Ahmad al-Sharaa’s Jihadist Past Points to a Russian Future for Syria Unless Europe Acts

The former leader of a Salafi-Jihadist group with prior links to Al-Qaeda is Syria’s current interim president. Once a frequent target of Russian airstrikes when he commanded Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Ahmad al-Sharaa’s transitional government now edges ever closer to normalizing ties with Moscow. Russia has shown little concern for the objectionable history of the man who ousted Bashar al-Assad, its longtime ally – so long as its two prized military bases in Syria remain intact. The United States and Europe, meanwhile, have approached Syria’s new leader with caution despite the rare opportunity to weaken Russia’s presence in the region. Concern is merited given Sharaa’s undemocratic steps to centralize power and affirm the role of Islam within the multi-religious state. But as the country sits on the verge of replacing one Russian-backed authoritarian with another, the Western powers’ hesitation leaves Syria in Russia’s grasp and hinders the formation of a secular, democratic state in the Middle East.

A New Era

In December 2024, after more than 13 years of civil war, Sharaa led HTS in a blitz to seize Damascus and oust Assad from power. Change happened fast. HTS disbanded and Sharaa relinquished his nom de guerre, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani. He swapped his military fatigues for a suit and was declared interim president in January 2025. In March, a transitional constitution was adopted, including protections for the rights of women and minorities. The new government released political prisoners from the prior regime and initiated a demobilization of what remained of Assad’s military. 

Sharaa then reached out to Syria’s minority ethnic groups, many of which having armed factions of their own. On March 10, he signed an agreement with the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to suspend hostilities. Previously backed by the US to help defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), the SDF have since controlled a large swath of Syria’s northeast. The accord absorbs the group into a new Syrian state military, and cedes its control of the northern border, airport and oil and gas facilities to the Sharaa government. Equally important, it sought to end fighting between the SDF and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army which had continued after the fall of Assad. The transitional government also opened negotiations with Druze communities in the south in pursuit of a similar deal. However, this has proven difficult considering a new wave of unrest that risks jeopardizing the talks. Uniting Syria’s many ethnic and religious groups remains essential to establish legitimacy in the wake of a divisive Assad regime.

An Islamist Agenda?

Whether Syria’s new leaders can keep promises to ethnic and religious minorities and adhere to the limited protections laid out in the constitution remains to be seen. After all, the establishment of an Islamic state in Syria was the original objective of HTS and its Al-Qaeda-affiliated predecessor, Jabhat al-Nusra. Thus, the degree to which Sharia law is incorporated into new state institutions – and how the conservative Sharaa government treats women, minorities, and anyone affiliated with the previous regime – will be key determinants. Alawites, the minority religious sect from which the Assad family hails, pose perhaps the greatest challenge. In March, Assad loyalists in the Alawite stronghold of Latakia launched an attack on government security forces. The consequences were deadly: over 1,600 Alawite civilians killed in response. More recently, government-aligned forces clashed with Druze outside Damascus and in the south, leaving both civilians and gunmen dead. Both incidents underscored Sharaa’s lack of absolute control over security forces and the challenging reconciliation process required for post-Assad Syria.

In Sharaa’s unfurling vision for Syria’s future, Sunni Islam has taken precedence. The new interim constitution guarantees “freedom of belief” for all religious groups, yet also enshrines Islamic law as the central tenet of the legal system. It permits the government to infringe upon freedom of religion, among other rights, should the order and security of the state be in jeopardy. The constitution provides Sharaa with a five-year transition period during which he will face minimal checks on his authority: He appoints one third of the legislature, while the other two thirds are appointed by a body which he also selects. Sharaa retains sole authority to appoint judges, all but eliminating judicial independence. Other aspects of daily life have undergone their own changes. A new school curriculum removed specific references to Syria’s multi-religious history, establishments selling alcohol were briefly shuttered before public outcry, and preachers have pushed Islam in Christian neighborhoods. While Sharaa still speaks publicly of inclusivity, he continues to shape unitary power in a state where successive rulers have governed through the marginalization of other religious groups.

