27 Years After “The Troubles,” Northern Ireland Remains at the Intersection of Religion and Politics

Although the April 1998 peace deal known as the Good Friday Agreement was supposed to have resolved the conflict in Northern Ireland, more recent political developments such as Brexit have brought the conflict to the forefront once again. The changing political landscape in the United Kingdom affected Northern Ireland dramatically, which has reignited long-standing tensions between unionists (those who prefer to remain part of the UK) and nationalists (those who want to reunite with the Republic of Ireland). Historically, Catholics in Northern Ireland experienced discrimination among the Protestant majority, leading to a “Catholic civil rights movement” in the 1960s, which “faced a harsh response from the government and police.” A central question regarding the conflict in Northern Ireland is whether it has been more of an issue of religion (Catholics versus Protestants), or one of political and social identity (unionists versus nationalists), or if both are equally important in constructing the identities of the country’s divided population. 

The Troubles (1960s-1998), Provisional IRA, and Brexit 

One of the first major events in Northern Ireland during the Troubles was Bloody Sunday in 1972. During a demonstration in the Bogside (predominantly Catholic) neighborhood of the city of Derry (known as Londonderry to members of Northern Ireland’s Protestant community), in which Catholics protested the British policy of the internment of suspected Irish nationalists, British Army paratroopers opened fire on the crowd, killing thirteen. This act of violence sparked protests across the whole of Ireland (for example, protestors in Dublin set the British embassy on fire). Arguably, the most recognizable name to emerge from the Troubles was the Provisional Irish Republican Army (Provisional IRA or PIRA)––a terrorist organization aiming to unite Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland and bring an end to British rule of Northern Ireland (in 1981, a spokesperson for PIRA outlined the group’s main goals, one of which was to “force a British withdrawal from Ireland and to establish a Democratic Socialist Republic”). A secondary goal was to “maintain the allegiance of the Catholic population in Northern Ireland and the Republic,” the group’s “primary support community.” PIRA also acknowledged that it was incapable of “directly” challenging the British military, so the group utilized “terrorism and insurgent violence” as a way to further its goals. 

The Troubles ended with the 1998 peace deal known as the Good Friday Agreement. The deal created a new power-sharing situation between unionists and nationalists in the country through the establishment of the Northern Ireland Assembly, which would have the power to make some decisions that had once been made by the British government in London. However, the Good Friday Agreement did not mark an official end to the hostilities in Northern Ireland, and after an approximately twenty-year period of relative calm, early 2021 saw a rise in tension and violence within the country, as a result of the United Kingdom leaving the European Union, which raised many new questions about the future of Northern Ireland. As a result of Brexit, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland would face a stark divide—one would no longer remain in the EU, creating a new and unsettling question of division at the border. In March and April 2021, Northern Ireland experienced its worst street violence in years, perpetrated mostly by unionist (pro-UK) youths against police officers. The violence began in the city of Derry (the site of Bloody Sunday in 1972) on March 29, and on April 7, the fighting spilled over a “peace wall” in the western part of Belfast that divides the Catholic and Protestant communities. Police officers were attacked, along with a press photographer, and a bus was hijacked and burned. According to the BBC, the violence was mainly “concentrated in areas where criminal gangs linked to loyalist paramilitaries have significant influence.” 

The Post-Brexit Conflict: Northern Ireland Protocol, Windsor Framework, and DUP Deal 

Many unionists were angered over the Northern Ireland Protocol, a product of Brexit, which was created in early 2021 to establish new checks on goods from Great Britain entering Northern Ireland’s ports, even if the goods remained in Northern Ireland. Unionists viewed this as unfair, as now Northern Ireland would be treated as distinctly separate from Great Britain. Essentially, unionists felt that the Protocol and the new regulatory border were cutting them off from the rest of the UK in favor of keeping an open border with Ireland. Part of the Good Friday Agreement stated that there should be an open border between the two Irelands, which, at the time, was not an issue, since both were members of the EU. Brexit complicated this, however, and a new arrangement was needed. 

The Windsor Framework was adopted by both the UK and the EU in 2023 as an amendment to the Protocol. The Framework established two “lanes” for goods entering Northern Ireland from Great Britain—a “green lane” for goods remaining within Northern Ireland (which are not subject to additional checks), and a “red lane” for goods that may continue into the EU (which are subject to checks). This allowed for a smoother flow of goods within the UK and removed the need for checks on goods entering and remaining in Northern Ireland, as the Protocol had required. 

