, though failed sanctions have an impact of only 1.0 percent decrease.[134] Finally, for sanctions to be successful, the economic pressure must be sufficient to increase domestic political pressure; to either topple the target regime, or to engender the adoption of new policies in accordance with the norms of the sender state.[135]

IRAN AND THE RENTIER STATE

The rentier structure of the Iranian state reflects its economy, which is highly dependent on oil domination.[136] For Iran, oil and gas revenues are the main source of foreign exchange earnings and fiscal revenues. Despite rapid non-oil export growth since the1960s, oil and gas receipts account for 72 percent of Iran's export revenues in the last decade. Oil and gas revenues also represent 65 percent of fiscal revenues, and will likely remain the main source of financing for development projects in the future.[137]

Iran is highly dependent on oil export revenues for its business cycle. From 2002-2008, Iran's fiscal spending and credit growth increased, as well as its export and oil revenues, resulting in high inflation. However, the government's tighter monetary policies, which coincided with the world recession of 2008-2009, led to a sharp decline in oil exports that decreased inflation and output.[138] Oil market price determines the Iranian government's monetary policies; thereby controlling its domestic inflation rate, business cycle, and social expenditures.

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ON IRAN

After the 1979, Islamic revolution in Iran when 52 Americans were taken hostage in the American embassy in Tehran, the United States and Iran cut all diplomatic relations. With the growing hostile atmosphere between the two countries, the United States has led international

---

[131] Daniel W. Drezner, "The Sanctions Paradox," *The Journal of Politics* 63, no. 2 (2001): 27-29, accessed April 13, 2017, doi:10.1017/CBO9780511549366, 53.
[132] Ibid., 310- 314.
[133] Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, (Washington: Peter G. Peterson, 2009).
[134] Allen, *The Domestic Political Costs of Economic Sanctions*, 917.
[135] Donald L. Losman, *International Economic Sanctions: The Cases of Cuba, Israel, and Rhodes* (New Mexico: University of New Mexico Press, 1979) 128.
[136] Cook and Mahdavy, *The Pattern and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran*, 428-431.
[137] Dominique Guillaume, Roman Zytek, and Mohammad Reza Farzin, "Iran - The Chronicles of Subsidy Reform," *International Monetary Fund*, July 2011, accessed April 13, 2017, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp11167.pdf.
[138] Ibid., 4.

efforts to apply sanction measures on the Iranian missile, energy, shipping, transportation, and financial sectors in order to influence a change in Iranian policies.[139]

In 1996 when doubts regarding Iran's nuclear activity increased, the United States was the first to impose sanction measures on Iran. The new measures' objective was to persuade Tehran to address the international community's concerns about its nuclear program development. Consequently, in 2006 the United Nations Security Council, the European Union, and other countries joined the United States to enforce a strong pattern of sanctions relating to Iran's nuclear non-proliferation. The sanctions targeted economic sectors to persuade Iranian leaders to engage in positive discussions with other countries and fulfill its nonproliferation responsibilities. Moreover, the sanctions were expected to induce Iran to collaborate as a normal non-nuclear-weapon state under The Nonproliferation Treaty.[140]

INTENSIFIED COLLECTIVE SANCTIONS

In 2012, the Obama administration convinced the international community to impose sanctions on Iranian oil exports and to disconnect Iran from the global transaction network SWIFT.[141] Oil embargos massively restricted Iran's revenues because oil exports were the main income source for the Iranian government and accounted for one-fifth of the country's GDP at the time. Therefore, oil sanctions targeted foreign firms that provided services and investments related to the energy sector, and firms that participated in activities related to oil exports.

Immediately after the amplification of oil embargos in 2012, the value of Iranian rial[142] collapsed and the inflation and unemployment rates tremendously rose. According to the Congressional Research Service, the intensified international sanctions from 2012 to 2014 decreased the value of the rial to 56 percent, and increased its inflation rates to more than 50 percent.[143] The same report says that the unemployment rate rose to as high as 20 percent in 2012 and 2013. Eventually, the effects of the new sanctions on the Iranian economy convinced the Iranian government to shift its policies to maintain stability.



Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Statistics Database and Iran Country Analysis Brief[144]

---

139 Robert Carswell, "Economic Sanctions and the Iran Experience," *Foreign Affairs* 60, no. 2 (1981): 247, accessed April 13, 2017, doi:10.2307/20041079.

140 "Timeline: Sanctions on Iran," *Al Jazeera*, October 16, 2012, accessed on April 13, 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/10/20121016132757857588.html.

141 Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) code is the global provider of secure financial messaging services. It is an internationally-recognized identification code for banks around the world.

142 Iranian Currency

143 Kenneth Katzman, "Iran Sanctions," *Congressional Research Service*, March 31, 2017, accessed on April 13, 2017, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf.

144 "Total Primary Energy Production 2014," *International Energy Statistics*, accessed April 13, 2017, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/data/browser/#/?vo=0&v=H&start=1980&end=2014.

THE IRANIAN SUBSIDY REFORM PLAN

In 2007, the European Union joined the United Nations and the United States to impose new sanctions on the Iranian economy. Highly dependent on its oil export revenues, the Iranian regime started to apply various economic measures to survive future budget deficits.

Historically, like the majority of oil-rentier states, domestic energy prices in Iran have been set high enough to cover production costs. This was only convenient with stable and relatively low international oil prices. However, after 2002, with the increase of international prices, the market value of oil could no longer compensate for the low domestic energy prices. In addition, high domestic rates of inflation due to exchange rate depreciations led to the growing disparity between domestic and international energy prices. Cheap energy stimulated demand, making Iran the country with the highest level of energy subsidies and the most energy-intensive economy in the world.[145]

In 2008, the significant increase of international oil prices to $150 per barrel resulted in massive revenues for the Iranian government. However, continuing to provide low domestic prices for energy was unjustifiable by any economic theory. A systematic management of revenues and expenditures is crucial for a country under severe pressure of economic sanctions to maintain its stability. In a world of scarce energy, no government supported paying high production costs for energy and subsidizing it for domestic use at the lowest price level any longer. The 2008 world recession reduced Iranian oil export revenues and the threat of sanctions intensified. The Iranian government aimed to gain more revenue through subsidy and tax reforms.[146]

Consequently, in 2010, the parliament passed the Iranian Subsidy Reform Plan. The reform cut a wide range of subsidies on water, electricity, and staple foods, resulting in a 4 to 20 times price increase in energy products. Although the government was harshly criticized, president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called it an achievement and the most important economic plan of the past 50 years.[147]

According to the Iranian government, the reform plan's objectives were to reduce waste and rationalize consumption. However, the plan would replace subsidies on food and energy with targeted social assistance and cash compensations for citizens. Moreover, the government announced that the revenues from the subsidies would be distributed as free loans to investors, and as energy subsidies to producers.[148] According to the World Bank, the overall indirect subsidies estimated to be equivalent to 27 percent of GDP in 2007-2008, were replaced with a direct cash transfer program to the Iranian households.[149]

The reform plan also aimed to improve social equity in the distribution of oil wealth by understanding how individuals and families allocate their incomes. Thus, for the poor who benefited little from cheap domestic energy prices, the compensation of $12 per person would represent a large portion of their income, intended to lift every Iranian out of poverty. The government used such arguments in support of the reform plan despite harsh critiques from opposition groups.

The government envisioned that households would receive at least 50 percent of the increase in revenues from the reform. In the first phase, the benefits were to be paid in cash. In the second phase, some of the additional gains would support higher social benefits and public goods. Moreover, 30 percent of the additional revenues were to be used to assist Iranian companies in adjusting to the higher energy costs. The government would use the remaining 20 percent of the

145 Guillaume, *Iran - The Chronicles of Subsidy Reform*, 5.
146 Maaike Warnaar, *Iranian Foreign Policy During Ahmadinejad Ideology and Actions* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 55-56.
147 Ibid., 57.
148 Guillaume, *Iran - The Chronicles of Subsidy Reform*, 7.
149 "Iran Overview," *World Bank*, October 1, 2016, accessed April 13, 2017, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/iran/overview.

additional revenues to cover its own higher energy bill.[150]

The Iranian authorities targeted the poorer segments of society in the distribution of revenues from the reform. However, due to inefficient tax administrations, they were faced with a lack of accurate household income data. In 2010, the statistical center of Iran began collecting information regarding the economic situation of individual households. The government announced the target of revenue recipients as first, the bottom 30-50th percentile of income groups, and second, the lower 70th percentile. Nevertheless, declining support to the upper income groups who inhabited larger cities and were the biggest energy consumers, would risk provoking public discontent and domestic conflict. Therefore, everyone was allowed to apply for the compensatory cash transfers, but the richest households were encouraged to renounce from applying.[151]

The revenues gained from the subsidies compensated for parts of the government's budget deficits, which were caused by export decline and world recession. However, with the exacerbation of sanctions on oil and SWIFT in 2012, the government went through a new phase of chronic economic and political instability. Consequently, new sanctions on oil and SWIFT played a crucial role in shifting the Iranian government's diplomacy to comply with the policies of the sender state.[152]



In 2013, with a new administration in power, Iran agreed to negotiate its nuclear objectives with the P5+1 countries,[153] and signed an agreement pact in Geneva. In 2015, The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, required Iran to have an exclusively peaceful nuclear program. The US and the EU have lifted nuclear-related sanctions on Iran as a result of Iran verifiably meeting its nuclear commitments.[154]

INEQUALITY RATIO

The reform plan described above stipulated to improve the distribution of wealth among the population, and aimed to prioritize the bottom income households. However, the government distributed cash to everyone in order to reduce the shock from the major increase of energy prices among the middle-class population.

---

150 Guillaume, *Iran - The Chronicles of Subsidy Reform*, 10.
151 Ibid., 14.
152 Katzman, *Iran Sanctions*, 55.
153 The P5+1 refers to the UN Security Council's five permanent members (the P5); namely China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, plus Germany. The P5+1 is often referred to as the E3+3 by European countries.
154 "Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action," *US Department of State*, accessed April 13, 2017, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/.

In order to estimate the effects of the reform plan on different classes of the Iranian society, this paper reviews poverty rates and the Gini coefficient index[155]before and after the reform. A view of the poverty lines for 2004 shows $2.70 per day for a rural individual and $3.80 per day for an urban resident. Similarly, the nationwide minimum wage level in 2004 was about $12 per day, which seems to be set to keep a family of four above a $3 poverty line.[156]

The Poverty Line in Iran



Source: www.djavadsalehi.com

This poverty diagram demonstrates a significant decline in poverty rates to below 5 percent during 2011-2013, when inflation rose and international sanctions intensified. The government's significant subsidy cash distribution among the poor is part of the explanation. Moreover, the Gini index shows remarkable stability in the 45 percent range before the reform plan period. However, during 2012-2014, the index rises from 37.4 percent to 38.8 percent in line with poverty after the redistribution policies of Ahmadinejad were taking effect.[157]



Source: www.djavadsalehi.com using HEIS data files, various years

---

155 Gini coefficient index is sensitive to the middle-income range.

156 See the monthly minimum wage of 1,066,000 rials for 1384 (2004/2005) reported in the Central Bank of Iran, Annual Report 1384, Table 44, and the PPP exchange rate of 2780 rials per dollar reported by World Bank. "World Development Indicators," *World Bank*, accessed April 13, 2017, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&country=IRN.

157 Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, "Poverty, Inequality, and Populist Politics in Iran," *Journal of Economic Inequality* 7, no. 1 (2008), 25, accessed April 13, 2017, doi:10.1007/s10888-007-9071-y.

In addition to the Gini index with a sharp decline after the 2006 aggregated international sanctions, the general entropy index with parameters GE(2)[158] and GE(-1),[159] equally shows a major drop among the top incomes. The small but significant increase in inequality during the 2008- 2009 period of rising oil revenues demonstrates an increase of inequality among the rich and among the poor. Additionally, the 2010 government subsidy spending indicates a short-term rise in revenues among the bottom poor, and a decline in revenues of the top bottom incomes.[160] In other words, the 2010 reform plan and the cash distribution among the Iranian citizens led to a decline in inequality rates. The top rich incomes decreased due to higher costs of energy products and inflation. However, the bottom low incomes gained more revenue because they were not benefiting from the government's previous subsidies on energy as much.

CONCLUSION

The oil rentier state's economy is dependent on the collection of economic rent associated with the production of a single commodity: oil. The oil rentier state's revenue is based on oil export prices determined by the oil market fluctuations. Hence, during oil boom periods, government spending will increase; however, during market stagnations or economic sanctions, the oil-rentier government will face a massive budget deficit. Therefore, economic coercion can successfully shift rentier state policies in favor of the sender state.

Iran had most of the characteristics of an oil rentier state. Dependent on oil price fluctuations and infected by Dutch disease, Iran's domestic labor economy and tax administration were distorted and remained high-risk for investors. As rentier states are dependent on oil wealth for state revenues rather than their citizens, Iran did not need to develop its tax administrations and economic infrastructures. Financially independent from its citizens, Iran became an autonomous state with growing authoritarian economic structures.

The increased threat of international economic sanctions, and the decline in government oil export revenues, led the Ahmadinejad administration to implement the 2010 reform plan. The objectives of the reform plan were to rationalize consumption and decrease inequality. The revenues from subsidies were distributed in cash among all citizens in order to prevent social discontent. The increased inflation caused by the rise in the cost of energy led to a decrease of income among the upper-middle and middle classes, who inhabited big cities with major energy consumption. Nevertheless, shortly after the cash distribution, poverty in the bottom lower income citizens reduced despite higher costs of energy and inflation.

The increased economic sanctions and the world recession threatened the Iranian government with budget deficits. This led to major economic infrastructural changes for the first time in Iranian history. Unlike other rentier states with no need for tax administration, the Iranian government was forced to create a transparent tax and data administration system to survive the collective economic sanctions placed upon Iran's economy.

Ultimately, the international economic sanctions were successful in shifting Iranian policy into compliance with the sender state's policies. By cutting off the government's main revenue, the economic sanctions were effective in the creation of new economic administration in line with democratic standards.

---

[158] GE(2) parameter is sensitive to changes in income in the top range.
[159] GE(-1) parameters is sensitive to changes in income in the bottom range.
[160] Djavad, *Poverty, Inequality, and Populist Politics in Iran*, 27.

Citizenship Rights in West Africa

Laura Powers

INTRODUCTION

Since its independence in the 1950s and 1960s, West Africa has been marred by civil wars and political violence. This trend has increased since the 1990s, leading scholars to investigate the causes of conflict in the region.[161] Scholars believe that poverty, human rights violations, bad governance and corruption, ethnic marginalization, and small arms proliferation have played a role in the conflicts.[162] Many of these causes are interrelated, but one important cause has been largely overlooked: citizenship has been central to multiple conflicts in West Africa, most notably conflicts in Mauritania and Cote d'Ivoire. Though not all conflicts in the region can be linked to contestation of citizenship rights, its centrality in two notable conflicts makes the role of citizenship worth researching.

In this paper, I explore the importance of citizenship rights in two conflicts in West Africa: Cote d'Ivoire from 1990 to 2002 and Mauritania in 1989. In the case of Cote d'Ivoire, the loss of citizenship rights for those living in the north of the country (traditionally ethnic groups with a history of migration and those that did not belong to the same ethnic group as those holding political office since independence) inspired a failed coup, and plunged the country into a civil war in 2002. In Mauritania, a border dispute with Senegal led the government to expel Senegalese nationals from the country and in the process, allowed for the government to expel black Mauritanians from 1989 to 1990. By assessing the role of colonialism, cross-border ethnic communities, and incentives for political and economic gain, a deeper understanding of the complexities of citizenship rights in these West African conflicts may be possible.

CITIZENSHIP IN ITS MANY FORMS

Theoretical Citizenship

Citizenship is a central component of the nation-state, but remains difficult to define. Citizenship fundamentally identifies who belongs to the state and who does not. Citizenship is a reciprocal relationship between the government and its citizens. According to Charles Tilly, "[citizenship] refers to a relation between 1) governmental agents acting uniquely as such and 2) whole categories of persons identified uniquely by their connection with the government in question."[163] This relationship suggests there is a responsibility both on the part of the government and the citizen. Tilly concedes that the conception of citizenship varies across cases. In this paper, citizenship is defined as the right to vote, the right to identification, and the right to residency.

Due to colonial legacies, conceptions of citizenship in Africa are unique and therefore widely studied. Scholars such as Mahmood Mamdani, Said Adejumobi, and Pal Ahluwalia have all contributed to the literature on this topic. Though these scholars differ, they generally agree that colonialism created pluralism. Peter Ekeh, in his seminal work, "Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement," outlines the duality of citizenship in Africa, which includes a

[161] Nancy Annan, "Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in West Africa: Causes, Challenges and Prospects," *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development,* 3.1, 3.
[162] Ibid.
[163] Charles Tilly, "A Primer of Citizenship," *Theory and Society*, 26.4 (Aug. 1997): 599.

legally binding relationship between the individual and the state, and the individual and their community. This dual-citizenship remained after the departure of colonialism and continues today.[164]

Among these scholars, two things are clear: 1) African nations are prone to struggle with multiple and complex conceptions of citizenship and belonging, and 2) colonialism is central to many of these competing conceptions of citizenship.

Citizenship in Colonial French West Africa

From 1895 to the 1960s, West Africa was primarily colonized by the French. West African colonies experienced a unique relationship with the French state, characterized by a changing definition of citizenship rights between 1946 and 1960. After World War II, France was greatly weakened, allowing its African colonies to demand more rights. In the ensuing period, African colonies continually negotiated, protested and bargained to shift, change, and redefine African citizenship within French colonialism. In 1946, France created the French Union, a system that divided West Africa into four territories (French West Africa or AOF, French Equatorial Africa or AEF, Algeria, and Senegal), and gave the territories legislative representation.[165] After continued debates between French and African politicians, the Loi-Cadre law was passed in 1956.[166] The law created universal suffrage for all subjects in French West African colonies, thereby creating both subjects and citizens.[167] This was soon followed by the referendum on the newly proposed 1958 constitution, which all subjects of the French empire could vote on. Each territory could choose between remaining a part of the French Union, or become an autonomous republic within the context of a French community.[168] With the latter option, France would still hold authority over the territories' foreign affairs and defense, but each republic would have a right to make decisions that impacted domestic affairs.[169] All the colonies, except for Guinea, voted to become a republic, and paved the way for complete independence in 1960 for most French West African colonies.[170]

The changing definitions of citizenship under colonialism created mixed perceptions of citizenship in West Africa and influenced both the creation and understanding of citizenship laws in these countries after their independence.