These actions increasingly suggest that Syria’s new leaders are establishing an Islamic state as they previously intended. As a result, Western leaders have been cautious to engage. The US under former President Joe Biden did pause select sanctions placed on the previous government. That approach was continued by current President Donald Trump until May when he lifted all US sanctions on the country in a deal that appeared better served for the financial interests of Gulf states. Meanwhile, the European Union paused some of its sanctions and increased financial commitments to Syria, while several countries reestablished diplomatic relations. But until now, the West has largely been caught flatfooted by the end of a brutal, half-century dictatorial regime. These efforts will be grossly insufficient to sway Sharaa towards building a government that protects the rights of Syria’s ethnic and religious groups, many of whom share credit for Assad’s ouster. If regional alliances and entrenched counter-terror policies in the US and Europe continue to prioritize isolation over engagement, it will likely ensure opportunity for Russia.

Moscow’s Second Chance

The Tartous naval base and Hmeimim air base are legacies from Russia’s long-standing alliance with the previous Syrian regime, and a key factor in its 2015 intervention in the civil war on behalf of Assad. Tartus is Russia’s only naval base on the Mediterranean, and Hmeimim serves as a midway point to support its Wagner mercenary operations in Africa and elsewhere. It was previously understood that both were tied to Assad’s survival. Now, that appears no longer the case. When Russian President Vladimir Putin dispatched a special envoy to discuss the bases with Syria’s new president in January, Sharaa had no choice but to listen. According to the UNDP, Syria has lost 40 years of human development. It is at least $20 billion in foreign debt, and with an estimated $400 billion needed to rebuild the country, foreign investment is a top priority. 

Putin has already taken advantage of Syria’s economic crisis. Just weeks after Assad fled to Moscow, Russia shipped freshly printed Syrian lira to help the ailing economy as a goodwill gesture. In addition to the relatively close economic ties between the two states from years of alliance, Russia remains the best candidate to sell arms to Syria and appears intent on doing just that. Syria’s military equipment is in tatters from years of war, economic hardship, and now Israeli airstrikes. As the existing weaponry is predominantly Russian, Moscow sees another unique advantage. HTS still bore a terrorist designation, so Sharaa will struggle to both purchase arms from any Western ally of Israel and supplant a decades-old reliance on Russian equipment. Russia does share the US and Europe’s concerns regarding Islamist extremism. However, so long as Sharaa does not give haven to fringe elements in Syrian territory, he would be likely to stay in Moscow’s graces.

With the return of President Trump to Washington, it is unlikely that there will be any effort from the US to oust Russia and encourage a secular and democratic Syria. Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy includes a history of capitulating to the central powerbrokers for Syria’s future. Trump has bowed to many Russian demands in ongoing negotiations to end the war in Ukraine, and has openly sought closer ties with Moscow. He has staunchly supported Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s resumption of the Gaza war against Hamas, and gave cover for Israel’s violation of the January 2025 ceasefire agreement. While Trump went against Netanyahu to pull back the sanctions on Syria, he did so instead at the request of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia who will likely benefit from the deal. No doubt a victory for Syria, the US dropped all prior demands and received no known concessions in exchange. Lastly, during his first term in 2018, Trump pulled US troops from the SDF-controlled northeast Syria at the behest of Turkey. Although a continued Russian presence at Tartus and Hmeimim run counter to US and European interests, this is unlikely to be a priority for Trump.

Enter Europe

If there is any chance to rein in Sharaa’s Islamist and authoritarian tendencies, it appears to only be Europe that can do so. The United Kingdom and leading EU states including France and Germany do not hold the same cards as Russia and the US but do have substantial leverage of their own. Europe is the gateway to the global economy. In lieu of US engagement, it can relinquish many of Syria’s barriers to international commerce. Syria needs cash more than anything. It cannot afford to pursue economic cooperation with a Russian economy that is itself largely cutoff from the world due to its invasion of Ukraine. Europe can offer Sharaa debt cancellation should he strengthen protections for the rights of women and minorities, and amend the interim constitution to do so. If Syria’s new leaders lawfully participate in the global economy, Europe can invest in Syria’s private sector and university system.

