A Decade Down the Nuclear Silk Road: The Search for Balance

In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping launched one of the most ambitious infrastructure projects, known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It was framed as an initiative to expand economic and regional cooperation; to create an economic belt that linked Eurasia by land and connected Southeast Asia, South Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe through a string of ports by the sea. Since 2013, the number of countries involved in the BRI has increased to 149 countries (including China) all around the globe. The most significant aspect of the BRI was Xi’s inclusion of nuclear energy. His plans included the exportation of nuclear power infrastructure to countries involved in the Belt and Road Initiative– a “Nuclear Dragon.” Essentially, this was an announcement that China would compete with the United States and Russia to become the leading exporter and country in nuclear energy. With the BRI, Xi intends to broaden its sphere of influence following its great power rivalry with the United States. However, to the detriment of BRI hopefuls, China’s “helping hand” poses detrimental risks across multiple security dimensions. If granted nuclear reprocessing rights by the US, South Korea could serve as an effective replacement for China’s nuclear BRI. South Korea can help diversify global nuclear cooperation, reduce environmental hazards from nuclear waste, and enhance energy security for developing nations. This shift would not only mitigate global reliance on fossil fuels but also prevent regional dependencies on a single power for nuclear technology, thus contributing to broader geopolitical balance and stability. 

The manipulative tendencies of the BRI came to light in 2017 when accusations of “debt trap diplomacy” surfaced against China. On paper, the BRI funds major infrastructure projects in developing countries while other developed countries hesitate to lend a helping hand. In reality, the unsustainable loans these countries acquire are used as leverage by the Chinese government. In other words, by binding developing countries to large amounts of debt, China gains the ability to demand large equity stakes in valuable ports, airports, and long-standing geopolitical alliances, to say nothing of nuclear infrastructure projects. For instance, in 2017, Sri Lanka was unable to “service its $1.1 billion package of loans” to China in order to finance the construction of “the Hambantota Port.” As a result, China received majority control of the port on a 99-year lease along with majority access to strategic infrastructure that acts as a foothold in the Indian Ocean, to Sri Lanka’s detriment. Clearly, even smaller infrastructure projects under China’s BRI raise concerns about debt-for-equity swaps, where financial sovereignty is compromised in favor of Chinese ownership. However, these concerns are amplified in the context of nuclear projects.  

The sensitive process of the “Nuclear Dragon” forces a BRI country’s dependency on China. Firstly, the process of constructing the nuclear power plant takes about ten years; after its completion, the units operate for around 60 years. Second, the supply of fuel, maintenance of the plant, disposal of spent fuel, and training of personnel are all dependent on China. Lastly, shutting down the reactor is extremely difficult, especially due to the need to dispose of the spent fuel. Therefore, as soon as the agreement is signed, the recipients of the nuclear BRI become trapped in a nearly hundred-year alliance with China. As countries inevitably turn to China, its influence threatens to undermine the balance of power. Consequently, as China’s share of the

nuclear market rises, its control over shaping the rules and norms in global nuclear governance rises, threatening global nuclear cooperation. The increasing possibility of China’s broadened role thus threatens global security regarding nonproliferation and the status quo of nuclear exportation. Therefore, the extended period of dependence on Chinese expertise and resources pose significant risks to the national security and autonomy of developing countries. The consequences of a debt-for-equity arrangement in such scenarios could lead to a prolonged loss of control over critical energy assets and infrastructure, deeply embedding external influence in national security matters. 

Beyond the economic and geopolitical implications, the BRI’s approach to nuclear projects introduces profound environmental security risks. Developing countries, especially, have expressed their interest in nuclear reactors, with 41 of them being BRI countries. Nuclear power, 

while offering significant energy outputs, comes with inherent challenges that are exacerbated under the BRI’s framework. Considerable amounts of BRI projects destroy ecologically sensitive areas to make room for roads, rails, power plants, and other infrastructure, often leading to major unintended consequences. The construction of a hydropower project in the Batang Toru rainforest in Indonesia is a prime example. To make room for the BRI-led construction, deforestation led to flooding in farmlands and threatened wildlife such as the Tapanuli orangutan– the rarest great ape species. The environmental consequences are not limited to immediate ecological disruptions; they also encompass long-term hazards associated with nuclear waste management and the potential for catastrophic events. Additionally, many BRI countries lack the resources, regulations, and technology to handle nuclear reactors safely and responsibly. Therefore, the “Nuclear Dragon” heightens the risk of mishandling nuclear technology and radioactive waste. 