CASE STUDIES

Cote d'Ivoire: Historical Background and Context

Cote d'Ivoire gained independence in 1960 with the help of Felix Houphouet-Boigny, who immediately after became president.[171] Under Houphouet-Boigny, the country prospered economically, largely due to a pro-immigration policy that encouraged workers from Burkina Faso to cultivate the land.[172] The economic prosperity ended in the 1980s with a drop in cocoa prices, causing wages to plummet, and those affected to demand democratization.[173] In 1990, Houphouet-Boigny allowed the first multi-party elections to take place, but Houphout-Boigny and the PDCI

---

164 Peter Ekeh, "Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 17.1 (Jan. 1975): 91-112.
165 Frederick Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nations: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945-1960* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 21-22.
166 Ibid, 214.
167 Ibid.
168 Henri-Michel Yéré, "'Double Nationalite' and Its Discontents in Ivory Coast, 1963-66," *Citizenship, Belonging, and Political Community in Africa* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2016), 128.
169 Ibid.
170 Ibid.
171 Abu Bakarr Bah, "Democracy and Civil War: Citizenship and Peacemaking in Cote d'Ivoire," African Affairs, 109.437 (Oct. 2010), 601.
172 "Cote d'Ivoire," *A Survey of Migration Policies in West Africa,* UN DESA, accessed 12 December 2016, http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/events/other/workshop/2015/docs/Workshop2015_CotedIvoire_Migration_Fact_Sheet.pdf.
173 Edmond Keller, "Cote d'Ivoire: Ivorité and Citizenship," Identity, Citizenship and Political Conflict in Africa (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2014), 93; Wilene A. Johnson, "Cote d'Ivoire: The Role of the Private Sector in Building a Peace Economy," *From Civil Strife to Peacebuilding* (Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2009), 57.

continued to dominate elections until his death in 1993.[174] His successor, Henri Konan Bedie used citizenship as a political tool in Cote d'Ivoire, creating instability that resulted in violence.

Bedie altered citizenship conceptions by passing a series of laws, known as the Ivoirité, which attempted to define who was a 'true' Ivoirian and who was not, by tracing and individual's family lineage. Those whose relatives were once migrants were not considered 'true' Ivoirians. Under Houphouet-Boigny, non-Ivoirians were allowed to vote but those rights were revoked under Bedie.[175] Though the laws were intended to take away voting rights from those who were not Ivoirian citizens (mostly migrant farmers from Burkina Faso), the stringent citizenship laws also effectively revoked rights from many who were previously recognized as Ivoirian citizens.[176] In rural areas, documentation was difficult to come by, and though many were eligible for citizenship and even possessed identification cards, their cards were confiscated.[177] Without identification cards, these Ivoirian citizens were unable to claim many citizenship rights.[178]

Another aspect of the Ivoirité stated that those running for high-level political, public office must have two Ivoirian parents. Scholars, like Abu Bakar Bah, argue that this was an attack against longtime political rival Alassane Ouattara, who was believed to be of Burkinabe heritage.[179] According to Bakarr Bah, "Ivoirité was institutionalized through electoral reforms and national identification policies that tacitly disqualified many Ivoirians from the north from seeking the presidency and denied them citizenship rights."[180]

In 1999, General Guei led a *coup d'état* to depose President Bedie, and placed himself in power. After a disputed election, however, Laurent Gbagbo was elected president in 2000. Gbagbo continued to support the Ivoirité laws, and in 2002, Cote d'Ivoire fell into civil war after another failed *coup d'état*. The civil war divided the country between the north and the south, and though many claimed that it was simply a matter of ethnic tension, the "…sense of wrongful denial of citizenship became the bedrock of the political protests and the civil war."[181] This became clearest in a statement by the leader of the insurgency group (Forces Nouvelles), Guillaume Soro. When speaking about the term Ivoirité, Soro stated, it "…is no more and no less than a xenophobic concept…according to those who originated from the south, northerners are considered foreigners in their own country."[182]

In Cote d'Ivoire, citizenship rights were used by multiple politicians and were directly related to the ensuing violence in 2002. Though ethnic tensions were present, they were linked to the larger issue of citizenship rights for those perceived as foreigners.

Mauritania: Historical Background and Context

Mauritania gained independence in 1960 under the leadership of President Moktar Ould Daddah.[183] The government was dominated by the Beydanes, an ethnic group identifying as Arab, while farming, teaching, and mid-level administration jobs were largely occupied by black

---

[174] Jennifer Widner, "The 1990 Elections in Cote d'Ivoire," *Issue: A Journal of Opinion,* 20.1 (Winter 1991), 31; Edmond Keller, "Cote d'Ivoire: Ivorité and Citizenship," *Identity, Citizenship and Political Conflict in Africa* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2014), 97.

[175] Brownen Manby, *Struggles for Citizenship in Africa,* (London: Zed Books Inc., 2009), 83.

[176] Abu Bakarr Bah, "Democracy and Civil War: Citizenship and Peacemaking in Cote d'Ivoire," *African Affairs*, 109.437 (Oct. 2010), 602.

[177] Edmond Keller, "Cote d'Ivoire: Ivorité and Citizenship," *Identity, Citizenship and Political Conflict in Africa* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2014), 96.

[178] Abu Bakarr Bah, "Democracy and Civil War: Citizenship and Peacemaking in Cote d'Ivoire," *African Affairs*, 109.437 (Oct. 2010), 602.

[179] Abu Bakarr Bah, "Democracy and Civil War: Citizenship and Peacemaking in Cote d'Ivoire," *African Affairs*, 109.437 (Oct. 2010), 602.

[180] Ibid.

[181] Ibid, 603.

[182] "n'est ni plus ni moins qu'un concept xénophobe…a ceux qui sont originaires du Sud, les Nordistes étant considérés comme étrangers dans leur propre pays." Guillaume Soro, *Pourqoui je suis devenu un rebelle: La Cote d'Ivoire au bord du gouffre ; entretiens avec Serge Daniel* (Paris : Hachette Litteratures , 2005), 20.

[183] "Mauritania Country File," *BBC News,* accessed 16 April 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13881985.

Mauritanians of the Haalpulaaren, Soonike, and Wolof communities.[184] The Beydanes believed that the black Mauritanians were favored by the French during colonialism.[185] This was because France invaded Mauritania from the South through Senegal and had already been dealing with black Africans there. In turn, France used black Mauritanians in the civil administration to gain political legitimacy in both Mauritania and Senegal.[186] After independence, the Beydanes-dominated government initiated a policy of Arabization, which limited black Mauritanians access to citizenship rights. In 1966, one of the more controversial policies was a policy that made speaking Arabic mandatory in secondary schools.[187] The Beydanes spoke a version of Arabic, while black Africans spoke French. This resulted in black students performing poorly during examinations.[188] Daddah also reduced the proportion of black Mauritanians working in the administration to 30 percent.[189] The tension came to a head in 1986 when, "…Black African intellectuals denounced the Bidhan (Bedyane) president and his regime for their campaign of discrimination against Black Africans in the civil service, in the school, and in terms of access to land…" with the publication of the "Oppressed Black Minorities" manifesto.[190] A failed coup attempt in 1987 by the *Forces de Liberation Africaine de Mauritanienne* (FLAM) only served to inflame an already tense situation.[191] In 1989, violence over a border dispute broke out in the Senegal River valley region bordering neighboring Senegal, and the government expelled Senegalese nationals for security reasons. Of the 70,000 to 80,000 expelled, it is estimated that 25,000 were black Mauritians who had their citizenship revoked and were expelled from the country under the claim that they were Senegalese nationals.[192]

A loss of state citizenship rights in Mauritania took place only after violence broke out, whereas in Cote d'Ivoire, the loss of citizenship rights instigated the violence. But if we analyze the Mauritanian case not under the narrow lens of the right to citizenship and residency, but in the more general definition of a reciprocal relationship between the state and the citizens, we see that the Mauritanian government attempted to redefine who belonged to the state post-independence. The state initiated policies that attempted to limit black Mauritanians' rights, defining them as second class citizens. These policies culminated in the decision to expel black Africans from the country. Though the Mauritanian case involves ethnic marginalization, it is also a case of tensions over citizenship rights and the government's attempt to redefine its citizenry.

CROSS-BORDER COMMUNITIES

In Mauritania and of Cote d'Ivoire, varying concepts of citizenship underpinned the respective conflicts, and both states' French colonial heritage contributed to this contestation. The changing definitions of citizenship continued post-independence in both cases, diluting the relationships between communitarian citizenship and state citizenship. Cross-border ethnic ties and communitarian identity were present in the groups whose citizenship rights were revoked. When

[184] "Black Africans," *Minority Rights Group International*, accessed 30 November 2016, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/10/14/Black%20Africans.pdf; Cedric Jourde, "Ethnicity, Democratization and Political Dramas: Insights into Ethnic Politics in Mauritania," *African Issues*, 29.1/2 (2001), 26.
[185] Ron Parker, "The Senegal-Mauritania Conflict of 1989: A Fragile Equilibrium," *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* 29.1 (Mar. 1991), 156.
[186] Ibid.
[187] "Black Africans," *Minority Rights Group International*, accessed 30 November 2016, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/10/14/Black%20Africans.pdf.
[188] Ibid.
[189] Ron Parker, "The Senegal-Mauritania Conflict of 1989: A Fragile Equilibrium," *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* 29.1 (Mar. 1991), 157.
[190] Cedric Jourde, "Ethnicity, Democratization and Political Dramas: Insights into Ethnic Politics in Mauritania," *African Issues*, 29.1/2 (2001), 26; "Black Africans," *Minority Rights Group International*, accessed 30 November 2016, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/10/14/Black%20Africans.pdf.
[191] Ibid.
[192] "Mauritania," *Citizenship Rights in Africa Initiative,* accessed 1 December 2016, http://citizenshiprightsafrica.org/region/mauritania/.

cross-border ties were present, the distinction between those who belonged to the state and who did not blurred.

Cote d'Ivoire's Cross-Border Communities

In the case of Cote d'Ivoire, President Houphouet-Boigny instituted pro-immigration policies, thereby strengthening cross-border ties between citizens of Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso. Houphouet-Boigny encouraged migrants from Burkina Faso to enter Cote d'Ivoire to cultivate the land in the north of the country. This was an enticing option for migrants from Burkina Faso due to limited resources available in their home country.[193] This policy created ethnic and communitarian ties between citizens of Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire, further complicating citizenship in the area. These specific ties were the result of the post-independence policy, although pro-immigration policies were also common during the age of French colonialism. According to Frederick Cooper, prior to independence, the lines of French West Africa were more porous, and movement was not as strict as it is today.[194] In that way, Houphouet-Boigny was not instituting a new law but instead supporting a practice that was common place under the French rule.

Mauritania's Cross-Border Communities

In Mauritania, the correlation between cross-border ethnic ties and colonial legacies from the French state, is stronger. Historically, black Africans belonging to the Haalpulaaren, Soonike and Wolof communities lived in the Senegal River basin area as farmers. When France created the delineation between Senegal and Mauritania in 1946, the ethnic ties between the communities in the Senegal River basin were not taken into consideration.[195] This lack of acknowledgement created issues after independence for both the Senegalese and Mauritanian governments. Because these groups were interlinked and shared the area historically, individuals would cross the newly formed border freely. Often families would live in one country while the land they cultivated would be in another.[196] The border was extremely porous due to these interlinkages, making it difficult to distinguish between Senegalese or Mauritanian citizenry. The deaths of Senegalese and Mauritanians during the border conflict of 1989 and the ensuing expulsions were met with mixed reactions. Those living in the area had to decide between loyalty to their ethnic group and their given country. This confusion allowed the government to expel black Mauritanians. Because of strong community ties, the government was able to claim that they were expelling Senegalese nationals, even if those being expelled were actually Mauritanian nationals with ties to diverse communities that also had Senegalese nationals.

ACCESS TO POLITICAL POWER AND LAND RIGHTS

As seen in both the cases of Cote d'Ivoire and Mauritania, citizenship was used as a political tool by the Ivorian and Mauritanian government to redefine who belonged and who did not. These policies were created to benefit the state. Since citizenship defines who is eligible to enter a reciprocal relationship with the state and, therefore, who has access to public resources that the state offers. In both Mauritania and Cote D'Ivoire, the government used citizenship to redefine who had access to land rights and political power.

Cote d'Ivoire and Access to Political Power and Land Rights

[193] "Cote d'Ivoire," *A Survey of Migration Policies in West Africa,* UN DESA, accessed 12 December 2016, http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/events/other/workshop/2015/docs/Workshop2015_CotedIvoire_Migration_Fact_Sheet.pdf.

[194] Frederick Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nations: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945-1960* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 16.

[195] Ron Parker, "The Senegal-Mauritania Conflict of 1989: A Fragile Equilibrium," *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* 29.1 (Mar. 1991), 156.

[196] Ibid, 158.

In Cote d'Ivoire, President Bedie sought to retain political power through the Ivoirité laws. The PDCI (the political party of both Houphouet-Boigny and Bedie) had ruled since 1960, but faced considerable opposition with the advent of a multi-party system. A splinter group of Bedie's political party (PDCI) called the *Rassemblement de Républicains* (RDR) nominated Alassane Ouattara as its presidential candidate.[197] Ouattara was very popular and posed a strong threat to Bedie's reelection. By disenfranchising many of those not considered truly Ivorian, as well as by barring Ouattara from running, Bedie was able to consolidate his power. General Guei, who deposed Bedie, claimed that he would oversee free and fair elections, but continued the laws of Ivoirité, which caused many to boycott the elections.[198] The next president, Laurent Gbagbo, who was elected in 2000, also continued the practice, and access to voting rights became a serious point of contention in the peace process during the ensuing civil war of 2002.[199] All these politicians saw the benefit of maintaining political power by limiting citizenship rights to an entire group of people.

The other resource at stake was the land itself. The immigration policies of Houphouet-Boigny designated land to those who worked it. For many, there was no documentation of this land ownership, but instead the land was passed down from parent to child. With the installation of Ivoirité policies, many who were no longer perceived as citizens had their lands confiscated.[200] This was beneficial to the government and groups that the government supported because the land in the North was fertile and largely agricultural. Crops, such as cotton and cocoa, were produced in this area and were highly lucrative; In the 1970s, Cote d'Ivoire was ranked the number one producer of cocoa in the world.[201] With regards to cotton, the government retained a large portion of those lands through the Ivoirité laws and continued to make money off the crops throughout the civil war.[202]

Mauritania and Access to Political Power and Land Rights

In Mauritania, citizenship rights were also redefined to gain access to political power and land. "Mauritania… used the crisis as an excuse to expel black Africans who were considered potential political opponents, including those with citizenship…"[203] Black Mauritanians had long resisted the efforts of the government's Arabization efforts, as evident by their creation of the FLAM. One year after the initial purge, "…about 500 black African officers and soldiers who served in the different branches of the Mauritanian military were executed, and many others were tortured and dismissed from the military."[204] The government attempted to squash opposition to the government in any way possible. Their focus on the military was closely linked to fears that the FLAM had infiltrated the military.

Access to land was also an important incentive in redefining citizenship rights. The Senegal River basin is a fertile area, traditionally cultivated by black Africans from both Mauritania and Senegal. North of the basin, nomadic Arab herders traditionally populated the area. But desertification in the 1980s pushed the Arab herders south, in search of water.[205] This migration caused conflict over access to water and land, with not only Mauritanian black Africans, but also Senegalese in the area, which caused outbreaks of violence.[206] After the expulsion, it became clear that the Beydanes (the Arab ethnic group) were interested in the area as those expelled (black

---

197 Abu Bakarr Bah, "Democracy and Civil War: Citizenship and Peacemaking in Cote d'Ivoire," *African Affairs*, 109.437 (Oct. 2010), 603-604.
198 Chrysantus Ayangafac, "The Politics of Post-Conflict Elections in Cote d'Ivoire," *From Civil Strife to Peace Building* (Ontario: Wilidrid Laurier University Press, 2009), 35.
199 Abu Bakarr Bah, "Democracy and Civil War: Citizenship and Peacemaking in Cote d'Ivoire," *African Affairs*, 109.437 (Oct. 2010), 611.
200 Ibid, 602.
201 Edmond Keller, "Cote d'Ivoire: Ivorité and Citizenship" *Identity, Citizenship and Political Conflict in Africa,* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2014), 93.
202 Lydie Boka-Mene and Oren E. Whynche-Shaw, "Foreign Investors and International Donor Contributions to Cote d'Ivoire's State-Building Efforts," *From Civil Strife to Peace Building* (Ontario: Wilifrid Laurier University Press, 2009), 79.
203 Ibid, 164.
204 Cedric Jourde, "Ethnicity, Democratization and Political Dramas: Insights into Ethnic Politics in Mauritania," *African Issues*, 29.1/2 (2001), 26.
205 Ron Parker, "The Senegal-Mauritania Conflict of 1989: A Fragile Equilibrium," *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* 29.1 (Mar. 1991), 158.
206 Ibid, 159.

Mauritanians) ranged "…from senior civil servants to farmers, and entire villages were subsequently resettled by Beydanes."[207]

CONCLUSION

In both Cote d'Ivoire and Mauritania since independence in 1960, contestations over citizenship contributed heavily to the outbreak political violence and a denial of rights. The legacies of colonialism, the influence of cross-border ethnic ties, and the competition for political power and land rights, has made defining the citizens of each country difficult and fluid.

In West Africa, scholars identified many different causes of political violence and exclusionary policies, but citizenship is not often cited. Cote d'Ivoire and Mauritania are examples of conflicts with citizenship at their centers, and through further scholarship, it is possible that citizenship is a factor in other conflicts in the Western Africa as well.

[207] Ibid, 165.

