Nationalism and Empire in China: World War I

World War I was not merely a conflict over colonial possessions; it was a global contest between empires governed by distinct political systems. The goal of the participating countries was not only to defeat their opponents but aimed to redistribute populations and resources in Europe and overseas, and incorporate them into their own territories. In this sense, the war was not fundamentally different from previous colonial wars.¹ Ironically, this war was previously a contest launched by empires for their own survival and expansion, but was ultimately dealt with before a devastating blow to the empires as a form of state organization and its expansionist logic. By 1918, with the victory of the Allies, three major continental empires, the Ottoman Empire, the Habsburg Empire, and the Romanov Empire disappeared from the world map due to their defeat.² 

Amid this imperial reordering, a rising power emerged in Asia: the Japanese Empire, which hoped to conquer  another Asian empire such as China, through pan-Asianism. In 1915, Japan proposed Twenty-One Demands as an example of Japan’s intentions to the Beiyang Government of the Republic of China. The treaty commands China to let Japan control over  the development of Shandong, southern Manchuria, and eastern Inner Mongolia, and the central government must hire Japanese advisers in political, financial, and military aspects. Although China did not participate in the main European battlefields, the war also affected China’s national destiny in modern history. At the 1919 Paris Peace Conference,  China appeared on the global stage for the first time as an ally of the victorious nations, marking an important milestone in China’s international development. Though ultimately unsuccessful diplomatically, this engagement remains historically significant.

This essay focuses on the ideological role of nationalism in prompting China to engage with World War I from the late 19th century until the early 20th century, that is, up to the end of the May Fourth Movement in 1919, and explores the complex relationship between empire and nationalism in China. Westad (2012) argued that after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, Japan curbed China’s efforts to become an independent modern country by levying the Boxer Indemnity, a written commitment made by the Qing Empire of China on September 7, 1901, to provide compensation to the thirteen Western nations involved in the Boxer Rebellion and foreign debts. However, the impact of the Sino-Japanese War went far beyond that. This war directly led to the decline of the Chinese Empire and ultimately determined the fate of the Qing Dynasty. In 1911, the Xinhai Revolution overthrew the Qing Dynasty, and China established a republic and adopted a new political system, republicanism.³ This revolution marked the end of the Chinese Empire, and nationalism became the new cornerstone of China’s national identity. However, did the empire really collapse after 1911?

This essay argues that, before World War II, imperialism did not end but continued the political legacy of the empire under a new ideology, accompanied by the discourse of nationalism.

Nationalism, Empire, and China

Chinese nationalism evolved into a dichotomy since its rise in the late 19th century. In the 1910s, the rise of Chinese nationalism enabled the establishment of the Republic of China after the fall of the Qing Dynasty and the maintenance of the country’s basic unity amid turmoil. On one hand, it prevented China from being dismembered by the great powers at the brink of imperial disintegration and preserved its sovereignty and territorial integrity. On the other hand, its ambiguity and instrumentalization of nationalism led different political forces to use it as a tool of rule or even a “scapegoat,” resulting in the failure of national integration. For example, Yuan Shikai invoked nationalist rhetoric to justify his imperial ambitions, presenting his self-proclaimed emperorship as a way to restore national dignity and stability. When his efforts failed, Yuan Shikai shifted the blame to the supposed immaturity of the Chinese people or the chaotic effects of republicanism, rather than acknowledging the deeper flaws in his power-driven manipulation of nationalist ideals. In this way, nationalism not only failed to unify but also obscured responsibility for political failures.  Instead, it strengthened the power structure of the imperial period and allowed the “empire” to survive in the nominally republican era. From the late 19th century to the early 20th century, nationalism became a key force in China’s response to external aggression and internal crises. Nationalism was mainly reflected in three stages, opposing foreign aggression, promoting political change, and maintaining national unity.

The first stage followed the end of the 19th century when nationalism was just beginning to rise. Under the rule of the Qing government, China faced internal and external crises, especially the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, which awakened nationalist sentiment. The intensification of social contradictions led to economic recession and political corruption, and public dissatisfaction was high. Internationally, the invasion of Western powers advanced step by step, and the Qing government repeatedly compromised and gave in, deepened a sense of national humiliation. Therefore, the initial nationalist sentiment was mainly focused on opposing foreign aggression and criticizing Westernized Chinese.⁴ For example, some Chinese believers who believe in Christianity are seen as enjoying “privileges” due to receiving protection from missionaries, participating in church schools, and enjoying judicial protection from the church, which has caused dissatisfaction among the public.