With the Damascus government yet to establish sovereignty across the entire country, Europe is well suited to address humanitarian needs in rural parts of the south and east. It is true that dramatic increases in European defense spending in response to Trump’s changing posture on NATO and Ukraine, in addition to his shuttering of USAID, have drastically reduced humanitarian funding globally. However, European donors and NGOs established a substantial presence in Syria during the civil war and remain far and away Syria’s greatest source for humanitarian assistance. Collaboration with Europe would allow tremendous progress on education, healthcare, economic livelihood and countering violent extremism. No such capacity could be provided by Russia. While the humanitarian principles prevent Europe from withholding aid as a deterrent, it can certainly scale up the response if Sharaa ensures a secure environment for NGOs to support the immense needs of the Syrian people.

Europe is also in a position to work with Syria on its security challenges. While arms sales are off the table for the foreseeable future, this could be deferred to Turkey who has already supported HTS and aims to continue doing so. Rather, it is achieving a sustainable solution to the ISIS question where Europe can lend its greatest support. HTS fought ISIS in 2014, and a resurgence of the hardline extremists would threaten Syria’s desire for economic stability and reintegration in the region. In addition to sleeper cells throughout the country posing an ongoing risk, SDF-run prisons in the northeast house some 10,000 alleged ISIS fighters. An additional 45,000 women and children alleged to be affiliated with the group are also detained in sprawling camps. The failure to rehabilitate and reintegrate low-risk persons and properly adjudicate those who committed crimes remains the greatest threat to the country’s future.

A history of prison breaks and the recent disruption in funding to SDF detention facilities due to Trump’s overseas aid cuts have shown that mass incarceration of ISIS fighters is not a long-term option. Europe can leverage its assistance to establish a more reliable, state-run prison system for former fighters and work with the UN to establish an effective, impartial judicial system. This would include a yearslong, comprehensive process to assess the risk of detained individuals and ensure the capacity of judges, prosecutors and lawyers to try former combatants of crimes committed during the caliphate, including those of sexual violence. This should require changes to the interim constitution’s flawed judicial setup. The Syrian people have suffered considerably at the hands of ISIS, and taking these actions would be an essential step to close that chapter. While reintegration of low-risk individuals may be unpopular at first, it is essential for a safe and stable Syria to emerge.

The final core area where Europe can play a role is in mediating border tension with Israel. From the moment the Assad regime collapsed, Israel undertook an air campaign to destroy military equipment with the stated intent of avoiding it falling into the hands of extremists. Israeli forces also extended their occupation past the Golan Heights and the neutral buffer zone, at least 12 kilometers into Syrian territory. Israel has since established nine outposts with no apparent intention to withdraw. It has set unrealistic terms dictating Syria’s sovereignty of its own territory, threatening any Syrian forces that deploy south of Damascus.

Israel’s Red Line

Israel certainly believes its intervention is justified. Sharaa once stated before taking power that “we will not only reach Damascus, but, Allah permitting, Jerusalem will be awaiting our arrival.” Israel preferred an Assad regime weakened by over a decade of war and the accompanying financial hardship. It could strike as needed to reduce weapon flows to Hezbollah in Lebanon and limit Iranian meddling on its northern border. It therefore sees the possibility of a rearming Islamist government in Damascus as a threat both politically and militarily. But concerns of Sharaa’s current trajectory aside, it is an insufficient justification to inhibit the Syrian people’s right to self-determination. Furthermore, Israel’s latest actions may actually increase the likelihood of confrontation with Syria and foster resentment for future generations.