The Haitian Anomaly

General Emancipation, Black Independence, and the Age of Revolution

Timothy Robustelli

In 1791, the largest and most successful slave revolt in history commenced in the wealthy French colony of Saint-Domingue.[208] Indirectly influenced by the concurrent French Revolution, a lack of imperial control and the pervasiveness of Enlightenment ideas contributed to this violent outburst against the system of plantation slavery.[209] With thousands of slaves rebelling and white planters conspiring to cede territorial control to the British, colonial commissioners declared general emancipation in 1793.[210] It was a desperate and precarious measure, yet the Republican slaves-turned-soldiers resisted subsequent British and Spanish invasions.[211] This defense of a colony demonstrated to the National Convention in Paris that black insurgents could more usefully serve the Republic as warriors. Consequently, this political body abolished slavery throughout the unstable French Empire on February 5, 1794 to rally more fighters to its side.[212] Nearly a decade later, the ex-slaves of Saint-Domingue successfully defended their freedom by vanquishing Napoleon Bonaparte's effort to re-establish slavery, and declared Haitian independence in 1804.[213]

The chaotic events of the Haitian Revolution (1791-1804) were an extreme shock to the widespread institution of New World slavery. Furthermore, the establishment of a relatively large and centrally located independent black state was a challenge to the broader Atlantic system dominated by oppressive European colonialism.[214] Yet, revolutionary concepts concerning racial equality, general emancipation, and the liberal teleological progression of humanity did not receive widespread support in the Americas for decades. Put differently, despite its immediate importance during the Age of Revolution, the Haitian Revolution largely failed to promptly inspire emancipation elsewhere.

The Haitian Revolution and its socio-political consequences did not occur in a vacuum. Anja Bandau stresses the extreme political, economic, and social connections within the Atlantic World.[215] In fact, both Robert D. Taber and Matthew Clavin insist that discussion of the Haitian Revolution was a transatlantic affair.[216] Most broadly, C.A. Bayly has demonstrated that influential concepts, such as modernity, equality, and citizenship, spread rapidly across the globe throughout the "long nineteenth century" (1789-1914) – and particularly during the Age of Revolution.[217]

This lack of influence thus generates the following question: why did the ideas behind the Haitian Revolution not spread more universally within the interconnected Atlantic World? Overall, concepts behind the Haitian Revolution did not spread beyond Hispaniola because they were radical, ill defined, and an anathema to the colonial status quo.

---

208. Laurent Dubois, *Haiti: The Aftershocks of History* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2012), 5.
209. Ibid, 24.
210. Ibid, 28.
211. Robin Blackburn, *The American Crucible: Slavery, Emancipation and Human Rights* (New York: Verso, 2011), 173.
212. Ibid.
213. Dubois, *Haiti*, 15.
214. David P. Geggus, ed., *The Impact of the Haitian Revolution in the Atlantic World* (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 2001), xi.
215. Anja Bandau, "Transatlantic Representations of the Revolution in Saint-Domingue at the End of the Eighteenth Century and the Haitian Turn," *Cross / Cultures: Reading in the Post / Colonial Cultures in English* 170 (2014): 186.
216. Robert D. Taber, "Navigating Haiti's History: Saint Domingue and the Haitian Revolution," *History Compass* 13, no. 5 (2015): 236; and Matthew Clavin, "A Second Haitian Revolution: John Brown, Toussaint Louverture, and the Making of the American Civil War," *Civil War History* 54, no. 2 (2008): 119.
217. C.A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914: Global Connections and Comparisons* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004), 1.

In Haiti, slaves first fought for tangible concessions, only openly embracing the idea of general emancipation well into the revolt. After emancipation and subsequent independence, these ex-slaves quarreled over alternate visions of freedom, and political elites were constrained by the contemporary geopolitics; both factors created difficulties in spreading the revolution overseas.

In the Atlantic World more broadly, abolitionist policies were often limited and constrained within the political context of the colonial world. Imperials powers were more concerned with the preservation of power and the expansion of the lucrative system of plantation slavery than with abolitionism.

A LIBERAL WORLD?

Broader debates concerning liberalism took place during the "long nineteenth century." The highlights of this period include the American and French Revolutions, the defeat of Napoleon and Imperial France in 1815, the 1848 Spring of Nations, as well as large-scale emancipations in Russia and the United States. This age was also characterized by the expansion of the global capitalist system, private property, and free trade.

Yet such an account overemphasizes the global permeation and influence of liberal ideas during this period. Several scholars have demonstrated that the political, economic, and social changes during this period were considerably limited in scope. Bayly, for instance, demonstrates that romanticized, progressive portrayals of the revolutions of 1848 are rather myopic.[218] Following limited outbursts of liberal and nationalist fervor, monarchical authority quickly re-established itself in Europe.[219] Similarly, Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper suggest that a liberal and virtuous characterization of the American Civil War should not be embellished.[220] Burbank and Cooper note that, "the war was about holding the polity together first and about slavery second," and that Lincoln was, "[deeply reluctant] to admit blacks into the citizenry."[221]

Liberal economic advances were also finite during the "long nineteenth century." This age is associated with the concepts of private property and free trade in relation to the development of the global capitalist system. However, instead of arguing for the victory of *laissez-faire* and liberal economics during the 1800s, several prominent scholars discuss the complex and often illiberal interpretations of these concepts. For example, Sven Beckert and Bayly juxtapose free trade with European imperialism.[222] Bayly, in particular, stresses that the British state's promotion of free trade due to economic self-interest – and not due to capitalist or liberal ideals.[223] Somewhat differently, Burbank and Cooper examine the paradoxical relationship between federally supported American settler expansion and the forceful dispossession of Native American lands. They write that, "for Americans, it was private property that was sacrosanct, at least for white men."[224]

Liberal ideals made limited progress during the "long nineteenth century." The Haitian Revolution demonstrates two broader points. First, the power of conservative and imperial actors was still present in the world during this period. Second, the revolution and its associated ideas were radical and unprecedented.

HAITI: LIMITED REVOLUTION

218. Ibid, 158-159.
219. Ibid.
220. Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 268.
221. Ibid.
222. Sven Beckert, "Emancipation and Empire: Reconstructing the Worldwide Web of Cotton Production in the Age of the American Civil War," *The American Historical Review* 109, no. 5 (2004), 1433; and Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World*, 128-132.
223. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World*, 136-138.
224. Burbank and Cooper, *Empires in World History*, 284.

Prior to the 1791 slave revolt, significant political tension already existed between the white planters and the conspicuous *gens de couleur*. As Laurent Dubois notes, the gens de couleur initially used the chaotic opening of the French Revolution in attempt to gain more political rights.[225] Utilizing revolutionary rhetoric of the era, wealthy and educated gens de couleur demanded equality, but notably did not attack the institution of slavery; many were slave owners themselves.[226] Aside from this small minority of slave owners, the free people of color in Saint-Domingue "generally supported the slave regime; in North Province many people of color had become indispensable as managers of sugar estates."[227]

The initial demands in Saint-Domingue were limited. Surprisingly, a majority of revolutionary actors at this early stage had an interest in the preservation of plantation slavery. Additionally, Blackburn observes that revolutionary ideas originally presented obstacles to slave emancipation in the New World.[228] Because slaves were property and a prop of public utility rather than members of the community, they were essentially restricted to permanent bondage.[229] The initial ideas in the French Revolution did not allow for general emancipation. This demonstrates that the concept was nearly "unthinkable" at the time.[230]

Operating within the accepted socio-political sphere, the gens de couleur only resorted to arms after the failure of political lobbying and a propaganda campaign in Paris.[231] Consequently, both white planters and free blacks rapidly armed their respective slaves, and Saint-Domingue advanced towards civil conflict. Soon after, the slaves turned against their masters, igniting the massive 1791 revolt.[232] However, as Blackburn argues, the slaves of Saint-Domingue initially only fought to acquire tangible concessions – and not for general emancipation.[233] He cites documents related to the uprising which demonstrate that rebel leaders at first negotiated for the selective emancipation of their immediate followers, three free days a week, and a ban on the whip.[234]

The complete abolition of slavery was not a prevalent issue. Numerous slave commanders allied initially with the Spanish monarchy that upheld the institution of slavery.[235] Only gradually did the militarily capable and politically adept rebel leaders call for general emancipation.[236] Nevertheless, the fact that a singular and successful slave revolt was needed to imagine a concept of general emancipation in Haiti attests to the radical character of this idea; even slaves did not readily and ubiquitously embrace the concept during the Age of Revolution.

DESPERATION: GENERAL EMANCIPATION AS POLITICAL DEVICE

The eventual abolition of slavery in Saint-Domingue was applied limitedly. By mid-1793, the situation in the colony became dire for Republican France. The counterrevolutionary white planters mobilized and large slave armies surrounded the colonial capital of Le Cap.[237] Republican commissioners Léger-Félicité Sonthonax and Étienne Polverel found themselves isolated and at risk

225. Laurent Dubois, *Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), 3.
226. Dubois, *Haiti*, 24-25.
227. Geggus, *The Impact of the Haitian Revolution in the Atlantic World*, 7.
228. Blackburn, *The American Crucible*, 178.
229. Ibid, 179.
230. Geggus, *The Impact of the Haitian Revolution in the Atlantic World*, xi.
231. Dubois, *Haiti*, 25.
232. Ibid, 25-26.
233. Blackburn, *The American Crucible*, 183.
234. Ibid.
235. Ibid, 184.
236. Ibid.
237. Dubois, *Haiti*, 28.

of losing the colony to the British, Spanish, or both. Desperate, the commissioners offered freedom and citizenship to any slave-warrior willing to fight for the new republic.[238] Ultimately, then, due to the continued danger of slave insurgents, counterrevolutionary white planters, and rival colonial powers, Sonthonax and Polverel declared the abolition of slavery in August 1793.[239]

Without precedent, this decree of general and immediate emancipation was a pragmatic political tool; it allowed the two commissioners to preserve Republican control of Saint-Domingue. The measure was the product of exceptional and unrepeatable circumstances within the colony itself. This act was not the tangible application of some revolutionary or liberal ideal – it was a radically desperate action.

Sonthonax and Polverel's subsequent decree, requiring that ex-slaves remain on their plantations for at least the coming year, demonstrates the disingenuous and ad hoc character of general emancipation in Saint-Domingue.[240] Following the imperial abolition of slavery in 1794, Louverture also understood the politico-economic importance of preserving plantation agriculture and white land ownership.[241] The concept of general and immediate emancipation was too radical even for Saint-Domingue. Consequently, this strongly suggests the inapplicable nature of the idea in the broader Atlantic World during the Age of Revolution.

CONTESTED VISIONS OF BLACK INDEPENDENCE

Following emancipation and subsequent independence in 1804, Haitians had the potential to consolidate their revolution and inspire insurrection elsewhere. The historian C.L.R. James goes so far as to compare Haiti with Fidel Castro's Cuba in regard to both demonstrative power and the development of a Caribbean identity.[242] However, empirical evidence suggests that the Haitian example largely failed to inspire similar movements. This was due in part to competing and ill-defined internal visions regarding black freedom and independence. Domestic discord prevented the presentation of a united and coherent model regarding an abolitionist, black, and independent state in the Western Hemisphere. Moreover, these divisions weakened a geopolitically constrained state within a hostile international system.

The origins of these divisions were visible as early as the 1797-1802 governorship of Louverture. The celebrated Haitian leader never genuinely considered dismantling the plantation system; he saw it as the only viable economic option for the country.[243] Underpinning this perspective was the belief that Haiti needed to prove it possible to produce sugar and coffee without slavery.[244] Yet legal enforcement of this model resulted in innumerable ex-slaves working on the same pre-revolutionary plantations for miniscule pay.[245]

This post-insurrection situation was poor recompense for the costs of the uprising.[246] For many ex-slaves, the plantation system was intrinsically linked to bondage. A counter-plantation vision of Haitian freedom soon emerged, emphasizing the importance of small subsistence plots and the resistance to plantation labor in all its forms. As a result, Louverture found himself in dispute with the majority of ex-slaves in the colony; he eventually resorted to force to impose his economic vision.[247]

238. Ibid.
239. Ibid.
240. Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*, 164.
241. Ibid, 4.
242. C.L.R. James, *The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L'Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution* (New York: Vintage, 1989), 391.
243. Dubois, *Avengers of the New World,* 4.
244. Dubois, *Haiti*, 31.
245. Blackburn, *The American Crucible*, 204.
246. Dubois, *Haiti*, 33.
247. Ibid.

This deep division over the meaning of independence prevented the Haitian Revolution from demonstrating how a black sovereign state in the Western Hemisphere could successfully transition from slavery to freedom.[248] Instead of economic vitality and unity, the Atlantic World was witness to Louverture's failed experiment, comprised of a free, yet considerably coercive labor regime.[249] Cumulatively, this economic breakdown readily played into pro-slavery arguments emphasizing black racial inferiority and lethargy.

As French governor, Louverture was constrained geopolitically as well. It is perhaps unrealistic to argue that the ex-slaves of Saint-Domingue had potential to inspire insurrection elsewhere when slavery continued to exist on Hispaniola itself. As Dubois notes in *Avengers of the New World*, "the ex-slaves in Republican-controlled areas would struggle to expand the limited freedom they had been given. The British would soon occupy much of the colony and would reestablish slavery as they went."[250]

The black leader also discouraged privateering and decided not to promote slave insurrections elsewhere.[251] For example, in a secret treaty with London, Louverture promised not to attack or encourage sedition in Jamaica in exchange for an end to the British blockade of Saint-Domingue. The colony critically needed trade relations with both the United Kingdom and the United States.[252] Louverture additionally sought procurement of military aid from Washington to better prepare his weak state against potential invasion.[253] He had little interest in encouraging slave insurrection in the American South or elsewhere.

Following the death of Louverture and independence in 1804, the Haitian state soon became formally divided into two distinct political entities. But first, the nascent country was briefly united under General Jean-Jacques Dessalines from 1804 to 1806. The self-styled emperor declared "peace to our neighbors" as he sought to reassure powerful European empires that he had no intention of spreading insurrection throughout their Caribbean slave colonies.[254] However, internal divisions among revolutionary generals quickly led to the assassination of Dessalines, political discord, and eventual division.[255] These political and economic partitions within post-independence Haiti exacerbated an already fractured image of black independence, contributing to the propagation of ill-defined and contradicting ideas in the Atlantic World.

Eventually, the two Haitian states presented drastically different and competing visions of black independence in the Western Hemisphere. In the north, King Henri Christophe sought to develop a European-style monarchy, artificially creating a black aristocracy and preserving the plantation system.[256] In the south, mulatto republicans such as Alexandre Pétion and Jean-Pierre Boyer initially endorsed a quasi-parliamentary system.[257] The political elite of the southern state also increasingly accepted the *lakou* system – a modification of subsistence farming influenced by egalitarianism.[258]

These two Haitian states were not completely isolated. Within the broader imperial world of the "long nineteenth century," the contrasting systems attracted different supporters. Many abolitionists, including the prominent Englishman Thomas Clarkson, "hoped that Christophe's

248. Ibid, 29-30.
249. Blackburn, *The American Crucible*, 204.
250. Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*, 165.
251. Blackburn, *The American Crucible*, 203.
252. Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*, 223.
253. Robert J. Reinstein, "Slavery, Executive Power, and International Law: The Haitian Revolution and American Constitutionalism," *American Journal of Legal History* 53, no. 2 (2013): 179.
254. Dubois, *Haiti*, 42.
255. Ibid, 49, 56-57.
256. Ibid, 64.
257. Blackburn, *The American Crucible*, 271.
258. Dubois, *Haiti*, 108.

regime would serve to refute the racist theories of their opponents and prove that…emancipation did not necessarily mean the end of prosperity in the Caribbean."[259] Conversely, the admired Abbé Grégoire, being too uncomfortable with monarchies, supported the southern republic.[260]

This competing support contributed to the fragmentation of the Haitian example as a powerful influence. As Seymour Drescher asserts, the new Haitian rulers appeared to be too preoccupied with internal struggles to pose an actual threat to the widespread system of colonial plantation slavery.[261] Drescher even disputes the notion that Haiti was a direct catalyst of any subsequent slave mobilizations within the Caribbean.[262] He says that, "neither as military threat, nor as threatening example, did Haiti loom large…after 1805."[263]

Geopolitical circumstances also continued to undermine the black state's influence during the Age of Revolution. Following independence from metropolitan France, Haiti was politically isolated by the major powers of the Atlantic World.[264] For example, American President Thomas Jefferson favored a policy of containment in regard to the former colony.[265] The Founding Father crudely suggested that the US, the U.K., and France could work together to "contain this disease to its island."[266] For their part, post-revolution Haitian leaders understood the acute hostility and resistance directed towards their state and foreswore wars against their slave-holding neighbors.[267]

ABOLITIONSIM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD: FRENCH AND AMERICAN EXAMPLES

Moving beyond the scope of Haiti, contemporary French and American abolitionist movements demonstrate the radical and nearly unthinkable character of the Haitian Revolution. These movements were constrained within the context of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Quite simply, many abolitionists could not readily adopt violent, general, and immediate emancipation as a platform within the existing political and social atmosphere. This was a world dominated by European empires in which slavery was commonplace and predominantly unquestioned as an institution.

In France, influential Enlightenment-era figures were subdued in their abolitionist demands. For example, Médéric Louis Élie Moreau de Saint-Méry only advocated for the improvement of slave conditions, while the Marquis de Condorcet insisted that slavery should be outlawed through a gradual process that would start by lessening the hardships of slaves' lives.[268] The prominent *Société des amis de Noirs* – which was extremely active in the early revolutionary period – called for an end to the Atlantic Slave Trade and advocated for the gradual emancipation of slavery in the Americas.[269] Nevertheless, C.L.R. James comments that the group was more concerned with battling for the rights of gens de couleur in the French National Assembly.[270]

Even after the 1791 slave revolt in Saint-Domingue, members of the Société only blamed the slave trade for the insurrection. In response, the organization limitedly called for racial equality of

259. Ibid, 68.
260. Ibid, 69.
261. Geggus, *The Impact of the Haitian Revolution in the Atlantic World*, 12
262. Ibid, 13.
263. Ibid, 12.
264. Reinstein, "Slavery, Executive Power, and International Law, "192.
265. Dubois*, Avengers of the New World*, 225.
266. Ibid.
267. Blackburn, *The American Crucible*, 218.
268. Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*, 72.
269. Ibid.
270. James, *The Black Jacobins*, 115.

the gens de couleur.[271] Dubois notes that the French abolitionist plan for the gradual reform of slavery was too extreme for many whites.