In 1898, the outbreak of the Boxer Rebellion marked a gradual shift in nationalism from an elite intellectual discourse to mass mobilization. The members of the Boxer Rebellion were mainly unemployed farmers and urban lower class in North China.⁵ Under the dual pressures of economic difficulty and social dissatisfaction, with slogans”supporting the Qing Dynasty and eliminating foreigners” targeting Western powers and their forces in China.⁶  Dominated by violence and xenophobia, the nationalist movement eventually led to the invasion of the Eight-Nation Alliance in 1900, which resulted in the loss of both sovereignty and treaty. The Qing government was forced to sign the “Xin Chou Treaty,” promised to pay large indemnities and allowed foreign powers to station troops in Beijing.

This series of humiliating events led many Chinese people to realize that the Qing government was not only unable to defend national interests but also to become the biggest obstacle to national rejuvenation.  As nationalism deepened, it eventually led to the end of the Qing Dynasty. From 1905 to 1911, in response to rising nationalism, the Qing government implemented the “New Deal,” including the establishment of the Institute of Qualifications and the preparation of the constitution.⁷ Failure to satisfy nationalists because it was seen as too little, too late. Despite efforts such as the establishment of the Institute of Qualifications and drafting a constitution, the reforms lacked political change and were perceived as superficial attempts to maintain imperial control rather than the people. Nationalists, influenced by modern ideas of democracy and national sovereignty, viewed the Qing as corrupt, ethnically alien (Manchu rulers over Han Chinese), and incapable of resisting foreign domination. The slow pace of reform, combined with ongoing economic weakness and external pressure, deepened public frustration and helped fuel revolutionary movements like Sun Yat-sen’s, which ultimately overthrew the Qing in 1911.⁸

The establishment of the Republic of China in 1912 became the cornerstone of the new nation’s legitimacy, replacing the imperial system as an important support for national identity. After the founding of the Republic of China, China participated in the 1919 Paris Peace Conference as an ally of the various powers, hoped to regain control of Shandong, under the Japanese occupation. Western countries such as Britain, France, and the United States supported Japan’s control of Shandong, which intensified a new stage of nationalism and led to the May Fourth Movement in 1919.

The Ambiguity, Division, and Instrumentalization of Nationalism

The ambiguity of nationalism is first reflected in its conceptual uncertainty, which has shaped China’s identity since the late 19th century. Since the late Qing Dynasty, nationalism has functioned both as a means of resisting imperialism and as a political tool to overthrow the dynasty. However, the true intent of nationalism is ethnically, culturally, and politically, and remains deeply contested. One example of this conceptual uncertainty can be seen in China’s early experiment with Western-style republicanism following the 1911 Revolution. 

Yuan’s greatest challenge was his inability to articulate a coherent vision of what China should become. Was it an empire aspiring to become a modern nation-state? Or a multi-ethnic entity held together by centuries of imperial tradition? Yuan, like many of his successors during the Warlord Era (1916–1928), became entangled in competing visions of China’s political future. His foreign advisors, majority of whom are Americans, supported the notion shared by Yuan himself that China was not yet ready for any form of democracy. These debates reflected the deeper struggle to identify with Chinese nationalism in a country with such complex histories, diverse ethnic groups, and a fractured political landscape.

 After the 1911 Revolution, although the Republic of China embraced nationalism as a crucial component to its identity, the country’s diversity and fragmented political landscape stood in stark contrast to that ideal. In reality, the new republic lacked centralized authority and soon fell into a prolonged period of warlordism, where regional military leaders exercised de facto control over their territories. This decentralized power structure undermined national unity and made it difficult to implement a cohesive nationalist agenda. Moreover, the Republic’s claim to represent a unified “Chinese nation” was complicated by the presence of multiple ethnic groupsManchus, Mongols, Tibetans, Hui Muslims, and Han, each with distinct historical relationships to the state. These political and ethnic tensions exposed the fragile foundation of Chinese nationalism in its early republican form.

The slogan “Expel the Tartars and restore China,” emphasized by revolutionaries like Sun Yat-sen, carried strong Han-centric overtones, implied that the nation was primarily defined by the Han people rather than as a multiethnic political community that included Manchu, Mongol, Tibetan, and Hui.⁹ After the fall of the Qing Dynasty, Manchu nobles were quickly marginalized. Although Puyi and other Manchu elites received financial compensation after the 1912 abdication, most Manchu officials and troops were excluded from the new regime, and Manchuria lost their political influence.

Outer Mongolia declared independence in 1911, signed the Sino-Russian-Mongolian Agreement in 1915 with Tsarist Russia’s support, and effectively broke away from Chinese rule. Tibet declared independence from the Republic of China under the 13th Dalai Lama in 1913 and maintained de facto independence with British support. These developments demonstrate that while the Republic of China sought to redefine national identity under the idea of a “Chinese nation,” it lacked the political tools to achieve meaningful integration. Competing definitions of nationalism among different groups, such as warlords, reformers, and revolutionaries— prevented it from becoming a stable foundation for national identity. The divisiveness of nationalism was especially evident in the political turmoil of the early Republic. This  political fragmentation reveals how nationalism, rather than forging unity, often reinforced disunity during the Republic’s formative years. Nationalism has failed to unify the country and instead became a rhetorical banner for rival political factions. After the fall of the Qing Dynasty, the Republic of China failed to establish a stable central government and quickly descended into warlordism. Competing warlords justified their rule with appeals to nationalism. For example, Duan Qirui promoted military expansion and participation in World War I as a way to strengthen China’s international standing, while Zhang Zuolin in Manchuria claimed to defend national sovereignty even as he collaborated with Japanese interests.