Seeking Solutions: Counter the BRI Surge 

Recipient countries of nuclear power plants have very few options to replace China’s BRI: Russia, the United States, France, Japan, and South Korea. Regardless of the BRI’s significant drawbacks, the potential replacements also do not present great options. Various challenges such as geopolitical tensions, historical animosities, economic sanctions, and slower technological updates make the first four less favorable. Given this context, South Korea emerges as the optimal choice for nuclear partnerships. Its geopolitical position, advanced technology, stringent safety standards, and proven track record in nuclear energy not only promise reliability but also significantly enhance geopolitical security and stability, and environmental sustainability. 

South Korea’s history of research and development, as well as its own reliance on nuclear energy, ensures a reliable and trustworthy partnership. As of 2024, South Korea’s 27 nuclear reactors account for nearly 29.6% of its electricity generation, making it the 5th largest generator of nuclear energy in the world. The country’s consistent advancements in nuclear reactor design while enhancing safety and efficient standards ensure the secure operation of nuclear facilities. This commitment to safety distinguishes South Korea as a key leader in the nuclear sector, a field where trust and reliability are not just valued but essential- qualities that stand in stark contrast to

China’s approach. This became evident in 2009, soon after it began its civil nuclear industry when South Korea secured the largest nuclear energy deal in world history with the United Arab Emirates. It beat out the United States and France, two highly favored rivals, for “one of the Middle East’s biggest ever energy contracts.” Then, in January 2023, South Korea and the UAE signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), furthering and accelerating their collaboration for nuclear energy. The continued partnership between the two countries highlights South Korea’s internationally recognized high standards for civil nuclear technology. In contrast, China has yet to develop a nuclear reactor with the same standards. Furthermore, unlike China’s greenwashing, South Korea has made genuine commitments to reducing GHG emissions and promoting sustainable practices in its nuclear energy projects. 

As mentioned above, the nature of operating nuclear plants inevitably deepens diplomatic ties between states, reinforcing the dependence of the importing countries. South Korea’s nuclear export endeavors have consistently revealed its dedication to fostering positive relations and equitable collaboration with other countries. For instance, with the UAE, South Korea “promised debt financing with low-interest rates of 1.75% – 2.6%” to encourage mutual trust. South Korea’s role in global governance and its international recognition have built up a sense of security for nuclear energy hopefuls. Alternatively, while China offers generous financing to cover initial construction costs, the “debt-for-equity” swaps inherent in its agreements pose significant security threats. Such financial arrangements can give China undue control over critical infrastructure, making countries vulnerable to political pressures. Consequently, should importing countries deviate from official Chinese positions, China could leverage its control to “threaten to suspend nuclear power generation.” The significant financial burden, the threat of debt distress, and the potential for the debt trap are causes for hesitation for many countries, both BRI recipients and others. 

Nevertheless, one of the key reasons for the attractiveness of the BRI is China’s “one-stop” solution – the ability to oversee and finance the process from beginning to end at a low cost, which includes the reprocessing/handling of spent fuel. Unfortunately for South Korea, nuclear fuel reprocessing is its greatest limitation. As many countries currently depend on nuclear reactors for energy, the growing concern is how to handle the spent (radioactive) fuel. Currently, there are two potential options for nuclear waste. The first is to store the spent fuel in temporary storage pools. For countries with scarce land like South Korea, storage pools are reaching full capacity, making alternative solutions an immediate necessity. In addition, the process of storing nuclear waste heightens security concerns: the potential for environmental pollution, the threat to human security from exposure to radioactive materials, the ecological threat posed by transporting hazardous waste to facilities, and the vulnerability of nuclear waste disposal facilities to terrorist attacks. 