American abolitionist discourse in the period immediately after the Haitian Revolution also demonstrates an abhorrent perception of violent, general, and immediate emancipation. Citing the African-American Frederick Douglass as an example, Davis notes that US abolitionists often ignored the Haitian Revolution in their orations.[272] Clavin goes into more detail concerning the American context, demonstrating that abolitionists utilized " the conservative tactic of moral suasion…they clung to the dream that slavery would end peacefully wherever it existed, in time."[273]

The North American movement generally targeted white, educated, and middle-class audiences in propaganda campaigns and speeches. As a result, Toussaint Louverture was initially portrayed as a passive, benevolent, and civilian leader of emancipation and black independence.[274] The fact that American abolitionists gathered to celebrate the anniversary of the peaceful and gradual abolition of slavery in the British Empire also indicates the conservative quality of the movement.[275] Factions of the group only radicalized and advocated for insurrection in the 1850s – five decades after Haitian independence.[276]

This relatively limited character of contemporary French and American abolitionist movements demonstrates the truly radical nature of events in Saint-Domingue. It was unimaginable for abolitionists to adopt and promote a platform of ubiquitous and instantaneous emancipation. In turn, this contributed to the lack of advocacy for the Haitian example abroad. Similar to most other members of society, gradual abolitionists gasped at the bloodshed in Saint-Domingue.[277] As Clavin asserts, many within American society viewed general and immediate emancipation as the harbinger of a racial apocalypse similar to the Haitian Revolution.[278] These US citizens did not accept this as a plausible idea during the Age of Revolution.

IMPERIAL AMIBITIONS: THE PRESERVATION AND SPREAD OF THE ATLANTIC WORLD SYSTEM

A final reason that the Haitian Revolution did not spread throughout the Atlantic World was because imperial powers did not want it to. Regardless of arguments concerning the morality of the institution, Atlantic empires derived a large part of their wealth from plantation slavery. In order to maintain and expand their political and economic power, these entities had an interest in the preservation and growth of slavery. For that reason, these empires viewed the black, independent, and inherently anti-slavery Haitian polity as a serious threat.[279] Several of these pro-slavery states undertook significant measures to reduce Haitian influence, prevent large-scale insurrection, and therefore ensure enslavement.

From a legal perspective, Robert J. Reinstein argues that an immediate "casualty" of the Haitian Revolution was the possibility of gradual emancipation in the Upper South of the United States.[280] "The [American] domestic reaction to the Haitian Revolution contributed to the enactment of draconian laws on emancipation and manumission that entrenched slavery for six decades."[281] As

271. Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*, 129.
272. Geggus, *The Impact of the Haitian Revolution in the Atlantic World*, 5.
273. Clavin, "A Second Haitian Revolution," 128.
274. Ibid.
275. Ibid, 135.
276. Ibid, 132.
277. Blackburn, *The American Crucible*, 177.
278. Clavin, "A Second Haitian Revolution," 118.
279. Dubois, *Haiti*, 5.
280. Reinstein, "Slavery, Executive Power, and International Law," 144.
281. Ibid.

briefly mentioned above, the United States government also adopted a pro-slavery foreign policy towards Haiti. This was an attempt to physically isolate the country and its founding ideas. Again, as Thomas Jefferson asserted, "as long as we don't allow the blacks to possess a ship we can allow them to exist."[282]

Other American polities adopted proactive countermeasures against potential insurrection following the Haitian Revolution, as well. In Cuba and Brazil, for instance, "the planter elites…were manifestly not paralyzed by fear of their slaves but, mindful that a further twist of war and revolution could compromise or destroy their wealth, they acted with due caution."[283] Measures included strengthening of the colonial garrison, encouraging European immigration, and halting slave imports.[284] In general, cessation of the Atlantic Slave Trade was not a tangible application of Enlightenment-era ideas. Rather, it was an act to stop the flow of potentially rebellious Africans into the Americas. Economically, it was also a means to increase the value of slaves on respective domestic markets.

Many Atlantic empires not only desired the preservation of slavery during the Age of Revolution but several actively attempted to expand the institution in the Western Hemisphere. These polities were completely averse to the nascent Haitian state. The ruin of Saint-Domingue created an economic vacuum for sugar and coffee.[285] Both Portuguese Brazil and Spanish Cuba viewed this development as an opportunity to increase their own respective production through the expansion of plantation slavery.[286] Similarly, in the United States, the 1803 Louisiana Purchase enabled slavery to spread across the newly acquired American Southwest.[287] The most powerful states of the time had strong interests in preserving and expanding the vital institution of plantation slavery. Poor, isolated Haiti was generally helpless to influence this status quo during the "long nineteenth century."

CONCLUSION

The Haitian Revolution had a significant impact within the larger context of French sociopolitical turmoil. Yet the upheaval had a limited liberal impact within the broader Atlantic World of the "long nineteenth century." Overall, this was because the Haitian Revolution was unprecedentedly radical, ill defined, and an anathema to the colonial interests of the period. The revolution's limited reach demonstrates the powerful and continued presence of conservative elements during the Age of Revolution.

282. Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*, 225.
283. Blackburn, *The American Crucible*, 264.
284. Ibid.
285. Ibid, 258.
286. Ibid, 258, 261.
287. Clavin, "A Second Haitian Revolution," 145.

MDGs and SDGs

Lessons Learned and Moving Forward

Brittany Stubbs

ABBREVIATIONS

ECOSOC	The United Nations Economic and Social Council
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
GNP	Gross National Product
HLP	High Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda
HLPF	High-Level Political Forum
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OWG	Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals
Rio+20	United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; 20-22 June 2012)
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SDSN	Sustainable Development Solutions Network
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNGC	United Nations Global Compact
WHO	World Health Organisation

In 2015, the UN General Assembly ushered in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). These goals were broad in scope, ranging from ensuring access to affordable, sustainable energy to the conservation of oceans, ending hunger, and empowering women and girls. But these goals were not the first of their kind, though they were an improvement. Instead, the SDGs followed in the footsteps of the first generation of development goals, established 15 years earlier: the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The MDGs were, at the same time, extraordinarily successful (the global poverty rate was halved within just a decade and a half) and yet woefully inadequate. Their implementation was, at best, uneven and the goals neglected to address the responsibility of wealthy states beyond that of providing funding. In fact, the failures of the MDGs were far more numerous than their successes. While the SDGs did, in fact, improve upon the MDGs, their prospects for success are dim in the light of unaddressed inadequacies and the current economic forecast in China.

The following essay will provide an overview of the creation of the MDGs, followed by an in-depth examination of the relative success of each of the eight MDGs and the successes and failures of the MDGs as a unit. It will then discuss the process of creating the SDGs, how lessons learned from the MDGs informed SDG formation, and then the SDGs' prospects for success.

THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS (MDGS)

The Making of the MDGS

In 1995, the World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen, held under the auspices of the UN, produced a final report that listed ten commitments "relating to creating an enabling environment for social development, eradicating poverty, promoting full employment, social integration and human rights protection."[288] Within these commitments, the report repeatedly stated the need to "adopt international development goals [focusing] on meeting basic needs and eradicating poverty."[289] In response, a committee within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) developed a list of goals to achieve the commitments made in Copenhagen.[290] In 2000, the OECD, UN, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Bank issued the joint publication, "A Better World For All: Progress towards the international development goals," in which the four organizations committed to seven development goals, based on the goals put forward by the OECD in 1996, that later evolved into the Millennium Development Goals.[291]

That same year, the UN Millennium Summit was held, producing the now-famous Millennium Declaration. The Declaration was later credited as the inspiration for the MDGs. The Declaration, however, had a broader mandate than economic development. It listed six fundamental values essential to international relations in the 21st century (freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect for nature, and shared responsibility) and had chapters focusing on peace, security, and disarmament; development and poverty eradication; protecting our common environment; human rights, democracy and good governance; protecting the vulnerable; meeting the special needs of Africa; and strengthening the United Nations.[292] Within Chapter Three, the chapter on development and poverty eradication, states committed to a list of targets. These targets have largely been considered the source of the MDGs. Despite these widely-publicized claims that all states joined together in the Millennium Declaration in 2000 to promote economic development by creating quantitative international goals, the goals were actually set four years before the Millennium Summit in 1996 by the OECD.

The Individual Goals and Their Relative Successes by Region

The resulting MDGs contained eight development goals and 18 development targets, all to be achieved by 2015. The first MDG (MDG 1) aimed to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger. Because the very purpose of the MDGs was to eradicate poverty, the success or failure of this goal is often used to determine the success or failure of the MDGs as a whole. More specifically, the first goal aimed to half extreme poverty and hunger by 2015. At the global level, poverty was halved five years ahead of schedule.[293] In fact, this target was still achieved by 2015 despite redefining "extreme

---

[288] Otto Spijkers and Arron Honniball, "MDGs and SDGs: Lessons Learnt from Global Public Participation in the Drafting of the UN Development Goals," *German Review on the United Nations* 62, no. 6 (2014), accessed December 10, 2016, http://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/306264; United Nations World Summit for Social Development, *Report of the World Summit for Social Development,* 1995, accessed December 10, 2016, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/116/51/IMG/N9511651.pdf?OpenElement.

[289] Otto Spijkers and Arron Honniball, "MDGs and SDGs: Lessons Learnt from Global Public Participation in the Drafting of the UN Development Goals," *German Review on the United Nations* 62, no. 6 (2014), accessed December 10, 2016, http://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/306264.

[290] The OECD is a group of wealthy states whose self-proclaimed purpose is "to promote policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of people around the world." These recommendations were published in a booklet entitled "Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation."

[291] Notably, the OECD, UN, IMF, and World Bank ignored a set of development goals put forward by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in "We the Peoples: the Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century," with the exception of those goals that Annan likewise adopted from the OECD. Otto Spijkers and Arron Honniball, "MDGs and SDGs: Lessons Learnt from Global Public Participation in the Drafting of the UN Development Goals," *German Review on the United Nations* 62, no. 6 (2014), accessed December 10, 2016, http://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/306264

[292] UN General Assembly, *United Nations Millennium Declaration,* 2000, accessed December 10, 2016, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f4ea3.html.

[293] United Nations, *We Can End Poverty: The Millennium Development Goals and Beyond 2015 Goal 1 Fact Sheet,* 2013, accessed December 10, 2016, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/Goal_1_fs.pdf.

poverty" as living on $1.00 a day to $1.25 a day.[294] According to the UN, the only region that failed to achieve this target was Sub-Saharan Africa[295] (although it's important to note that, as of 2010, Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for nearly half of individuals living in extreme poverty).[296]

MDG 2 aimed to achieve universal primary education. While Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Caucasus and South Asia underachieved this target, each of these regions were close to meeting the minimum requirements.[297]

MDG 3 promoted gender equality and the empowerment of women. More specifically, MDG 3's purpose was to "[e]liminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015," though the UN also began to measure women's share of paid employment as well as women's equal representation in parliaments.[298] Equal girls' enrollment in primary school was largely successful, with Oceania being the only region failing to fulfill its obligations. The success of the indicator on women's equal share in employment was disappointing, however, with half of regions underachieving.

MDG 4 aimed to reduce child mortality and measured progress towards this goal by aspiring to reduce the mortality rates of children under five years-old by two-thirds. Excepting the last MDG target under MDG 8 (aimed at increasing the number of internet users), this target was the most successful target. The only region which failed to fully achieve this target was Oceania.[299]

MDG 5 sought to improve maternal health by reducing maternal mortality by two-thirds. While it is true that maternal mortality was significantly reduced between 2000 and 2015 (the number of maternal deaths was reduced from 523,000 to 289,000 in 2013), the rate of decline was less than half of what was necessary to fulfill the obligations of this target, according to the World Health Organisation (WHO).[300] Included within the MDG were indicators measuring progress towards universal access to reproductive health. However, as of 2014, 17 percent of women had no access to antenatal care and, in Africa, only 51 percent of births are attended by skilled personnel.[301]

MDG 6 sought to combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and other diseases. It had two measures of success. The first target was to halt and to begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS. WHO has noted substantial progress towards halting and reversing HIV/AIDS. "In 2013 an estimated 2.1 million people were newly infected with HIV – down from 3.4 million in 2001."[302] The number of individuals receiving antiretroviral therapy increased significantly, with the overwhelming majority of individuals receiving this treatment in low- and middle-income countries.[303] The second target aimed at halting and reversing the incidence of malaria and other major diseases (including malaria and tuberculosis).[304] WHO stated that significant progress has also been made towards both goals

---

[294] United Nations, *We Can End Poverty: The Millennium Development Goals and Beyond 2015 Goal 1 Fact Sheet,* 2013, accessed December 10, 2016, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/Goal_1_fs.pdf.

[295] United Nations, *Millennium Development Goals: 2015 Progress Chart,* 2015, accessed December 10, 2016, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2015_MDG_Report/pdf/MDG%202015%20PC%20final.pdf.

[296] "10 Poverty in Africa Facts," The Borgen Project, June 14, 2016, accessed December 10, 2016, http://borgenproject.org/10-quick-facts-about-poverty-in-africa/.

[297] Ibid.

[298] "Goals, Targets & Indicators," UN Millennium Project, accessed December 11, 2016, http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/goals/gti.htm; United Nations, *Millennium Development Goals: 2015 Progress Chart,* 2015, accessed December 10, 2016, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2015_MDG_Report/pdf/MDG%202015%20PC%20final.pdf.

[299] Ibid.

[300] "Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)," World Health Organization, May 2015, accessed December 13, 2016, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs290/en/.

[301] Ibid.

[302] "Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)," World Health Organization, May 2015, accessed December 13, 2016, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs290/en/.

[303] Ibid.

[304] "Goals, Targets & Indicators," UN Millennium Project, accessed December 11, 2016, http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/goals/gti.htm; United Nations, *Millennium Development Goals: 2015 Progress Chart,* 2015, accessed December 10, 2016, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2015_MDG_Report/pdf/MDG%202015%20PC%20final.pdf

globally. Incidents of malaria and tuberculosis declined, achieving the target to halt and reverse the spread of the two diseases. The mortality rate of malaria also decreased.[305]

MDG 7, the goal on ensuring environmental sustainability, was arguably the least successful MDG with nearly half of regions severely underperforming on one or more targets.[306] The goal contains three targets. The first target aimed to "[i]ntegrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programs and reverse the loss of environmental resources." The UN measured this goal using the proportion of land covered by forest, the ratio of area protected to maintain biological diversity to surface area, energy use per $1 GDP, carbon dioxide emissions per capita, and the proportion of the population using solid fuels.[307] The second target sought to halve the proportion of people without access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation. The third target attempted to improve the lives of at least of 100 million slum dwellers by 2020. The indicator measuring the success of this goal was the number of households with access to "secure tenure," as measured by UN-HABITAT.[308] Most regions demonstrated progress towards this target. Climate change, however, was not directly addressed in MDG 7.

MDG 8, tasked with creating a Global Partnership for Development, had seven different targets, including developing a predictable trading and financial system, addressing the needs of the Least Developed Countries and Small Island Developing States, and more. [309]

It was also the MDG with the broadest mandate. In a progress report published by the UN in 2015, the UN published only the progress towards the last target, namely the success of regions in increasing the number of internet users. By this measure alone, MDG 8 appears to be the most successful MDG as every region was able to demonstrate substantial progress towards achieving this indicator though this is severely misleading.[310]

By far, the region with the most difficulty when implementing the MDGs was Oceania. Of the 18 MDG targets, Oceania was only able to demonstrate success in four indicators: universal primary schooling, reducing maternal mortality by three-quarters, halting and reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS, and increasing the number of internet users. According to the *Millennium Development Goals: 2015 Progress Chart*, the most successful region was Southern Asia which demonstrated progress in every measure. The only indicator that Southern Asia failed to achieve in its entirety was an indicator on halving the proportion of the population without sanitation. The four least performing MDGs according to the UN were MDG 1 (eradicate extreme poverty and hunger), MDG 3 (promote gender equality and empower women), MDG 6 (combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases), and MDG 7 (ensure environmental sustainability). These four MDGs were the only MDGs demonstrating a severe deficiency in progress in at least one region, though each of these four MDGs showed insufficient progress towards targets in several regions.[311] \

---

305 Improvements are additionally needed to halt and reverse the spread of tuberculosis in Northern Africa; "Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)," World Health Organization, May 2015, accessed December 13, 2016, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs290/en/; United Nations, *Millennium Development Goals: 2015 Progress Chart,* 2015, accessed December 10, 2016, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2015_MDG_Report/pdf/MDG%202015%20PC%20final.pdf.

306 United Nations, *Millennium Development Goals: 2015 Progress Chart,* 2015, accessed December 10, 2016, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2015_MDG_Report/pdf/MDG%202015%20PC%20final.pdf.

307 "Goals, Targets & Indicators," UN Millennium Project, accessed December 11, 2016, http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/goals/gti.htm; United Nations, *Millennium Development Goals: 2015 Progress Chart,* 2015, accessed December 10, 2016, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2015_MDG_Report/pdf/MDG%202015%20PC%20final.pdf.

308 "Goals, Targets & Indicators," UN Millennium Project, accessed December 11, 2016, http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/goals/gti.htm; United Nations, *Millennium Development Goals: 2015 Progress Chart,* 2015, accessed December 10, 2016, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2015_MDG_Report/pdf/MDG%202015%20PC%20final.pdf.

309 "Goals, Targets & Indicators," UN Millennium Project, accessed December 11, 2016, http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/goals/gti.htm; United Nations, *Millennium Development Goals: 2015 Progress Chart,* 2015, accessed December 10, 2016, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2015_MDG_Report/pdf/MDG%202015%20PC%20final.pdf.

310 United Nations, *Millennium Development Goals: 2015 Progress Chart,* 2015, accessed December 10, 2016, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2015_MDG_Report/pdf/MDG%202015%20PC%20final.pdf.

311 United Nations, *Millennium Development Goals: 2015 Progress Chart,* 2015, accessed December 10, 2016, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2015_MDG_Report/pdf/MDG%202015%20PC%20final.pdf.

