Economy Above All: Bolsonaro and the Memory of the Military Regime

In today’s uncertain political climate, the rise of far-right parties worldwide has sparked intense debate about the origins and causes of this phenomenon. Jair Bolsonaro, who claimed victory in Brazil’s presidential election of 2018, exemplifies the contemporary far-right leader in numerous ways. During his electoral campaign, Bolsonaro’s rhetoric glorified the country’s former military regime, reflecting a talking point common among far-right leaders, both past and present. This included frequent praise of the military dictatorship and, in particular, the economic successes during those repressive years. 

Economic Success Under Brazil’s Military Regime 

The military dictatorship in Brazil (1964-1985) left behind many negative legacies, such as the suspension of political freedoms, but it is also remembered as a time of significant economic and infrastructural growth. Many have concluded that the military regime of Brazil was “less physically repressive than its counterparts in the Southern Cone,” such as Chile or Argentina, while at the same time demonstrating more economic success than its neighbors. The period from 1968 to 1973 became known as the “Brazilian Miracle.” Throughout the 1970s, the economy grew an average of seven percent annually, and per capita GDP increased by 130 percent from 1964 to 1980. 

Overall, the military regime “vastly improved the material conditions of most Brazilians,” though it fundamentally decreased their political rights. This economic success left a lasting impression on many voters well into the twenty-first century, as Jair Bolsonaro—who “celebrated” the regime’s brutal practice of harming and even killing dissidents—rose to political prominence. Bolsonaro, a far-right populist, is a highly controversial figure, not least because of his negative remarks toward non-white Brazilians, who make up the majority of the national population. Ahead of the 2018 election, he “exalted” the former military regime, supported the use of torture, and threatened to imprison and even exile his political opponents. Many voters recalled Brazil’s flourishing economy under military rule and ultimately chose to vote Bolsonaro into power, believing that he could return Brazil to its economically successful past. 

Bolsonaro’s Commitment to the Military Regime’s Developmental Works in the Amazon

Economic growth and a commitment to infrastructural development were central during Brazil’s 21 years under military rule following the 1964 coup that ousted democratically elected President João Goulart, forcing him into exile in Uruguay. It remains a widely shared perspective among the Brazilian military and right-wing political figures that the coup, which ushered in decades of military dictatorship, protected Brazil from communism. In 2019, in his first year in office, Bolsonaro—a former military general—reflected this sentiment. He referred to the coup as the “second independence of Brazil,” claiming that the military in 1964 prevented the Soviet Union from transforming Brazil into a satellite state and that Brazilians “owe [their]freedom and democracy” to the coup. 

Under the military regime, Brazil’s Special Public Relations Office (Assessoria Especial de Relações Públicas, or AERP) promoted the idea of “great power Brazil,” characterized by large-scale construction projects across the country. These projects included the Itaipu Hydroelectric Dam on the Paraguayan border and the Trans-Amazonian Highway. The military regime constructed roads in the Amazon to expand agriculture in the region, a theme that resurfaced during Bolsonaro’s candidacy. Bolsonaro admired the regime’s resolution to “exploit” the rainforest in exchange for economic gain, exemplified by projects such as the highway traversing the country from east to west, cutting through the Amazon. During his campaign, Bolsonaro promised to advocate for Brazil’s agribusiness sector, intending to clear more forested areas for agricultural production. Instead of reserving forest land for Indigenous Brazilians, he claimed that “[w]here there is [I]ndigenous land… there is wealth underneath it,” reinforcing his desire to exploit the Amazon rather than preserve it, again reminiscent of the military regime, opting for environmental destruction in the name of economic development. 

Agricultural workers and landowners, specifically in western and northern Brazil, resented attempts under President Lula (in office from 2003 to 2011) to limit the clearing of new farmland in the Amazon. Lula is the founder of the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, or PT), one of only two parties that had governed Brazil since 1994. In the 2018 election, these groups supported Bolsonaro against PT and its 2018 candidate Fernando Haddad because Bolsonaro was in favor of exploiting the Amazon for economic gain. They believed Bolsonaro’s dismissal of environmental concerns in the Amazon could financially benefit them. Among these groups included the Parliamentary Agricultural Front, the country’s congressional farm lobby, which endorsed Bolsonaro ahead of the election. 

Brazil’s Relationship With Democracy 

Brazil’s relationship with democracy has been complicated ever since the democratization process began in 1985. In 2017, just a year before Bolsonaro’s election, 78 percent of Brazilians “claimed they were not satisfied with democracy.” The economic performance of Brazil’s new democracy after 1985, under José Sarney, was “initially poor,” and the country “endured nearly a quarter century of income stagnation, most of it coinciding with liberalization and democratization of the political regime.” For example, the “minimum wage did not recover its pre-coup level in real terms until 2009,” and, potentially even more problematic, “under military rule the minimum wage was always higher than it was for the first two decades of the post-1985 democracy.” Between 1985 and 2005, average economic growth was “less than half of what it was in the equivalent 20-year period after the 1964 coup.” This fueled skepticism of the reintroduction of democracy post-dictatorship, as many Brazilians saw their financial situations worsen during the transition. 