The second option is to recycle the nuclear waste by reprocessing it. Nuclear fuel reprocessing is executed by separating uranium and plutonium from the spent fuel. The plutonium is then sent back to a specialized nuclear power plant to be reused. The process also allows for the reduction of dependence on imported uranium. However, as building a nuclear bomb only takes 22 pounds of recycled plutonium, reprocessing raises serious proliferation concerns. This security risk was exemplified in 1974. After Canada gifted India with a “peaceful” research reactor, the technology was used to create and test a nuclear bomb by reprocessing nuclear waste. For the alarmed United States, proliferation became an even greater concern, resulting in stricter and tighter controls and guidelines for nuclear exports being implemented. Currently, only a select few possess nuclear reprocessing capabilities: the United States, China, and Russia, who developed their own technologies, and Japan and India, along with members of the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), who received reprocessing rights from the United States. In the case of South Korea, the Korea-U.S. Nuclear Energy Cooperation Agreement, otherwise known as the 123 Agreement, places additional limitations on its use of nuclear power. According to the agreement, South Korea cannot pursue uranium enrichment or “spent fuel reprocessing without prior consent” from the United States. Despite South Korea’s dependence on nuclear energy, U.S. objections to amending the agreement persist, primarily due to concerns related to non-proliferation trust. This ongoing resistance further complicates South Korea’s ability to counter China’s expanding influence. Regardless of its advanced technological capabilities and strategic geopolitical positioning, legal restrictions hinder the nation’s capability to alter the strategic equilibrium of the nuclear sector. 

Granting nuclear reprocessing rights to South Korea is a strategic imperative for itself and the United States and its allies. Currently, the United States and South Korea are conducting a joint study known as the Joint Fuel Cycle Studies, to find another reprocessing solution that prevents the production of plutonium, which would mitigate the proliferation risk of reprocessing. Enabling South Korea to manage its own nuclear fuel cycle would both enhance South Korea’s energy autonomy and create a democratic and sustainable alternative to the BRI. Reprocessing rights would allow South Korea to recycle spent nuclear fuel, a critical step towards a closed nuclear fuel cycle. This would not only extend the life of nuclear fuels but also diminish the need for new uranium imports, thereby enhancing energy security. In a region where energy supply chains are increasingly influenced by geopolitical strategies tied to the BRI, South Korea’s ability to reprocess would serve as a bulwark against potential energy coercion and ensure a more stable and controlled energy supply. The U.S. has made consistent efforts to limit China’s influence in Southeast Asia; South Korea’s influence and strategic positioning would be a perfect opportunity to combat China’s BRI. Even without reprocessing, South Korea continues to demonstrate its “high competitiveness” in nuclear exports due to its “historical experience in the nuclear industry.” Therefore, if South Korea were given reprocessing rights, it would finally be able to effectively combat the “one-stop” solution of the BRI. Such a development would reinforce South Korea’s role as a pivotal player in energy markets and enhance its standing as a responsible steward of nuclear technology. By aligning itself with international norms and securing its position, South Korea can solidify its stance as a leader in sustainable nuclear development, offering a counter-narrative to the BRI that prioritizes transparency, safety, and regional cooperation.

As China continues to expand its influence through the Belt and Road Initiative, it is crucial that nations like South Korea are equipped with the tools to ensure regional energy security, environmental sustainability, and geopolitical balance. Providing South Korea with the ability to manage its nuclear fuel independently could help foster a more stable and secure Asia-Pacific region. This would not only counterbalance China’s growing nuclear footprint but also promote a model of nuclear energy that prioritizes safety, sustainability, and transparency. Furthermore, by reducing dependencies on external energy supplies and minimizing environmental risks, South Korea can help ensure human security, offering protection from the hazards of nuclear mishaps and external geopolitical pressures. Ultimately, by obtaining nuclear reprocessing rights, South Korea could serve as a check against potentially exploitative energy practices under the BRI and reinforce the principles of autonomy and environmental stewardship in global energy markets.

Editors

Julia White, Managing Editor

Ivy Jiang, Copy-Editor

Hana Kim

Hana Kim is a first-year MA candidate in the International Relations program at NYU, concentrating in Asian Studies. She obtained her BA in International Studies with a focus on Global Politics from Pepperdine University. Her undergraduate thesis exposed the neglected impact of U.S. censorship on Japanese war crimes and its ongoing ramifications on Japan-ROK relations. During her research internship at the Global America Business Institute, Hana enriched her academic pursuits with practical experience. She is dedicated to dissecting the historical, cultural, and political complexities of East Asian Affairs, aiming to bridge historical gaps and shape regional policies. Her interests include ROK politics, U.S. foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific, security, and diplomacy.