Successes and Failures in Achieving the MDGs

Looking at the statistics above, one could easily argue that the MDGs were either a profound success or a significant failure. During the period between 2000 and 2015, international economic development progressed substantially, but developing countries did not the achieve the MDGs in their entirety. Jeffrey Sachs, a well-known leader in the field of Sustainable Development, summarized:

> *[The MDGS generated] incentives to improve performance, even if not quite enough incentives for both rich and poor countries to produce a global class of straight-A students. Developing countries have made substantial progress towards achievement of the MDGs, although the progress is highly variable across goals, countries, and regions… Some countries will achieve all or most of the MDGs, whereas others will achieve very few.*[312]

Structurally, the MDGs have their advantages. Phillip Alston, a scholar at NYU and an expert in economic and social rights argued in 2005 that the MDGs had four positive characteristics. First, the goals were limited and thus "prioritize[d] certain objectives over the many others endorsed every year by the international community."[313] Second, the goals had quantitative indicators that allowed the goals to be measured and states to be held accountable for their implementation. Third, the goals were time-bound, preventing a "progressive realization." Finally, Alston states that "an extensive institutional apparatus [was] set up to promote them" (*e.g.* the Millennium Project, the Millennium Campaign, efforts to produce national MDG reports in every developing country, and "highly focused efforts by virtually every major international development agency.")[314] Excepting the last advantage, scholars often repeat this praise of the MDGS specificity, its quantitative indicators, and its time-bound nature. Jeffrey Sachs, for example, reiterates many of these advantages,

> *By packaging these priorities into an easily understandable set of eight goals, and by establishing measurable and timebound objectives, the MDGs help to promote global awareness, political accountability, improved metrics, social feedback, and public pressures…*[315]

The failings of the MDGs, however, are far more numerous. As noted earlier, even Jeffrey Sachs noted the structural limitations of the MDGs. The MDGs seemed to be severely handicapped from their conception. Instead of representing global development goals, defined and created by the international community at large, the MDGs were developed by the wealthiest states in the international arena and only later agreed upon by member states. The Millennium Summit and the Millennium Declaration received input from NGOs, states, the business community, social movements, etc., but the OECD formed the MDGs years before these inputs were solicited. As was discussed in the introduction, if one examines both the Millennium Declaration (2000) and "Shaping the 21st Century" (the recommendations put forward by the OECD in 1996) the MDGs are nearly identical to those proposed by the OECD. In fact, the recommendations provided by the OECD lack only two of the goals later to be named the Millennium Development Goals: MDG 7 on combatting HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and other diseases and MDG 8 on developing a global partnership

---

[312] Jeffrey D. Sachs, "From Millennium Development Goals to Sustainable Development Goals," *The Lancet* 379 (June 2012), accessed December 13, 2016

[313] While this argument appears to be most common, Keyzer and Van Wesenbeeck argue that the limited scope of the MDGs likewise proved to be a disadvantage because they caused the "omission of important issues and underinvestment in other key areas of development." Maya Fehling, Brett D. Nelson, and Sridhar Venkatapuram, "Limitations of the Millennium Development Goals: A Literature Review," Global Public Health, December 2013, accessed December 15, 2016, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3877943/#R58; Michiel Keyzer and Lia Van Wesenbeeck, "The Millennium Development Goals, How Realistic Are They?," *Economist-Netherlands* 154 (2006), accessed December 15, 2016, doi:10.1007/s10645-006-9019-9.

[314] Philip Alston, "Ships Passing in the Night: The Current State of the Human Rights and Development Debate Seen through the Lens of the Millennium Development Goals," *Human Rights Quarterly* 27, no. 3 (2005): 756, accessed December 14, 2016, http://its.law.nyu.edu/faculty/profiles/representiveFiles/Alston%20-

[315] Jeffrey D. Sachs, "From Millennium Development Goals to Sustainable Development Goals," *The Lancet* 379 (June 2012), accessed December 13, 2016.

for development. Otherwise, the MDGs and the OECD's recommendations are mirror images. In fact, even the ordering of the MDGs is identical to that of the original OECD recommendations.[316] In this way, the MDGs represented the interests of wealthy states more so than the international community at large, though member states did approve to institute these goals at the UN General Assembly in 2000.

The MDGs further focused their attention on developing countries, almost entirely ignoring the wealthy states. Ashwani Saith states that the focus on developing countries "ghettoize[d] the problem of development and locate[d] it firmly in the third world."[317] Instead of requiring minimum standards of development for the wealthiest states, these wealthy countries were obligated to provide development assistance to developing states (specifically 0.7 percent of GNP in Official Development Assistance [ODA]). Even with this obligation, wealthy states failed to provide funding for international development efforts. To this day, only six states have met this obligation (though not necessarily consistently): Sweden, Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom, and while ODA has continually increased since 1970, net ODA as a share of GNI was only 0.29 percent in 2014.[318] Without the appropriate funding, developing states could not reasonably be expected to achieve all MDG indicators.

The MDGs were successful in certain aspects, of course. The poverty rate halved between the years 1990 and 2010, and this enormous success is worthy of celebration.[319] However, several scholars argue that rapid economic growth in China caused this success.[320] MDG success across other regions and developing countries was uneven, however (as was demonstrated earlier in the case of Oceania). It's also important to note that China's economic growth began in 1978, 22 years before the implementation of the MDGs. Once again, however, this growth was already evident decades before the MDGs were in place and continued seemingly despite the MDGs. Instead of the MDGs proving successful then, it appears that, given this data, the MDGs happened to occur during an already prosperous decade and a half.

Finally, while it is valuable that the MDGs had measurable indicators, and while substantial efforts were made to produce national MDG reports in developing countries, the reliability of data regarding the MDGs is incomplete. In a joint project titled, *Equity and Growth in a Globalizing World*, published by the World Bank, a group of scholars state that only a limited number of countries "are equipped with national statistical agencies that produce high quality national survey programs and provide the information needed to rigorously monitor the MDGs." These countries include a few in Latin America, as well as China, India, Indonesia, South Africa, and Thailand.[321] Even the states that do have the capacity to monitor the MDGs have an incentive to inflate the results for the sake of reputation or foreign investments. While UN Country Teams could perhaps verify these statistics, given an appropriate amount of time, money, and resources, the UN cannot publish results contrary to those provided by member states because to do so would violate state sovereignty and deteriorate the relationship between member states and the UN System.

---

316 *Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Cooperation* (1996), accessed December 11, 2016, https://www.oecd.org/dac/2508761.pdf; UN General Assembly, *United Nations Millennium Declaration,* 2000, accessed December 10, 2016, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f4ea3.html.

317 Ashwani Saith, "From Universal Values to Millennium Development Goals: Lost in Translation," *Development and Change* 37, no. 6 (2006), accessed December 15, 2016, doi:10.1111/j.1467-7660.2006.00518.x.

318 "Development Aid Stable in 2014 but Flows to Poorest Countries Still Falling." OECD Development Assistance Committee, April 8, 2015. Accessed December 15, 2016. https://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/ODA%202014%20Technical%20Note.pdf; "History of the 0.7% ODA Target," *OECD DAC Journal*, March 2016, accessed December 15, 2016, https://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/ODA-history-of-the-0-7-target.pdf.

319 Jeffrey D. Sachs, "From Millennium Development Goals to Sustainable Development Goals," *The Lancet* 379 (June 2012), accessed December 13, 2016.

320 Ibid; François Bourguignon et al., "The Millennium Development Goals: An Assessment," in *Equity and Growth in a Globalizing World*, ed. Ravi Kanbur and Michael Spence (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, 2010), 20.

321 François Bourguignon et al., "The Millennium Development Goals: An Assessment," in *Equity and Growth in a Globalizing World*, ed. Ravi Kanbur and Michael Spence (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, 2010).

THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS (SDGS)

The Making of the SDGs

The post-2015 development agenda process (that would eventually produce Agenda 2030 and the SDGs), unlike the MDGs, was lengthy and included a "multitude of workstreams" involving member states (high-income countries and the least-developed countries alike), civil society, and the private sector. Spijkers and Honnibal summarize the complicated processes and opportunities for public participation that led to the development of Agenda 2030 in addition to stand-alone conferences and stock-taking events:

- Secretary-General led initiatives, including the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda (HLP), the Sustainable Development Solutions Network (also known as SDSN and whose focus was the science and technology sector), and the UN Global Compact (also known as UNGC and whose focus was the private sector)
- "The intergovernmental Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals (OWG), which drafted proposed SDGs (mandated by Rio+20)"[322]
- UN Development Program's (UNDP) "The Global Conversation Begins" report, which "offers a snapshot of the current stories emerging from this global exercise in listening to people's perspectives and priorities."[323]

The intergovernmental Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals began meeting in March 2013 and met monthly until June 2014.[324] In August 2014, the group published the "Open Working Group Proposal for the Sustainable Development Goals" and in September 2015 during the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly, member states adopted the agenda.[325] The resulting SDGs contained 17 goals instead of 8, and 169 targets instead of 18.[326] Agenda 2030 also had a much broader scope than the MDGs. Whereas the MDGs were focused on eradicating poverty, the SDGs were premised on a "triple bottom line," a combination of economic development, environmental sustainability, and social inclusion.[327] The SDGs, for example, include goals on affordable and clean energy (MDG 7), climate action (MDG 13), and gender equality (MDG 5), in addition to goals to eradicate poverty and hunger (MDG 1 and 2).[328] And where the MDGs sought to "halve poverty," the SDGs sought to "end poverty.[329]

---

322 Otto Spijkers and Arron Honniball, "MDGs and SDGs: Lessons Learnt from Global Public Participation in the Drafting of the UN Development Goals," *German Review on the United Nations* 62, no. 6 (2014), 7, accessed December 10, 2016, http://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/306264.

323 Ibid; "The Global Conversation Begins: Emerging Views for a New Development Agenda," UN Development Group, 2013, v, accessed December 15, 2016, http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/MDG/english/global-conversation-begins-web.pdf.

324 "Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals," Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, accessed December 15, 2016, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/owg.

325 "Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015," UN General Assembly, October 21, 2015 (A/RES/70/1), accessed December 15, 2016, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A%2FRES%2F70%2F1&Lang=E; "Open Working Group Proposal for the Sustainable Development Goals," UN Open Working Group of the General Assembly on Sustainable Development Goals, August 2014, Accessed December 15, 2016, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/1579SDGs%20Proposal.pdf.

326 "Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015," UN General Assembly, October 21, 2015, accessed December 15, 2016, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A%2FRES%2F70%2F1&Lang=E.

327 Jeffrey D. Sachs, "From Millennium Development Goals to Sustainable Development Goals," *The Lancet* 379 (June 2012): 2206, accessed December 13, 2016.

328 "Sustainable Development Goals," United Nations, accessed March 18, 2017, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdgs.

329 "Goals, Targets & Indicators," UN Millennium Project, accessed December 11, 2016, http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/goals/gti.htm; United Nations, *Millennium Development Goals: 2015 Progress Chart,* 2015, accessed December 10, 2016, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2015_MDG_Report/pdf/MDG%202015%20PC%20final.pdf; "Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015," UN General Assembly, October 21, 2015, accessed December 15, 2016, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A%2FRES%2F70%2F1&Lang=E.

How the MDGs Informed the Formation of the SDGs

The most profound difference between the development of the MDGs and the SDGs was the level of civic engagement in the process. However, the MDGs (both their successes and failures) helped to inform the SDGs beyond increasing public participation in their formation. The international community attempted to reinstitute within the framework of the SDGs the three greatest strengths of the MDGs, namely that the MDGs were specific, quantitative, and time-bound. Again, the SDGs were limited to a relatively narrow set of goals, with measurable indicators. Again, the SDGs provided states a period of 15 years with which to achieve these measures. However, the number of goals doubled and the number of indicators increased nine-fold.

In response to accusations that the MDGs focused far too heavily on the developing countries without applying the same amount of pressure on wealthier states, the SDGs received a broader mandate.[330] The progress of the SDGs is measured in each country, not just in the developing world. In part, this is also because Agenda 2030 includes social development initiatives as well as economic (e.g. Goal 5 on gender equality) and includes indicators that require international cooperation (e.g. Goal 13 to combat climate change and Goal 14 to conserve and sustainably use the oceans).

Finally, to increase accountability, the UN created the High-Level Political Forum (HLPF), to be convened annually under the auspices of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and every four years under the auspices of the General Assembly.[331] During each HLPF session, states voluntarily participate in a review of national progress towards the 2030 Agenda and the HLPF reviews thematic progress on cross-cutting issues as well.

The SDGs' Prospects for Success

The UN demonstrated notable progress in the creation of the SDGs. The goals are now all inclusive in that they promote social development as well as economic, and require the same standards of progress for both wealthy and developing states. Civil society and public participation was incorporated into the creation process of the SDGs, and therefore the goals are more representative of all individuals instead of just those policy-makers from high-income countries. These improvements will likely prove to benefit the implementation of the SDGs. However, there are reasons to be cautious regarding the likelihood of success of the SDGs.

While it is a significant achievement that social development was included within the SDGs, the sheer number and extent of the goals included make the SDGs nearly impossible to realize. While the MDGs focused too specifically on eradicating poverty in the developing world, the SDGs include every possible lofty goal from reducing climate change (Goal 13) to ensuring sustainable consumption and production (Goal 12). Many regions, such as Sub-Saharan Africa and Oceania, struggled under the burden of 18 targets and now these same regions are expected to meet 169 targets. Much of the success of the SDGs, particularly in developing countries, will depend upon the ability of the international community to provide the necessary funding. Unfortunately, ODA is still increasing at a slow pace and only six states are fulfilling the 0.7 ODA target.[332]

Additionally, much of the success of the MDGs is credited to extraordinary economic growth in China (growth that was well-established before the MDGs came into being). China's economic growth rate is the slowest it's been in 25 years, however, down from over 14 percent in

---

[330] Ashwani Saith, "From Universal Values to Millennium Development Goals: Lost in Translation," *Development and Change* 37, no. 6 (2006), accessed December 15, 2016, doi:10.1111/j.1467-7660.2006.00518.x.

[331] "High Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF)." Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform. Accessed April 11, 2017. https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/majorgroups/hlpf.

[332] "Development Aid Stable in 2014 but Flows to Poorest Countries Still Falling." OECD Development Assistance Committee, April 8, 2015. Accessed December 15, 2016. https://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/ODA%202014%20Technical%20Note.pdf.

2007 to 6.9 percent in 2015.[333] Though this slowdown seemed inevitable after decades of unprecedented growth, if this decline continues (or, rather, if China fails to recover its previous economic growth rates), the SDGs will be much harder to achieve.

Finally, the ability to collect accurate data must be improved to adequately monitor progress towards the 2030 Agenda. Technology will certainly make data collection easier. However, the same challenges faced by the MDGs are likely to continue throughout the implementation of the SDGs. The vast majority of states will remain unable to provide the necessary statistics; states will continue to report on their own progress and will continue to have an incentive to inflate economic progress; and the UN will remain unable to collect and disseminate its own data to protect state sovereignty.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The SDGs improved upon the MDGs. The SDGs contained a broader scope that included social development alongside economic development. Civil society, the private sector, and developing states were able to provide inputs during the creation process, and an accountability mechanism (the HLPF) was created to encourage the realization of the 2030 Agenda. Despite these worthy efforts, the SDGs failed to address many of the MDGs' failings. The SDGs have incorporated far too many goals and targets, yet ODA is unlikely to increase at the rate necessary to meet these heightened expectations. The SDGs, unlike the MDGs, may have to rely far less on China's economic growth to achieve its mandate given China's current economic slowdown. Finally, the SDGs failed to address the current inadequacies of member states to measure progress towards international development goals. Because of these failings, it seems highly probable that the SDGs will be far less successful than their predecessor and will likely prove to be a disappointment to the international community at large.

333 "GDP Growth (annual %)," The World Bank, China, accessed December 16, 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=CN; Mark Magnier, "China's Economic Growth in 2015 Is Slowest in 25 Years," The Wall Street Journal, January 19, 2016, accessed December 16, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-economic-growth-slows-to-6-9-on-year-in-2015-1453169398.

The Failure of Political Reform in Egypt

Danielle Warren

Millions of Egyptians gathered in Tahrir Square on January 25, 2011 to call for the ousting of Egypt's authoritarian ruler, President Hosni Mubarak. This uprising was unique in that it "exhibited remarkable levels of pluralism and tolerance that had been missing in Egyptian society for decades."[334] Egyptians were drawn to the streets by their shared grievances despite any differences in ideological beliefs. The sense of community felt during this 18-day uprising earned the name the "Spirit of Tahrir,"[335] and its momentum seemed to indicate that social, economic and political change were well within grasp of Egypt's citizens. Although Egyptians successfully ousted Mubarak, the democratically elected government that followed has since collapsed in Egypt. How, then, did the Spirit of Tahrir dissipate—and political reform fail—just a little over one year later?

For these purposes, the definition of political reform is progress towards the fair rule of law, and the establishment of an accountable and legitimate government. There were multiple factors that contributed to the failure of political reform in Egypt. These include President Mohamed Morsi's arbitrary commitment to democratic principles, Egypt's economic and energy crises, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces' (SCAF) tight grip on power, and—perhaps most decisively—the lack of compromise between the SCAF, the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). The MB's minor attempts at democratization were not enough to obtain full political reform and the constraints placed on Morsi by the SCAF and the SCC undermined his presidency. These issues ultimately resulted in the failure of political reform and brought about a return to authoritarianism in Egypt with General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi as its new face.