It was widely believed that “democratic consolidation would be easier in countries where the outgoing dictatorship had been more economically successful and less physically repressive,” as was the case in Brazil. In other words, Brazil’s economy had thrived during the dictatorship, while the regime had remained less brutal and bloody than neighboring regimes, such as in Argentina, where the economy had struggled. However, Brazil demonstrated that the opposite could be true. Since the economy had performed well under the military regime, and most Brazilians faced less physical repression than their Argentine neighbors, many were less inclined to embrace a politically free democracy. Argentine political scientist Guillermo O’Donnell hypothesized that in “countries where the political class and bourgeoisie had been thoroughly traumatized by prior experiences with military rule,” such as Argentina and not Brazil, efforts to avoid a return to authoritarianism would be stronger. 

Over the past quarter-century, public support for democracy in Argentina has consistently been higher than in Brazil, despite Argentina enduring greater political instability and more severe socioeconomic crises. In 2013, only 49 percent of Brazilians believed democracy to be “preferable to any other form of government,” compared to 73 percent of Argentines, 71 percent of Uruguayans, and 63 percent of Chileans—countries that experienced more brutal dictatorships than Brazil. 

Economics may also shape attitudes towards democracy versus dictatorship as well, and it’s possible that a strong economy outweighs the benefits of political rights and freedoms. Since Brazil prospered economically under its dictatorship, many Brazilians today may not see democracy as a necessity. This mindset contributed to the election of Bolsonaro in 2018. Considered one of the most “extremist leader[s] in the history of democratic elections in Latin America,” Bolsonaro believed that the dictatorship was a “glorious era” for Brazil. 

The Economic Climate of Brazil Pre-2018

The recession leading up to the 2018 election assisted Bolsonaro’s victory as well. Many Brazilians blamed the PT for the significant economic decline following 2013, while President Michel Temer’s failed efforts to revive the economy contributed to his consistently low approval ratings. While Brazilian democracy had experienced moments of instability since 1985, “never before had it performed so poorly for so long” leading up to the 2018 election. By 2017, Temer’s first full year in office after the impeachment of PT President Dilma Rousseff, “[m]isery was widespread,” and unemployment had “increased to a record 12.7 percent and underemployment affected an additional 23.8 percent of the economically active population.” Bolsonaro lost the poorer northeast regions to the PT in the election, but he achieved outstanding results in the wealthier states of the south and southeast, as well as in the Federal District.

Bolsonaro’s opponent, Fernando Haddad, was a member of the PT, which may have worked in Bolsonaro’s favor. With the Brazilian economy in a critical state under both Dilma (a PT member) and Temer, voters may have seen Bolsonaro as the better choice to fix the economy, rather than sticking with the same party that had overseen a major economic decline. Some voters believed that the PT had “created an infrastructure of corruption,” and that the Brazilian population could not risk reelecting the PT after Dilma’s performance in office. 

The recession also raised environmental concerns, as it significantly reduced funding for the Ministry of Environment. Bolsonaro claimed that, once in office, he would eliminate the Ministry of Environment, and instead merge it with the Ministry of Agriculture, which was more inclined to support the interests of those seeking to convert forests into agricultural land. This idea would directly benefit agricultural workers and landowners who supported Bolsonaro, as his proposed environmental policies were expected to result in their financial gains. 

Conclusions: Is the Economy More Important Than Political Freedoms? 

Brazil’s economy experienced significant success under the military dictatorship until 1985, when the transition to democracy brought a sharp decline. During his 2018 campaign, Jair Bolsonaro championed the military regime and glorified it to an extreme degree, evoking memories of a more robust economy than the one under former President Dilma of the PT—the same party as Bolsonaro’s opponent, Fernando Haddad. Workers in agriculture, a significant sector of Brazil’s economy, believed Bolsonaro’s dismissive attitude toward environmental preservation in the Amazon could lead to their own personal gain, as the presidential candidate drew on the military regime’s pattern of exploiting the rainforest for large-scale developmental and agricultural projects. The crippling recession leading up to the 2018 election further fueled Bolsonaro’s rise, as the incumbent PT fell out of favor with vast segments of the public. Ultimately, Brazil’s turbulent and unstable relationship with democracy after the fall of the military regime led to the idea that it was acceptable to elect an extremist, populist candidate, which is exactly what the Brazilian people did. 

Editor

Jacqueline Tong, Copy Editor

Nicole Monette

Nicole Monette (she/her) is a second-year master’s student in the Global Journalism and European & Mediterranean Studies program. She graduated in May 2022 with a Master of Science in Global Affairs from NYU, where she completed her thesis on plausible scenarios for the trajectory of the war in Ukraine. As a Global Affairs student, she was a member of a consulting project in conjunction with the UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee researching the political climate in Afghanistan following the U.S. withdrawal in 2021. She was also the Managing Editor of Global Affairs Review, the student journal of NYU’s Center for Global Affairs. Before returning to NYU, she spent eight months in Rome and Milan studying Italian at an intensive language school. She is currently researching issues related to youth unemployment and depopulation in southern Italy, specifically the regions of Calabria and Sicily.