January 2024 saw the appointment of Sinn Féin member Michelle O’Neill to the position of Northern Ireland’s first minister, the first Irish nationalist to ever hold the role. This followed the Democratic Unionist Party’s boycott of power-sharing in the Northern Irish government for two years over post-Brexit trade rules, specifically those that made unionists feel more separated from Great Britain. The DUP and UK government unveiled a deal that eased these concerns, which “la[id]out several new measures aimed at simplifying domestic imports and encouraging trade between” Northern Ireland and Great Britain, according to the BBC. Additionally, the deal aimed to diminish checks and paperwork for goods coming from the rest of the UK into Northern Ireland. 

The Demographics of Brexit in Northern Ireland

To better understand the conflict in Northern Ireland after Brexit, it’s useful to look at the Brexit vote and how it connects to growing interest in Irish unity. In the June 2016 referendum, 55.8 percent of Northern Ireland voted to stay in the EU, though most unionists supported leaving. The results of the referendum ignited calls for a “border poll,” in which voters in both Northern and the Republic of Ireland could vote in a referendum for unity. The EU has stated that if unity were to occur, Northern Ireland would automatically regain its membership in the bloc. 

Today, the argument in favor of unity relates strongly to economics. The EU has given nearly $800 million to Northern Ireland every year to support “agricultural projects, economic growth, cultural development, and peace initiatives.” The open border with the Republic “facilitates annual exports worth 3.4 billion pounds ($4.4 billion),” and it has even been said that peace efforts in the 1990s were aided by “the elimination of economic barriers across Britain and Ireland.”

However, religion and politics are still intertwined in Northern Ireland as a result of Brexit. While over 85 percent of those identifying as nationalist, Irish, and Catholic voted to remain in the EU, about two-thirds of unionist, Protestant, British identifiers voted to leave the bloc. There existed a strong correlation between Catholic, Irish nationalists wishing to remain part of the EU and Protestant, British unionists wishing to leave it. Additionally, “two thirds of all respondents believe[d]that Northern Ireland should have ‘special status’ after exit,” which would mean that “the relationship between Northern Ireland and the EU would be closer than the relationship that Britain would have with the EU.” 

The concern over the creation of a “hard border” was central in Northern Ireland after Brexit. Law enforcement officials feared that a hard border post-Brexit would present security risks, since during the Troubles “the border regions were considered ‘bandit country,’ with smugglers and gunrunners” and checkpoints “were frequently the site of conflict, especially between British soldiers and militant nationalist groups.” Economic fears over Northern Ireland’s departure from the EU are not unfounded. Northern Ireland’s economic development has been “crucial” to helping the country find lasting peace. People living in border communities also fear the logistical difficulties of customs checkpoints, claiming that a hard border would negatively affect their daily lives greatly. Economic inequality between Catholics and Protestants remains an issue in Northern Ireland that requires attention in order to maintain peace. Various studies “indicate that the historically poorest areas in Northern Ireland”––those that experienced the worst effects of the Troubles––“remain so and that many of the areas considered to be the most deprived are predominantly Catholic.” This suggests why a majority of Catholics voted in favor of remaining part of the EU, which has assisted Northern Ireland economically, although interestingly, socioeconomic status did not matter much; there was “little variation between how working class, less well-educated Catholics voted compared to middle class, more highly educated Catholics.” Ultimately, while religion will likely always remain part of the conflict in Northern Ireland, in the post-Brexit landscape economics seem to take precedence—however, this comes as both related to and unrelated to religious identity.

Editors

Pau Torres Pagès, Managing Editor

Kyla Bernal, Copy Editor

Nicole Monette

Nicole Monette (she/her) is a second-year master’s student in the Global Journalism and European & Mediterranean Studies program. She graduated in May 2022 with a Master of Science in Global Affairs from NYU, where she completed her thesis on plausible scenarios for the trajectory of the war in Ukraine. As a Global Affairs student, she was a member of a consulting project in conjunction with the UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee researching the political climate in Afghanistan following the U.S. withdrawal in 2021. She was also the Managing Editor of Global Affairs Review, the student journal of NYU’s Center for Global Affairs. Before returning to NYU, she spent eight months in Rome and Milan studying Italian at an intensive language school. She is currently researching issues related to youth unemployment and depopulation in southern Italy, specifically the regions of Calabria and Sicily.