BACKGROUND

President Mubarak ruled Egypt for 30 years as a "quasi-military leader."[336] He kept Egypt under emergency law, which allowed him to make arbitrary arrests against his opposition and restrict civil liberties.[337] The Muslim Brotherhood started out in 1928 as a small group working to improve the lives of the poor in Egypt, but it rapidly grew into a multinational—and, at times, controversial—Islamist organization.[338] The MB's goal of "restoring Islam to its rightful position of centrality in the social order" pinned it against secular military regimes in Egypt.[339] Still, the MB built a strong presence, particularly because it offered social services not provided by the government. Moreover, other civic institutions could not develop under Mubarak's draconian rule. Mubarak suppressed the MB due to its growing influence and subsequently "amended the constitution to ban religious-based political parties."[340] Accordingly, the MB was outlawed "almost from the time it was

[334] Emad El-Din Shahin, "The Egyptian Revolution: The Power of Mass Mobilization and the Spirit of Tahrir Square," *Journal of the Middle East and Africa* 3, (2012): 68
[335] Ibid.
[336] *BBC News*, "Profile: Hosni Mubarak," March 24, 2017, accessed April 9, 2017.
[337] Ibid.
[338] Rehab Sakr, "Why did the Muslim Brotherhood Fail? The Double-Faced Discourse of Ikhwan and Political Response to Islamist-Secular Diversity in Egypt," *Danubius* 32 (2014): 76.
[339] Jennifer Wilmot, "A commitment to politics: the trajectory of the Muslim Brotherhood during Egypt's 2011–13 political opening," *Contemporary Arab Affairs* 8, no. 3 (July 2015): 381.
[340] *Al Jazeera World*, "The Brotherhood and Mubarak: The story of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood and its emergence into the political arena after decades of suppression," May 24, 2012, accessed April 9, 2017.

founded... until the aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring,"[341] which forced the organization to operate furtively for much of its history. After Mubarak was forced to step down from the presidency on February 11, 2011, the MB formed the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) as its "political arm."[342] This allowed the Islamist group to adopt "the tone of a governing party rather than a beleaguered opposition group."[343] The MB subsequently became the strongest political group in Egypt with Mohamed Morsi as its presidential candidate.

Before Egypt's first democratic election, however, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) assumed transitional leadership of the country due to its already-large presence in the Egyptian government. The SCAF is the military enclave of Egyptian politics,[344] or more specifically, a council of military elites who make up what is called the deep state.[345] David Faris defines the deep state as "the presence of unaccountable, unelected elites that exert control over elected or civilian officials."[346] The SCAF has a self-ascribed role as the "guarantor of constitutional legitimacy and security,"[347] and enjoyed significant authorities under Mubarak. Moreover, there is a general understanding in Egypt that joining the military and rising through the ranks "serves as a springboard for commercial or political privilege,"[348] making it a lucrative and powerful entity of Egyptian society and politics.

The SCAF's alleged goal after Mubarak was removed was to "oversee the transition and ensure that the power would be transferred to a civilian government elected by the people."[349] Upon assuming power in February 2011, the SCAF issued an Interim Constitutional Declaration, which granted sole parliamentary and presidential powers to the SCAF.[350] Additionally, the SCAF issued an official declaration called the al-Selmi Document in late 2011, which granted the council "broad influence over the decision-making process in Egypt,"[351] including veto power over the soon-to-be president's authority to declare war. The document also gave the SCAF power to "overrule any passage that 'contradicts the basic tenets of the Egyptian state and society.'"[352] These laws, among others, were an attempt by the SCAF to avoid being cast aside once a democratically elected president assumed office. Although this document was rejected due to public protests,[353] in June 2012—right around the time of the highly anticipated presidential election—the SCAF issued another addendum to the Constitutional declaration, which largely resembled the al-Selmi document. Specifically, the document noted that the president only declares war "after the approval of the SCAF."[354] This was an attempt by the military to blur the lines between civil-military rule and hold onto certain authorities; in particular, controlling national security.

---

341 Noah Feldman, "A Life or Death by Choice for Egypt's New Pharaoh," *Bloomberg View*, June 16, 2015. Accessed October 7, 2015. http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-06-16/a-life-or-death-choice-for-egypt-s-new-pharaoh.
342 Shadi Hamid, "Beyond Guns and Butter: A U.S.-Egyptian Relationship for a Democratic Era," *Middle East Memo* 22, Brookings (April 2012): 4.
343 Ibid.
344 Steven Cook, Ruling But Not Governing: The Military Enclave in Egypt, Algeria and Turkey (The John's Hopkins University Press, 2007) in David M. Faris. "Deep State, Deep Crisis: Egypt and American Policy," *Middle East Policy* (2013): 100.
345 Hicham Bou Nassif, "Wedded to Mubarak: The Second Careers and Financial Rewards of Egypt's Military Elite, 1981-2011," Middle East Journal 67, no. 4 (Autumn 2013): 509-529.
346 David M. Faris, "Deep State, Deep Crisis: Egypt and American Policy," *Middle East Policy* (2013): 100.
347 Alexey Khlebnikov, "Why did the 2011 Egyptian Revolution Fail?," *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies* 10, no. 3 (2016): 100.
348 Faris, "Deep State, Deep Crisis: Egypt and American Policy," 100-1.
349 Khlebnikov, "Why did the 2011 Egyptian Revolution Fail?,"100.
350 Gamal M. Selim, "Egypt Under SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood: The Triangle of Counter-Revolution," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 2 (Spring 2015): 181.
351 Arab Strategic Report. (2013). Cairo, Egypt: Markaz Al-Ahrâm Lil Dirâsât Al-Siyâsiyyah Wa Al-Istirâtîjiyyah, 308 in Gamal M. Selim, "Egypt Under SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood: The Triangle of Counter-Revolution," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 2 (Spring 2015) 183.
352 Ibid.
353 Evan Hill, "Background: SCAF's last-minute power grab," *Al Jazeera*, June 17, 2012, accessed April 10, 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/egypt/2012/06/201261812449990250.html
354 "English text of SCAF amended Egypt Constitutional Declaration," *Ahram Online*, June 18, 2012, accessed April 14, 2017, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/45350/Egypt/Politics-/URGENT-English-text-of-SCAF-amended-Egypt-Constitu.aspx.

The MB/FJP candidate Mohamed Morsi was elected president on June 24, 2012 after the FJP won a majority of seats in the parliamentary elections held earlier that year.[355] While the MB initially attempted to work with the SCAF on political reform, constitutional documents previously passed by the SCAF were a significant source of contention. This led both parties to become suspicious "of each other's intentions to increase their respective control of the Egyptian state."[356] Moreover, there was also contention between the judiciary branch and the Freedom and Justice Party. During Morsi's rule, the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) "dissolved parliament, saying the rules, under which a third of the parliament candidates contested, were unconstitutional, making the entire body's makeup invalid."[357] The SCC also "revoked a law that would have barred former regime officials… from holding office."[358] This bureaucratic infighting stalled political progress in Egypt. In response, Morsi attempted to exempt his authorities and decisions from judicial oversight in November of 2012 and dismissed the head of the judiciary.[359] One month later, Morsi drafted a new constitution that broadly incorporated Sharia law. Specifically, the Constitution allowed "clerics to intervene in the lawmaking process," and left certain "minority groups without proper legal protection."[360] This move outraged many Egyptian citizens.

Coupling Morsi's power grab with an increase in Egypt's public debt and high unemployment rates, citizens began to view Morsi's government as inefficient and possibly undemocratic.[361] The tourism, real estate, and construction industries were negatively impacted by internal instability under Morsi, leading many Egyptians to suffer economically.[362] Additionally, Egypt saw an energy shortage which forced Egyptians to wait in long lines for fuel. There were also occasional power outages and water shortages under Morsi's rule.[363] After one year in power, Morsi did not produce the transformative results the people hoped for, and Egyptians blamed him for the country's economic and societal ills. The frustration over these crises drove Egyptians to protest again on June 30, 2013, this time demanding the removal of President Morsi and the FJP. The desire for democracy, human rights and social justice that had originally brought Egyptians to the streets in January of 2011 was replaced with a desire for stability. The SCAF subsequently removed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood from power. Immediately following Morsi's ousting, the SCAF reinstated military regime, this time under General Abdel Fatah al-Sisi.

ANALYSIS

Many scholars and journalists have pointed at Morsi's attempt to incorporate Sharia law into the new Constitution as the explanation for the collapse of Egypt's first democratically elected government. While Morsi's actions certainly contributed to his downfall, other factors were working in tandem to reverse the revolution's outcome and stall political progress. These factors include the government's inability to solve the failing economy, power outages, and fuel shortages, as well as government infighting and a lack of power-sharing behind the scenes. The latter severely

---

[355] Toni Johnson, "Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood: Their History and Egypt's Future," *Council on Foreign Relations*, December 5, 2012., accessed October 7, 2015, http://news.yahoo.com/egypts-muslim-brotherhood-history-egypts-future-094801290--politics.html.
[356] Selim, "Egypt Under SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood," 186.
[357] Johnson, "Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood: Their History and Egypt's Future."
[358] Ibid.
[359] Laura Smith-Spark, "The rise and rapid fall of Egypt's Mohamed Morsy," *CNN*, July 4, 2013, accessed April 16, 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/02/world/meast/egypt-morsy-profile/.
[360] Peter Beaumont, "Mohamed Morsi signs Egypt's new constitution into law," *The Guardian*, December 26, 2012, accessed April 13, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/26/mohamed-morsi-egypt-constitution-law.
[361] Salem Y. Lakhal, "Morsi's Failure in Egypt: The Impact of Energy-Supply Chains," *Middle East Policy* 21, no. 3 (Fall 2014): 134-135.
[362] Ibrahim al-Ghitany, "The performance of the Egyptian economy under Morsy," *Egypt Independent*, June 25, 2013, accessed April 14, 2017, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/performance-egyptian-economy-under-morsy.
[363] Perrine Mouterde, "Egypt's energy crisis sparks conspiracy theories," *France 24*, July 13, 2013, accessed April 16, 2017, http://www.france24.com/en/20130713-egypt-petrol-fuel-morsi-cairo-muslim-brotherhood-islamist-energy-conspiracy.

undermined the new regime and allowed elements of the old regime to grip onto power. The SCAF attempted to maintain their political authority—consistent with the historic deep state in Egypt—and both the SCAF and MB were unwilling to compromise with one another. The SCC also complicated matters, and at times reinforced the ways of the old regime.

In the lead-up to his removal from office, Morsi attempted to consolidate his power. He issued a decree that exempted his decisions from judicial oversight following the SCC's dissolution of the lower level of parliament.[364] He also incorporated Sharia law into the new Egyptian Constitution and removed the head of the SCC.[365] These authoritarian actions prompted mass protests, as Egyptians began to fear that Morsi was not interested in democratization and instead wanted to enforce an Islamic state.[366] Moreover, these actions contradicted the Brotherhood's earlier statements on Islam and the Constitution. The MB initially claimed that they were "committed to gradual and peaceful Islamization and only with the consensus of Egypt's citizens."[367] Morsi also claimed during the election, "There is no such thing called an Islamic democracy. There is democracy only… The people are the source of authority."[368] As such, Morsi engaged in "double-speak" since he paid lip service to the Egyptian public, but attempted to implement policies that would please the MB and hardline Salafists.[369] It is likely that Morsi recognized the SCAF was working against him and saw it as one of his last opportunities to conceal his power. While Morsi's intentions are debated—with skeptics saying he intended on incorporating Sharia from the outset—,[370] what matters more is that Morsi lost the trust of many Egyptians and became viewed as unwilling to cooperate within a democratic and pluralistic system. This is significant because it legitimized the power of the military over national security, since the SCAF stepped in to save Egypt from what was seen as Morsi's dictatorial rule.

Additionally, the failing economy in Egypt led many of Morsi's supporters in the poor and middle class to "become disaffected," and pull their support for him.[371] The economic crisis, however, cannot be pinned on one person or ruling party. Putting aside the fact that a year is too ephemeral to fix the issues with Egypt's economy, the MB was not wholly responsible for the deterioration of the economy. The economy was, in fact, on the decline before Morsi assumed office: "He [Morsi] inherited a huge public debt and a legacy of 30 years of corruption under President Hosni Mubarak. Dissatisfaction with economic conditions in the country was already high."[372] Egypt's internal security issues further crippled the economy, as tourism slowed and foreign investments became more infrequent. It is likely, however, that whoever won the presidency would have faced similar issues. Shadi Hamid of the Brookings Doha Center argues, "Anyone who was going to be president right now was going to deal with a deteriorating economy and a rotten, corrupt bureaucracy, many of whom are hostile to President Morsy and the Muslim Brotherhood."[373] While some argue that the Brotherhood was more focused on consolidating power than fixing the economy, the FJP vocally supported an "Egyptian economy built on the principle of economic freedom," and declared that "economic freedom is the guarantor of economic creativity, progress,

---

364 Nirmala Pillay, "The Rule of Law and the New Egyptian Constitution," *Liverpool Law Review* 35, no. 2 (August 2014): 151 and Smith-Spark, "The rise and rapid fall of Egypt's Mohamed Morsy," *CNN*.
365 Ibid.
366 Jeffrey Haynes, "The 'Arab Uprising', Islamists and Democratization," *Mediterranean Politics* 18, no. 2 (July 2013): 179.
367 Johnson, "Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood: Their History and Egypt's Future."
368 Mohamed Morsi quoted in Smith-Spark, "The rise and rapid fall of Egypt's Mohamed Morsy," *CNN*.
369 Carrie Rosefsky-Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013, in Bassam Tibi, "Changing Islamism from Jihadism to Institutional Islamism, a Moderation?" *Soundings: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 98, no. 2 (2915): 156.
370 Smith-Spark, "The rise and rapid fall of Egypt's Mohamed Morsy," *CNN*.
371 Fawaz Gerges, quoted in Smith-Spark, "The rise and rapid fall of Egypt's Mohamed Morsy," *CNN*.
372 Smith-Spark, "The rise and rapid fall of Egypt's Mohamed Morsy," *CNN*.
373 Shadi Hamid, quoted in Smith-Spark, "The rise and rapid fall of Egypt's Mohamed Morsy," *CNN*.

and development..."[374] Certainly advocating for liberal economic prosperity and implementing successful economic policies are two different things; however, the FJP was eager to boost the economy as they were aware it would legitimize Morsi's rule and keep the SCAF at bay. Moreover, a few months before his ousting, Morsi agreed to try and renegotiate with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) regarding economic reforms to receive loans.[375] The negotiations for an IMF loan began before Morsi took office and ran into "repeated snags" because the IMF wanted Mubarak to "rein in public finances" and broaden reforms.[376] As such, Egypt's issues with the IMF began before Morsi's rule. Because Morsi was ousted before any economic policies could take effect, whether or not Egypt's economy would have ultimately improved remains an unknown.

In addition to the economic problems, fuel shortages and power outages that occurred in the months leading up to the removal of Morsi were detrimental to the MB's credibility as an effective ruling party. This was arguably the *coup de grâce*, which led to Morsi's removal from power.[377] Following Morsi's ousting, it seemed as though the SCAF "injected a large quantity of gasoline into the market to fix the shortage,"[378] since the energy crisis seemed to resolve itself overnight. It is important to consider how Egypt went "from having long lines for gasoline" under Morsi's rule, to "having such an abundant supply that the lines disappeared" the day after Morsi was jailed.[379] Critics of Morsi claim that the "miraculous turnaround only proves how badly he was running the country."[380] On the other hand, *The New York Times* journalists Ben Hubbard and David Kirkpatrick argue that the "miraculous end to the crippling energy shortages seems to indicate that the legions of personnel left in place after… Mubarak was ousted… played a significant role—intentionally or not—in undermining the overall quality of life under the Islamist administration of Mr. Morsi."[381] Although concrete evidence indicating that the SCAF manufactured this energy crisis is lacking, the return of the police to the streets immediately following Morsi's fall indicates that forces were working against him. For instance, under Morsi's rule, "crime increased and traffic clogged roads," and yet, "the police refused to deploy fully," until after Morsi was removed from power.[382] While Morsi may have shown an inability to develop a comprehensible solution to economic issues and fuel shortages, the unwillingness of the SCAF and the police to work towards fixing these issues indicates that some sought to undermine Morsi at the expense of Egyptians. It is reasonable to interpret this to mean that even if Morsi had developed a solution, it would not have been accepted or applied.

Ultimately it is the lack of power-sharing that contributed most to the demise of democracy in Egypt, as indicated by the power struggle underlying the economic and energy crises in Egypt. Scholar Arend Lijphart argues that power-sharing is "a set of principles which… provide each significant group in a society with representation and decision-making capacities in general affairs."[383] Power-sharing involves compromise and is a crucial element of successful democratization. This is particularly true in a country like Egypt, where the deep state makes it

---

[374] *Egypt Independent*, "Part IV of the Freedom Party Program and Justice: Economy," April 5, 2011, accessed April 9, 201, http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/388072 also in Hamid, "Beyond Guns and Butter," 5.
[375] Selim, "Egypt Under SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood," 194.
[376] Roula Khalaf, "Morsi adviser blames IMF for delaying Egypt $4.8bn loan agreement," Financial Times, June 9, 2013, accessed April 9, 2017.
[377] Lakhal, "Morsi's Failure in Egypt" 135.
[378] Ibid, 143.
[379] Ibid.
[380] Harold Maass, "Did Egypt's military manufacture an economic crisis to sabotage Morsi?," *The Week*, July 11, 2013, accessed April 17, 2017, http://theweek.com/articles/462268/did-egypts-military-manufacture-economic-crisis-sabotage-morsi.
[381] Ben Hubbard and David D. Kirkpatrick, "Sudden Improvements in Egypt Suggest a Campaign to Undermine Morsi," The New York Times, July 10, 2013, accessed April 10, 2017, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/11/world/middleeast/improvements-in-egypt-suggest-a-campaign-that-undermined-morsi.html?smid=pl-share.
[382] Ibid.
[383] Arend Lijphart, 1977a: 25 in Alexandre de Sousa Carvalho "Power-sharing: concepts, debates and gaps," *Janus.net e-journal of International Relations* 7, no. 1 (May-October 2016): 20.

extremely vulnerable to military takeover. The lack of trust between the MB and the SCAF made power-sharing nearly impossible. The SCAF—which is a "deeply rooted bureaucracy"—resisted Morsi not only because of a lack of trust, but because the SCAF had "always hated" the Brotherhood due to its resistance to Mubarak's rule.[384] The MB and Morsi, likewise, distrusted the SCAF and were "disinclined to compromise or to reach out to his [Morsi's] political and ideological opponents,"[385] especially those from the old military regime. Both parties attempted to pass laws that would undermine the other, and the SCC involved itself into this power struggle, most times on the side of the SCAF. The constant bureaucratic infighting in Egypt misallocated time and resources towards the consolidation of power rather than towards tending to Egypt's fragile state and economy. Instead of working together, the SCAF and MB tried to work around one another and undermine each other's power.