In 1915, Yuan Shikai declared himself emperor, argued that the “Chinese nation must have a strong central power” and that only strong leadership could preserve unity. His emperorship was met with widespread resistance. In retaliation, Cai E launched the “National Protection War” under the nationalist slogan of “preserving the republic,” which eventually led to Yuan’s death in 1916 and the collapse of the monarchy restoration.

Meanwhile, northern and southern regimes remained in conflict. In 1917, Sun Yat-sen established the Protection Government in Guangzhou to uphold the “Provisional Constitution,” but in practice, relied heavily on alliances with local warlords. The Beiyang warlords, for their part, invoked nationalism to justify separatist rule under the pretense of maintaining national order. Although the political factions appealed to nationalist rhetoric, their definitions and objectives diverged significantly, resulting in further fragmentation and localization of power. This not only undermined national integration but also reflected a deeper continuity with imperial structures. Despite the fall of the Qing dynasty, nationalism became a tool to reproduce hierarchical, regionalized authority rather than dismantle it, thereby prolonged the imperial logic of fragmented sovereignty under new ideological terms.

Lastly, nationalism was routinely used as a scapegoat by various political leaders. In the early Republic, changes in power were often accompanied by new nationalist rhetoric. After Yuan Shikai’s failed restoration, the Beiyang government continued to invoke nationalism while retaining Qing-era bureaucracy. Warlord politics largely preserved imperial structures. In 1917, Duan Qirui’s Beiyang government used the excuse of “recovering Outer Mongolia” to send troops  after the Russian Revolution, but due to prolonged internal disunity, Mongolia was supported by the Soviet Union to establish a puppet regime in 1921.

In the three northeastern provinces, Fengtian warlord Zhang Zuolin strengthened his military under the banner of “resisting foreign aggression,” but accepted Japanese aid and collaborated with Japan behind the scenes. After the May Fourth Movement in 1919, Anhui warlord Duan Qirui suppressed student protests under the guise of safeguarding national interests to preserve his rule. These cases demonstrate how nationalism was often weaponized by leaders to maintain power and obscure corruption, rather than serving as a unifying national ideal.

Conclusion

In the 1930s, China experienced profound social unrest, including rural revolts sparked by excessive taxation, land disputes, and warlord abuses in provinces like Henan and Hunan. As well as labor strikes in urban centers such as Shanghai and Tianjin, where factory workers protested low wages, poor working conditions, and a lack of rights. The country also suffered from a lack of shared national goals and a diminishing global presence. Under authoritarian rule, citizens felt deeply oppressed and helpless, unable to effectively respond to external threats. Although nationalism reawakened due to Japanese aggression, many urban elites exposed to global ideas questioned its direction and utility.

Although the Chinese Empire was nominally dissolved after 1911, its legacy continued in subtle ways before World War II. Nationalism failed to dismantle the old power structure and was instead co-opted by different political actors. The reconstruction of national identity thus became complicated and fragmented. Competing use of nationalism as a legitimizing tool only deepened internal division and political instability. This outcome stood in stark contrast to the original promise of nationalism to unify the people under a common identity and purpose.  Ultimately, the solution to China’s chronic issues must ultimately emerge from within China itself.

1. Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History : Power and the Politics of Difference, vol. 322–324 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010). ↩︎
2. Robert Gerwarth and Erez Manela,The Great War as a Global War: Imperial Conflict and the Reconfiguration of World Order, 1911–1923. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 215 ↩︎
3. Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire : China and the World since 1750 (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 133. ↩︎
4. Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire: China and the World since 1750 (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 248. ↩︎
5. Robert Gerwarth and Erez Manela, Empires at War / 1911-1923 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 797. ↩︎
6. Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire : China and the World since 1750 (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 153-156. ↩︎
7. Robert Gerwarth and Erez Manela,The Great War as a Global War: Imperial Conflict and the Reconfiguration of World Order, 1911–1923. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 222-226 ↩︎
8. Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire : China and the World since 1750 (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 166-170 ↩︎
9. Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire: China and the World since 1750 (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 148-150 ↩︎

Yichen Gao

Yichen Gao is a second-year graduate student in International Relations at New York University (NYU). Her work sits at the intersection of migration and gender studies and the long history of U.S.–China relations (1700–present), with a special focus on how racism shapes law, policy, and everyday life. Before moving to New York, she studied East Asian Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK), where she built a strong foundation in regional politics, transnational migration, and social movements.