For his part, Sharaa owes some credit to Israel for weakening Iran and Hezbollah – although he’s unlikely to admit it. Its actions deprived Assad of the critical support he needed to contest HTS’s 2024 offensive. As for Israel, Sharaa can keep Iran and Hezbollah out of Syria – no doubt also a priority for the Gulf states who will be engaged in postwar reconstruction. The two neighbors do not need to like each other to mutually benefit. Europe can use its leverage to facilitate this, including brokering an agreement concerning the shared border. Syria could commit to withhold aggression against Israel, prevent extremists groups from using its territory, and keep Iran out. In response, Israel would have to revoke its support for Russian retention of Tartus and Hmeimim, suspend its air campaign and withdraw from Syrian territory. A formal agreement is the only sustainable solution. It is not logical for the Israeli government to infer that it can force Syria to be a quasi-state forever.

Challenges and Opportunities for Peace

With much to be gained by Russia and the considerable commitment required by Europe there is reason to be skeptical. Russia still has the ultimate trump card: Assad’s asylum in Moscow. Although unlikely to give him up, it remains a possibility in which they could receive substantial compensation. For Israel, it faces no legitimate Syrian military threat at the moment and has no desire to in the future. Europe has been unable to leverage even the most basic policy changes in Israel’s deadly war in Gaza. This raises real questions about its ability to mediate an Israeli withdrawal from the newly occupied areas inside Syria. Israel will also stand firm against any state seeking to arm and rebuild a new Syrian military which includes former jihadists. Concerning Europe, it might be expected that any authoritarian acts by Sharaa’s government – forewarned in the interim constitution – will result in a withdrawal of support. Not without visible evidence of progress can any substantial cooperation be established. The will in European capitals to undertake such an endeavor is far from certain.

However, one major factor remains. The Syrian people have no appetite to replace an old authoritarian leader with a new one. After more than 13 years of civil war and decades more of repression, they will have a low tolerance for overreach by new leadership. Many Syrians shed blood to reach this moment, not just HTS. If the worst case scenarios of Sharaa’s constitution come to be, he will no doubt face public pushback to the level that his fledgling security state can ill afford. While he may be willing to make amends with Russia, it is unlikely that the Syrian people will. Moscow can neither be trusted nor relied on. Sharaa requested Assad’s return from Russia as part of an agreement to keep its bases but Moscow denied him. While Russia would prefer to avoid doing so to reassure its other client state leaders that it will not sell them out, this proves to Sharaa that they are unwilling to pay a high price to keep the bases. For Turkey, it will rearm and train the new Syrian military, and invest heavily in reconstruction to affirm its access. There is little that Israel can do to stop this. Israel’s best chance at stability is to avoid inflaming tensions with its new neighbor.

Looking Forward

Europe must reimagine Syria’s role in its strategic response to Russian aggression globally, including in Ukraine. Afterall, Putin’s preoccupation with Ukraine prevented Russia from allocating support to an Assad regime it had grown tired of propping up. Yet the Tartus and Hmeimim bases have allowed Russia to conduct destabilizing operations far beyond Ukraine and Syria. Success in diminishing its regional influence will have major repercussions for Russia’s ability to support the war effort in Ukraine and impede its meddling in Africa – even if it finds alternatives in Libya. Given his about-face to abandon Assad, Putin’s record should prove to Sharaa that he is not one to be relied on.

It is not a stretch for European leaders to see the interconnection of these two conflicts. An aggressive strategy that keeps Russia out of Syria will have a long-term contribution to international peace and security. Even if there are imperfections along the way, the UK and EU will find that there is far more to be gained by engaging the new Syrian government and preventing it from becoming a Russian-backed, Islamist, authoritarian state. The fall of Assad presented a momentous opportunity. But powers are shifting, and Europe stands alone in upholding a democratic international system. Syria now has the chance to be a part of that system. While Russian military and economic assistance may be appealing in the immediate term, it can not compare to the long-term stability that a partnership with Europe can bring. Sharaa will see that there is substantial room for Islam in a secular democracy. On the other hand, he will quickly encounter great difficulty in establishing and maintaining an Islamic state in a multi-religious country still recovering from the legacy of ISIS.

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Editors

Julia Bails, Managing Editor

Jacqueline Tong, Copy Editor