CONCLUSION

When coupling Morsi's attempts to incorporate elements of Sharia law into the Constitution with the economic problems in Egypt and the lack of reconciliation between the SCAF and the MB, it becomes evident why political reform was unsuccessful. Morsi's rash decision to overextend his authority and the SCAF's efforts to undermine Morsi further sealed the fate of his presidency. Whether or not Morsi was a moderate Islamist, to some extent, is moot because the other institutions, namely the SCAF and the SCC, would not compromise and did not trust the MB. The power struggle between elites made it so that political reform was hopeless from the time the SCAF published the Interim Constitution and the Muslim Brotherhood formed the FJP. The SCAF and the MB were skeptical of each other from the outset and thus unwilling to share decision-making capacities, marking the ultimate failure of the revolution. The case of Egypt sheds light on the need for reconciliation and power-sharing in democracy transitions, and thus provides a prescription for emerging democracies: elites from the previous regime—as well as new representatives and revolutionaries—must be willing to compromise and put the fate of the country before political power.

---

384 Max Read, "Did the 'Deep State' Sabotage Morsi?," *Gawker*, July 11, 2013, accessed April 17, 2017, http://gawker.com/did-the-deep-state-sabotage-morsi-742435712.
385 Max Read, "Did the 'Deep State' Sabotage Morsi?," *Gawker*, July 11, 2013, accessed April 17, 2017, http://gawker.com/did-the-deep-state-sabotage-morsi-742435712.

Individual Attitudes Toward Free Trade

Beyond the Economics

Alina Zheng

INTRODUCTION

Understanding voters' attitudes toward international free trade is essential to understanding the origins of trade policy in democratic states. Recently, more studies have used survey data to understand how voter demographics affect attitudes towards trade. Many of these studies involve testing main models of trade theory, such as the Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardo-Viner models. Heckscher-Ohlin's factor endowments theory dictates that individuals owning factors of production abundant in supply prefer free trade as they benefit from the increased business, whereas free trade harms those that own factors of production relatively scarce in supply.[386] Alternatively, Ricardo-Viner's specific factors approach claims that the industry in which individuals work determines their attitudes towards trade.[387] Despite the usefulness of these models in explaining preferences for free trade at the firm level, there is little evidence that either model accurately predicts attitudes towards free trade at the individual level. Few studies have tested the strength of these models in this regard, but University of Pennsylvania professors Mansfield and Mutz, for instance, find that "the revealed comparative (dis)advantage of the industry in which an individual is employed does not influence his or her opinions in the way that this approach predicts."[388] This would suggest that the Heckscher-Ohlin model fails to explain individual attitudes toward international free trade. Moreover, they claim that "education has no direct effect on trade attitudes, thus suggesting that its effects represent out-group anxiety rather than economic self-interest."[389]

Studies of voters' attitudes towards trade point to one universal finding: that in democracies, those with higher levels of education are more likely to support free trade. Some scholars see this phenomenon as representative of significant traction in the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, which states that an increase in the price of a good will lead to an increase in the price of the factor used to produce it.[390] These scholars claim that education is a form of endowment of skills, so the Stolper-Samuelson theorem is verified by the fact that people with more education do indeed prefer free trade. The possible argument here is that education level can be viewed as an individual's skill level; therefore their competitiveness in exporting/importing industries is higher than an individual with inferior education, making their chances of profitability with international trade higher and their preferences more pro-trade. In addition, individuals with lower levels of education are more likely to work in industries producing goods that are cheap to import, and suffer from the foreign competition as a result. These studies have found that education is consistently indicative of pro-liberalization trade policy attitudes and that left-leaning individuals tend to be pro-liberalization, which is congruent with an evidence that higher levels of education tend to have a correlation with democratic attitudes in the United States.

However, not all agree that this is sufficient to verify the economic model. Harvard and Stanford professors Hainmueller and Hiscox also find that "effects of education on individual trade

386 Leamer, Edward E. "The Heckscher-Ohlin model in theory and practice." (1995).
387 Rodrik, Dani. "Political economy of trade policy." Handbook of international economics 3 (1995): 1457-1494.
388 Mansfield, Edward D., and Diana C. Mutz. "Support for free trade: Self-interest, sociotropic politics, and out-group anxiety." International Organization 63, no. 03 (2009): 425-457.
389 Ibid, 452.
390 Hoffman, Michael ES. "What explains attitudes across US trade policies?." Public Choice 138, no. 3-4 (2009): 447-460.

preferences are not primarily a product of distributional concerns linked to job skills."[391] They show that attitudes towards free trade among the highly educated are almost uniform, as are attitudes among the lower educated regardless of employment or industry. However, unlike supporters of the Stolper-Samuelson concept, Hainmueller and Hiscox theorize that higher levels of education are instead representative of greater exposure to ideas about trade and globalization.[392]

Apart from these economic theories, scholars have recently found an evidence that social factors may be strong determinants of attitudes towards trade as well. For instance, Mansfield and Mutz found evidence that national media coverage can shape voters' perceptions of how well the economy is doing and how trade influences their lives — which in turn can shape how their policy attitudes are formed.[393] Similarly, Naoi and Kume have found that the reason why protectionism may be supported in specific industries might be related to whether an individual is close to someone who has experienced net loss from free trade, even if he or she has not.[394]

Finally, an interesting new phenomenon that has recently gained attention in the United States specifically is anti-foreigner sentiments. The most prominent example is the rise of Donald J. Trump. His capitalization on these anti-foreigner sentiments by promoting ideas like barring immigration and criticism of Mexicans and Muslims has been part of a successful campaign and victory of the presidency. While the Republican party has traditionally been the party of free trade, Trump represents a changing face of the US ideologies in that he has openly supported renegotiating trade deals with the intention of raising trade barriers. Trump's victory helps to accentuate a question that I pose in this paper: Is anti-foreigner sentiment and/or lack of exposure to immigrants a direct determinant of attitudes towards trade? In their working paper, Rothwell and Diego-Rosell help to scratch the surface of this question by studying who actually supports Trump and what kinds of individual factors can help us to predict why. Their study shows that Trump supporters are less educated and more likely to work in blue collar occupations, but are financially no worse or better off than the average citizen.[395] However, Trump supporters are much more likely to live in predominantly White communities or rural areas. While these are interesting results as determinants of being a Trump supporter, I go a step further and investigate whether these geographic and sociological factors directly influence US voters' attitudes towards trade rather than Trump specifically.

Mansfield and Mutz also take on this issue in their study on "out-group anxiety."[396] They conclude that "incorporating the effects of sociotropic perceptions, isolationism, and out-group anxiety substantially increases the explanatory power of models of such attitudes."[397] However, I caution against taking their results as granted because Mansfield and Mutz's methods of operationalizing their measures of out-group anxiety are questionable. Without directly asking the respondents questions about sentiments towards foreigners, but instead categorizing their responses to other questions as broadly in/out group thinking, their measure of these sentiments have uncertain accuracy. Both studies attempt to measure how nationalism and sociological factors can directly affect voter attitudes. Rothwell and Diego-Rosell link a favorable view of Trump from respondents with, at least to some extent, a strong attitude in favor of nationalism as this is a centerpiece of Trump's campaign. Similarly, Mansfield and Mutz's measurement of out-group

---

391 Hainmueller, Jens, and Michael J. Hiscox. "Learning to love globalization: Education and individual attitudes toward international trade." International Organization 60, no. 02 (2006): 469-498.

392 Ibid.

393 Mansfield and Mutz, "Support for free trade: Self-interest, sociotropic politics, and out-group anxiety." 425-457

394 Naoi, Megumi, and Ikuo Kume. "Explaining mass support for agricultural protectionism: Evidence from a survey experiment during the global recession." International Organization 65, no. 04 (2011): 771-795.

395 Rothwell, Jonathan T., and Pablo Diego-Rosell. "Explaining nationalist political views: The case of Donald Trump." (2016).

396 Mansfield and Mutz, Support for Free Trade, 425.

397 Ibid, 453.

anxiety broadly attempts to detect respondents' belief of whether the United States is culturally superior to other countries.

The focus of this paper is not necessarily to verify one model over another, but rather to clarify which individual factors from the available data are most significant in affecting voters' attitudes towards trade in the United States~~,~~ amidst the changing social environment of Trump and growing anti-foreigner sentiments. Using data from 2015, I help to explain the relationship between attitudes towards trade and these sociological factors, as well as improve on some aspects of previously researched models using a similar kind of survey data.

DATA AND VARIABLES

Using data from the Pew Research Center Political Survey, I go beyond the economic models previously investigated, and instead delve into the societal- and individual-level characteristics that may affect one's opinion of free trade. Interviews were conducted from May 12, 2015 to May 18 by randomly calling telephone numbers of registered voters. Calls were staggered over times of days and days of the week to maximize the chance of making contact with potential respondents.[398]

I focus on the attitudes of Americans for two reasons. First, there exists previous research conducted in the United States providing comparability for my analysis, and a basis to improve on.[399] Second, the United States currently exhibits an emphasis on voters' attitudes towards immigrants and, consequently, foreigners in general.[400] I find evidence that exposure to ideas about trade is not the only determining factor, but also that individuals' attitudes towards foreigners in general have significance.

I use multivariable probit regression as a baseline method, to estimate how various factors correlate with the binary probability of seeing Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) as a good thing. I select this method as the most straightforward way to obtain estimations of the marginal effect of each variable on the probability of liking free trade.

The Dependent Variable

My dependent variable is designed to measure the probability of a given individual seeing FTAs as a good thing, to represent their attitude towards free trade. The survey question I use is as follows: *In general, do you think that free trade agreements between the US and other countries have been a good thing or a bad thing for the United States?* I turn the respondents' answers to this question into a dummy variable where 1 = FTAs are a good thing and 0 = FTAs are a bad thing. Although this question is specifically about Free Trade Agreements, FTAs are highly representative of the United States' involvement with international trade, so a measure of support for FTAs is indicative of that individual's support/opposition of free trade in general. Existing studies have used similar surveys to measure individual support for international trade, or alternatively records of their voting decisions on FTAs.

The Independent Variables

The key independent variables I investigate fall into four categories: (1) level of education, (2) respondents' perceptions of the effects of free trade, (3) attitudes towards foreigners, and (4) the respondent's location of residence.

---

398. Pew Research Center, May 2015 Political Survey, http://www.people-press.org/category/datasets/.
399. Hoffman, "What explains attitudes across US trade policies?", 447-460.

400. Fussell, Elizabeth. "Warmth of the Welcome: Attitudes toward Immigrants and Immigration Policy." Annual review of sociology 40 (2014): 479.

1 Education Variables

With the educational variables in mind from the previous studies, it is evident that more well-educated individuals tend to favor a more active role of the United States in foreign affairs, and have a more favorable view of free trade. It has been hypothesized that this could be the case for three reasons: (1) their tendency to be more open to foreign contact in general and less ethnically based prejudice; (2) they've had more exposure to economists' ideas about free trade through education directly; or (3) their education is a factor endowment by nature of being a skill.[401]

To measure the effect of education on attitudes toward free trade, I include three dummy variables for the levels of education attained at various points which are Some College, College Graduate, and Postgraduate Degree to include in the probit model. This is a replication of Mansfield and Mutz's methods to identify at what level education matters with respect to views on FTAs. Education is a categorical variable where a high school diploma or less as the highest level of education attained for respondents is omitted as a baseline comparison.[402]

2 Perceived Effects of Free Trade

For variables to represent perceptions of the effects of FTAs, the first is a variable to measure respondents' perceptions of how free trade affects their personal situations labeled Perceived Effects of Trade on Self. This is taken from the question "Thinking about the financial situation of you and your family. . . Do you think free trade agreements have definitely helped, probably helped, probably hurt, or definitely hurt the financial situation of you and your family?" This variable is a dummy variable coded as 1 = FTAs helped and 0 otherwise to indicate whether the respondent had a positive view of FTAs with respect to their family or not. The second variable measures respondents' perceptions of how free trade affects the nation, labeled Perceived Effects of Trade on US. This variable is based on the question "Do free trade agreements make the American economy grow, slow down the economy, or not make a difference?" Similarly, responses are coded into a dummy variable where 1 = Make the Economy Grow and 0 otherwise.

Looking at respondents' perceptions of the effects of FTAs on their personal situations, we can see from Figure 1 that although the distribution is skewed right, Americans have a generally positive view of FTAs. About 51% of respondents said that FTAs definitely helped or probably helped their families whereas only 40% said that they hurt. Looking at the distribution of responses for the perceived effect of FTAs on the nation as a whole in Figure 2, again the opinions are tipped in a slightly positive direction; however, generally the sample is split on this issue. In fact, the responses are split almost completely evenly with 37% of respondents saying that FTAs make the national economy grow and 37% saying that they cause the economy to slow down. The comparison of these two questions is interesting as it seems that respondents had a better reaction to FTAs with respect to their own families as opposed to the economy as a whole. This seems to imply that respondents may not feel as strongly about the effects of FTAs on their families personally as much as they feel witness to an economic downturn of the nation instead. However, contrary to Mansfield and Mutz's findings, a much smaller portion of respondents said that FTAs have no effect on their families (only 10%).

[401] Hainmueller, Jens, and Hiscox. "Learning to love globalization: Education and individual attitudes toward international trade." 469-498.

[402] Mansfield and Mutz. "Support for free trade: Self-interest, sociotropic politics, and out-group anxiety." 442.



Figure 1: Distribution of perceptions of free trade with respect to individual families.



Figure 2: Distribution of perceptions of free trade with respect to national economic growth.

3 Attitudes Toward Foreigners

To test noneconomic influences on people's opinions of free trade, I use variables representing respondents' attitudes towards foreigners and variables detailing characteristics of the area they reside in. Previous studies' attempts to measure attitudes towards foreigners have not been satisfactory. For instance, Mansfield and Mutz touch on the idea of "nationalism" and "ethnocentrism" in their paper, but provide an unsatisfactory measure that simply "draws on three previously used questions to assess whether respondents believe that the United States is culturally superior to other countries" without providing a firm indicator of this concept.[403]

Admittedly, directly asking people if they hold suspicions or negative feelings towards foreigners would not likely lead to very honest or usable results. Instead, similar to the way some have used the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) as a case issue to measure people's attitudes towards free trade, I use survey questions on two key issues in US politics to determine attitudes towards foreigners: immigration policy and war.[404] The first variable, labeled Opinion of Immigrants, uses people's perceptions of immigrants in the United States to represent their attitudes towards foreigners. This variable is drawn from the question "Here are some pairs of statements. Please tell me whether the first statement or the second statement comes closer to your own views—even if neither is exactly right. Immigrants today strengthen our country because of their hard work and talents OR Immigrants today are a burden on our country because they take our jobs, housing and health care." I use the responses to this question to code Opinion of Immigrants as a dummy variable where 1 = agrees that "immigrants strengthen our country," and 0 = otherwise to represent whether someone has inherently positive views of foreigners or not.

The second variable, labeled Drone, uses a question about US drone strike tactics to measure respondents' benevolent feelings towards foreigners or lack thereof as another representation of attitudes toward foreigners. This variable is drawn from the question "How concerned are you, if at all, about whether US drone strikes endanger the lives of innocent civilians? Are you very concerned, somewhat concerned, not too concerned or not at all concerned?" Again, this is coded into a dummy variable where 1 = somewhat concerned or very concerned and 0 = otherwise.

4 Geographic Indicators

Previously, studies have found that individuals living in more rural areas tend to have more nationalistic attitudes, implying that they would be more inclined to be against free trade.[405] However, those studies have not yet directly tested how this variable affects individuals' attitudes toward free trade. The first set of variables I use to investigate the direct relationship is a measure of population density using the respondents' area codes, derived from 2010 Census data according to their responses.[406] These are categorized into five categories of density, from lowest to highest in people per square mile (Very Low, Low, Medium, High, and Very High Density). Similar to income, this measure is represented by a series of categorical variables where the first category of Very Low Density is omitted as a baseline comparison. The second variable of my geographic variables is a classification of the region that the respondent resides in using the 2010 Census Urban Rural Classification, assigning each respondent a number from 1 to 3 where 1 = Urban Region, 2 = Suburban Region, and 3 = Rural Region. This is a categorical variable represented by a series of indicator variables where the third category of Rural Region is omitted as a baseline comparison.

5 Control Variables

Finally, all of the models include control variables representing other personal characteristics correlated with attitudes toward free trade including income, party identification, gender, and age.

---

403 Ibid, 439-440.
404 Guisinger, Alexandra. "Determining trade policy: Do voters hold politicians accountable?." International Organization 63, no. 03 (2009): 533-557.
405 Rothwell and Diego-Rosell. "Explaining nationalist political views: The case of Donald Trump." 2016.
406 US Census Bureau. 2010 Census Data. 2010. Distributed by US Census Bureau. http://www.census.gov/2010census/data/.

Income is measured by each respondent's total family income for the year of 2014. Income is a categorical variable separated into four categories: (1) Under $30,000, (2) 30 to Under $50,000 (3) 50 to Under $100,000 and (4) $100,000 and above. Since income is a categorical variable, it is represented by a series of indicator variables where each coefficient represents the marginal effect of earning an income in that category's range compared to the previous category, and so on. The first category of Under $30,000 is omitted as a baseline comparison. Gender is a simple dummy variable where 1 = male and 0 otherwise, and Age is a continuous variable. Party identification is treated as a categorical variable where Democrat and Republican are each dummy variables coded as 1 if the respondent identifies with that party and 0 otherwise. Independent political affiliation and other political affiliations are omitted as a baseline comparison.

MODELS AND RESULTS

I start with a baseline multivariate probit model to measure the correlation of education with attitudes toward free trade, solely using my variables for education and control variables. Then in each model after, I add another set of factors to test — starting with perceptions of the effects of free trade, then attitudes towards foreigners, and finally geographic indicators about where the respondent resides. The results are shown in Table 1. The models are designed to measure how each factor affects the binary probability of holding a favorable view of Free Trade Agreements. While I primarily look at marginal effects of each variable for the most useful interpretation, original unmodified coefficients from the models can be found in Table 3 of the Appendix. The multivariate probit models can be expressed as follows:

$$P[F_i] = E_i + C_i + \varepsilon_i \qquad (1)$$

$$P[F_i] = E_i + P_i + C_i + \varepsilon_i \qquad (2)$$

$$P[F_i] = E_i + P_i + F_i + C_i + \varepsilon_i \qquad (3)$$

$$P[F_i] = E_i + P_i + F_i + G_i + C_i + \varepsilon_i \qquad (4)$$

where the numbers correspond to the number of the model in Table 1. The probability $P[F_i]$ of individual i perceiving FTAs as a "Good Thing" is dependent on their highest level of education attained (E); their perceptions of the effect of FTAs on the national economy and on their personal financial situation (P); their attitudes towards foreigners (F); geographical characteristics of their zipcode (G); and control variables including income, political affiliation, gender, and age (C); with remaining error *ε*.

From Model 1, we can see that whether someone has a postgraduate degree is the strongest indicator of his or her attitude toward free trade; but as I add in other variables of interest, it loses significance. This is likely because the other factors I add in have much stronger statistical power and diminish the significance of the education variables. On the other hand, whether someone holds a college degree does become significant in

Table 1: Marginal Effects of Multivariate Probit Models — Significance of Perceived Effects of FTAs on View of FTAs

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Some College	0.00729	-0.0130	-0.0149	-0.0205
	(0.0394)	(0.0416)	(0.0416)	(0.0416)
College Grad	-0.0357	-0.0834	-0.0881	-0.0913
	(0.0383)	(0.0410)	(0.0410)	(0.0411)
Postgrad	0.129	0.0571	0.0445	0.0462
	(0.0340)	(0.0401)	(0.0412)	(0.0413)
Income [30 to Under $50,000]	-0.0114	-0.0189	-0.0161	-0.0161
	(0.0379)	(0.0408)	(0.0407)	(0.0408)
Income [50 to Under $100,000]	0.00905	-0.0180	-0.0188	-0.0185
	(0.0361)	(0.0392)	(0.0392)	(0.0395)
Income [$100,000 and Above]	0.0394	-0.0339	-0.0386	-0.0460
	(0.0386)	(0.0438)	(0.0441)	(0.0447)
Republican	-0.00173	0.000103	0.0113	0.0204

	(0.0318)	(0.0342)	(0.0346)	(0.0346)
Democrat	0.0134	-0.0113	-0.0196	-0.0284
	(0.0298)	(0.0330)	(0.0333)	(0.0338)
Male	-0.0248	-0.0399	-0.0421	-0.0429
	(0.0260)	(0.0279)	(0.0279)	(0.0280)
Age	-0.00425	-0.00178	-0.00136	-0.00118
	(0.000724)	(0.000794)	(0.000806)	(0.000815)
Perceived Effects of Trade on US		0.379	0.376	0.379
		(0.0237)	(0.0239)	(0.0239)
Perceived Effects of Trade on Self		0.444	0.446	0.448
		(0.0246)	(0.0247)	(0.0248)
Opinion of Immigrants			0.0642	0.0550
			(0.0295)	(0.0299)
Drone			-0.0904	-0.0914
			(0.0307)	(0.0307)

Low Density				0.0474 (0.0444)
Medium Density				0.0859 (0.0476)
High Density				0.111 (0.0466)
Very High Density				0.0991 (0.0484)
Urban Region				-0.0139 (0.0327)
Suburban Region				0.0247 (0.0503)
N	1487	1487	1487	1487
pseudo R^2	0.025	0.354	0.360	0.364

$p < 0.05$, $p < 0.01$, $p < 0.001$ Standard errors in parentheses the latter models. This implies that after holding more things constant, such as perceptions of trade or attitudes towards foreigners, whether someone attended college has a greater impact on his or her attitude towards trade. Similar to studies in precedence, no level of income is a significant explanatory variable of attitudes toward free trade. If we are looking at education as a part of the factor endowments model, then taking into account the coefficients for income, there does not seem to be strong evidence for the Stolper-Samuelson theorem.

While there is little evidence that individuals' level of income affects their attitudes toward trade, from Model 2, we can see that perceptions of how trade affects respondents' families and/or the nation are highly correlated with their opinions on FTAs overall. In Table 1, the marginal effects of the variables Perceived Effects of Trade on US and Perceived Effects of Trade on Self are highly statistically significant. Respondents who feel that FTAs have a positive effect on their families are much more likely to think that FTAs are a good thing overall, and the same goes for perceptions of the effects of FTAs on the US. Including the perceived effects of FTAs on respondents' families and the nation substantially strengthens the model's explanatory power, increasing the R^2 value from only about 3% to 35%. Each adjusted model consequently also increases the explanatory power, but only by a marginal amount.

Surprisingly, the gender and political affiliation (Democrat or Republican) of respondents do not have a significant correlation with attitudes toward FTAs. Controlling for more variables, those who identify as Democrats tend to be more protectionist than those who do not and vice versa for Republican, but the coefficients are not significant. In Model 1, age is highly significant showing that older individuals are much more likely to have protectionist attitudes towards FTAs than the younger individuals.

Next, looking at the measures of attitudes toward foreigners in Models 3 and 4, I find that the measurement of compassion towards foreigners is actually more significant than the immigration indicator of positive attitudes toward foreigners. However, the coefficient is negative and statistically significant meaning that those with concerns for civilians in US drone strikes are actually about 9% more likely to be protectionist. This is surprising and gives cause to reevaluate my theory on how this variable relates to attitudes towards FTAs and free trade. Rather than an indication of positive or negative attitudes toward foreigners as I thought before, it seems that a more plausible explanation is that this variable is representative of attitudes towards US foreign affairs and whether the US should be more or less involved with other countries' politics. Regardless, these two variables verify that opinions about foreigners and US involvement in foreign affairs in general, not just in an economic sense, significantly correlate with American's attitudes toward FTAs and free trade.

Finally, in Model 4, I add my two variables to account for geographic considerations about the respondent's environment, specifically the idea that those in rural or less populated areas are more likely to have a nationalistic or isolationist attitude, and consequently, more protectionist attitudes and vice versa. We can see that population density is statistically significant at two of the classification levels, but region type does not have a strong relationship with attitudes toward trade. This tells us that individuals living in more densely populated areas are more likely to have a favorable outlook on free trade or FTAs, at least on some levels.

ACCURACY OF THE MODEL

One apparent concern in replicating Mansfield and Mutz's model is that while it is plausible to theorize that one's perceptions of how FTAs affect their personal financial situation and the national economy will help determine their view on whether FTAs are a good thing, it is more likely that these two variables are simply alternative measures of the same thing— respondents' favorable or unfavorable views of FTAs. Especially when these questions are asked in immediate succession, respondents are likely inclined to answer similarly. Thus, I think an alternative variable should be estimated in order to truly test the relationship between an individual's perceived financial situation and attitudes toward free trade. Rather, a more valuable variable to look at would be individuals' perceptions of their personal financial situations overall and the national economy overall, to see if these general economic conditions are reflected in their opinions of free trade agreements.

Secondly, in light of the coefficient that I found for the drone variable, it seems that it would be useful to further investigate the effect of attitudes towards the United States' general involvement with foreign affairs on attitudes toward free trade, in addition to positive or negative attitudes toward foreigners themselves.

Revised Models

According to findings from the above models, I revise my models to include the respondents' perceptions of the United States' economy overall and their personal financial situation overall, as opposed to perceived effects of FTAs. I believe this to be a better representation of a possible causal relationship, because asking about perceived effects of FTAs is very close to variations on the same question of how respondents feel about FTAs overall. To operationalize these variables, I utilize three survey questions. Each are coded as binary indicators where 1 = excellent or good and 0 otherwise. The first variable, labeled Perceived State of US Economy, is a measure of respondents' perceptions of the US economy overall worded as follows: "How would you rate economic conditions in this country today. . . as excellent, good, only fair, or poor?" Next, is a variable to indicate how respondents perceive their own current financial situation, labeled Perceived State of Personal: "How would you rate your own personal financial situation? Would you say you are in excellent shape, good shape, only fair shape or poor shape financially?" Finally, the third variable is a measure of respondents' optimism for the future of their personal financial situation, labeled Optimism: "Over the course of the next year, do you think the financial situation of you and your family will improve a lot, improve some, get a little worse or get a lot worse?" The indicator for this variable is coded as 1 = Improve Some, 0 = Get Worse. The revised Model 4 can be expressed as follows:

$$P[F_i] = E_i + S_i + F_i + G_i + C_i + \varepsilon_i \qquad (4)$$

where I replace the variables for individuals' perceptions of the effects of FTAs on the nation and their personal situations (P) in the previous Models 2-4, with the three new variables representing respondents' perceptions of the general state of the national economy and their personal situations (S). The results of these revised models are in Table 2; the unmodified coefficients of these models can be found in Table 4 of the Appendix. The results shown in Table 2 are mostly similar for the variables that remained constant throughout the models; however, for the new indicator of perceptions of the US economy, I do find an extremely statistically significant marginal effect for people's perceptions of the state of the US economy and their attitudes toward free trade. Such a high marginal effect would imply that those who are more satisfied with the health of the nation's economy overall, are more likely to support free trade and FTAs than individuals who perceive the nation's economy as doing poorly. Moreover, I do not find significant results for the other two new indicators pertaining to personal financial situations. This seems to suggest that people's attitudes toward free trade are directly linked to their perceptions of the national economy overall, regardless of their personal situation or perceptions of their immediate community. Interestingly, in Model 4 with the previous perceived effects indicators, my measurement of compassion for foreigners measured by the "drone" survey question had highly significant effects; but with these new indicators, I find the opposite — my variable for perceptions of immigrants is statistically significant but my variable for the question about drones is not.

Table 2: Marginal Effects of Revised Models — Using Perceived General State of the US Economy and Personal Financial Situation as Opposed to Perceived Effects of FTAs.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Some College	0.00747	0.0137	0.00970	0.00406
	(0.0396)	(0.0399)	(0.0401)	(0.0401)
College Grad	-0.0399	-0.0576	-0.0584	-0.0638
	(0.0385)	(0.0387)	(0.0389)	(0.0390)
Postgrad	0.126	0.113	0.0947	0.0929
	(0.0343)	(0.0351)	(0.0362)	(0.0364)
Income [30 to Under $50,000]	-0.0117	-0.0231	-0.0196	-0.0168
	(0.0381)	(0.0387)	(0.0388)	(0.0389)
Income [50 to Under $100,000]	0.0135	-0.0174	-0.0116	-0.00362
	(0.0363)	(0.0384)	(0.0384)	(0.0386)
Income [$100,000 and Above]	0.0438	0.00660	0.00430	0.00788
	(0.0387)	(0.0421)	(0.0423)	(0.0426)
Republican	-0.00134	0.00853	0.0341	0.0406
	(0.0319)	(0.0320)	(0.0323)	(0.0323)
Democrat	0.0117	-0.00914	-0.0196	-0.0264
	(0.0301)	(0.0309)	(0.0313)	(0.0316)
Male	-0.0253	-0.0233	-0.0238	-0.0223
	(0.0262)	(0.0263)	(0.0264)	(0.0265)
Age	-0.00428	-0.00382	-0.00335	-0.00317
	(0.000725)	(0.000758)	(0.000768)	(0.000775)
Perceived State of		0.126	0.107	0.107
US Economy		(0.0287)	(0.0295)	(0.0296)
Perceived State of		0.0561	0.0447	0.0447
Personal		(0.0290)	(0.0293)	(0.0294)
Optimism		0.0440	0.0301	0.0287
		(0.0282)	(0.0285)	(0.0285)
Opinion of Immigrants			0.121	0.114
			(0.0282)	(0.0285)
Drone			-0.0373	-0.0373
			(0.0313)	(0.0313)
Low Density				-0.00331
				(0.0439)
Medium Density				0.0302
				(0.0486)
High Density				0.0440
				(0.0492)
Very High Density				0.0243
				(0.0511)
Urban Region				-0.0649
				(0.0305)

Suburban Region				-0.0548 (0.0500)
pseudo R^2	0.025	0.041	0.051	0.055
N	1487	1487	1487	1487

$p < 0.05$, $p < 0.01$, $p < 0.001$ Standard errors in parentheses

CONCLUSION

In any democratic model of government, it is obvious that the preferences of the masses are essential to our understanding of policymaking for any issue, including free trade.[407] Despite this fact, our understanding of what shapes individual's attitudes toward free trade are still limited. The strong implication of my study is not only that standard political economy models are very limited in how much of the variation in preferences they can account for, but also that noneconomic factors can play a significant role in shaping individuals' preferences over trade. Most research until now emphasizes the economic factors that affect trade preferences including factor endowments, specific factors, and other standard models of trade. However, this evidence shows that on the contrary, individual prosperity or economic endowment does not actually correlate strongly with protectionist or liberalization preferences. As the United States is a highly developed country, theoretically highly skilled individuals will benefit economically from open trade and should therefore prefer trade liberalization such as Free Trade Agreements. While there is limited support for this hypothesis, stronger evidence exists for other factors such as attitudes toward foreigners or opinions about the state of the US economy in general.

Moreover, in fixing Mansfield and Mutz's key oversight of using alternate measures of the dependent variable rather than unique separate independent variables, I was able to identify more accurate sources of trade preferences going past the obvious correlations. In an age of expanding globalization and trade liberalization, individuals likely tend to associate the financial well-being of the nation overall with the growing trend of free trade, whether globalization is truly the cause or not. Individuals observe this phenomenon and the current situation, and link them together to form their opinions. This is especially represented in my new models with different variables directly measuring the marginal effect of people's perceptions of the state of the national economy overall, rather than the perceived effects of free trade. Regardless of personal situations or perceptions of their local community, this measure was significant in predicting individuals' attitudes toward free trade. This has significant implications for future research on the roots of voters' opinions on not just trade issues, but also economic issues overall.

Finally, in a year when illegal immigration is one of the most controversially relevant topics, noneconomic factors such as individuals' opinions about foreigners and the unfamiliar are more and more salient. Finding that these perceptions, although not economically rational to link to trade, have a significant effect on trade preferences provides a step forward in getting to the true causes of preference distribution on trade issues at the individual level.

[407] Funk, Patricia, and Christina Gathmann. "Estimating the effect of direct democracy on policy outcomes: preferences matter." Stanford Center for International Development Working Paper 248 (2005).

APPENDIX

Table 3: Unmodified Coefficients for Models 1-4

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Some College	0.0198	-0.0312	-0.0372	-0.0561
	(0.105)	(0.124)	(0.125)	(0.125)
College Grad	-0.106	-0.264	-0.279	-0.286
	(0.102)	(0.123)	(0.124)	(0.124)
Postgrad	0.351	0.151	0.112	0.116
	(0.102)	(0.128)	(0.130)	(0.130)
Income [30 to Under $50,000]	-0.0309	-0.0671	-0.0593	-0.0586
	(0.100)	(0.118)	(0.119)	(0.120)
Income [50 to Under $100,000]	0.0359	-0.0515	-0.0539	-0.0502
	(0.0967)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.116)
Income [$100,000 and Above]	0.117	-0.0869	-0.0995	-0.117
	(0.105)	(0.126)	(0.127)	(0.128)
Republican	-0.00355	0.00188	0.0355	0.0600
	(0.0845)	(0.101)	(0.104)	(0.104)
Democrat	0.0312	-0.0299	-0.0566	-0.0813
	(0.0800)	(0.0972)	(0.0983)	(0.0992)
Male	-0.0673	-0.109	-0.117	-0.119
	(0.0698)	(0.0837)	(0.0843)	(0.0846)
Age	-0.0113	-0.00514	-0.00390	-0.00343
	(0.00192)	(0.00234)	(0.00238)	(0.00241)
Perceived Effects of Trade on US		1.292	1.286	1.297
		(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.107)
Perceived Effects of Trade on Self		1.377	1.390	1.397
		(0.0863)	(0.0873)	(0.0878)
Opinion of Immigrants			0.195	0.169
			(0.0875)	(0.0887)
Drone			-0.280	-0.281
			(0.102)	(0.102)
Low Density				0.128
				(0.139)
Medium Density				0.246
				(0.158)
High Density				0.333
				(0.163)
Very High Density				0.274
				(0.165)
Urban Region				-0.0582

				(0.0975)
Suburban Region				0.0534
				(0.154)
N	1487	1487	1487	1487
pseudo R^2	0.025	0.359	0.365	0.368

$p < 0.05$, $p < 0.01$, $p < 0.001$ Standard errors in parentheses

Table 4: Unmodified Coefficients for the Revised Models

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Some College	0.0198	0.0362	0.0258	0.0108
	(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.106)
College Grad	-0.106	-0.153	-0.156	-0.170
	(0.102)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.104)
Postgrad	0.351	0.314	0.261	0.256
	(0.102)	(0.103)	(0.104)	(0.105)
Income [30 to Under $50,000]	-0.0309	-0.0610	-0.0519	-0.0444
	(0.100)	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.103)
Income [50 to Under $100,000]	0.0359	-0.0462	-0.0309	-0.00963
	(0.0967)	(0.101)	(0.102)	(0.103)
Income [$100,000 and Above]	0.117	0.0176	0.0115	0.0210
	(0.105)	(0.112)	(0.113)	(0.114)
Republican	-0.00355	0.0227	0.0914	0.109
	(0.0845)	(0.0853)	(0.0873)	(0.0878)
Democrat	0.0312	-0.0242	-0.0519	-0.0700
	(0.0800)	(0.0820)	(0.0826)	(0.0834)
Male	-0.0673	-0.0619	-0.0634	-0.0593
	(0.0698)	(0.0703)	(0.0706)	(0.0709)
Age	-0.0113	-0.0101	-0.00892	-0.00843
	(0.00192)	(0.00202)	(0.00204)	(0.00206)
Perceived State of US Economy		0.345	0.294	0.294
		(0.0822)	(0.0836)	(0.0839)
Perceived State of Personal		0.149	0.119	0.119
		(0.0775)	(0.0782)	(0.0785)
Optimism		0.116	0.0797	0.0762
		(0.0743)	(0.0752)	(0.0755)
Opinion of Immigrants			0.320	0.302
			(0.0750)	(0.0758)
Drone			-0.100	-0.100
			(0.0851)	(0.0852)
Low Density				-0.00880
				(0.117)
Medium Density				0.0811
				(0.132)
High Density				0.119
				(0.135)
Very High Density				0.0651
				(0.138)
Urban Region				-0.173
				(0.0813)
Suburban Region				-0.144

				(0.130)
N	1487	1487	1487	1487
pseudo R^2	0.025	0.041	0.051	0.055

$p <$ 0.05, p < 0.01, p < 0.001 Standard errors in parentheses